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STATE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME
FROM A MULTISTATE BUSINESS
PAUL J. HARTMAN*

THE PROBLEM, ITS SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE
So long as we have a federal system of government, a continuing
problem, and certainly one of the most pressing, is that of an effective
coordination of taxes. That problem has achieved paramount importance in late years. Because of new and expanding conceptions as to
what governments should do for people, our state governments are
continually confronted with ever-increasing demands that they provide additional governmental functions and supply more governmental services. The resulting increase in governmental activities
and extension of benefits mean urgent needs for additional revenue.
As prices have spiraled under the increasing pressure of meeting
our domestic and foreign civilian and military commitments, the
revenue problem grows more acute. It is costing the states and local
governments more money to do their existing jobs, to say nothing of
shouldering additional responsibilities. From a total expenditure by
state governments in 1944 of a little over $5 billion the amount has
soared to a total of in excess of $24 billion in the fiscal year 1957an increase of almost 500%. 1 State tax collections have also risen
constantly. Between 1944 and 1959 there was an increase from
slightly over $4 billion to $15.8 billion, or an increase of upward of
400%.2 Local taxes total about the same amount as state taxes.3 That
means that the states and their political subdivisions collected over
$31.5 billion in fiscal 1959. The states have understandably persisted
in their efforts to get some return for the benefits they have conferred
upon all business transacted within their borders, whether it be local
business or interstate operations.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee, Virginia
and West Virginia Bars; member, ABA Subcommittee, Personal Property,
Sales & Use, and Franchise Taxes; author, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce (1953). The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Kenneth L. Roberts of the Vanderbilt Law School for his assistance in the
preparation of this article-especially his statutory research found in connection with the materials dealing with the net income tax structures of all
the states. The author also wishes to express his indebtedness to vr. Donald
W. Pemberton, a senior at the Vanderbilt Law School, for his research assistance.

1. For the 1944 expenditures, see

HIsTORICAL STATISTICS ON STATE AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 1902-1953 19 (1955),

issued by the United

States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. For the 1957 expenditures, see Cor'mrium OF STATE GOVERNAENT FINANCES N 1957 1 (1958),
issued by the same agency.
2. For the tax collection for 1944, see HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 1902-1953, supra note 1, at 1. For the 1959 tax
collections, see 20 CCH STATE TAX REV. No. 35 at p. 1 (Sept. 3, 1959).
3. Ibid.
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On the other side of the coin, the federal government is saddled
with staggering military and civilian expenditure obligations both
at home and aboard. The maintenance of a high rate of economic
activity with resultant tremendous revenue yields remains a grim
necessity. It is of vital importance, therefore, that our national economy not be strangled with tax barriers that will prevent optimum
employment and production. The economic well-being of our nation,
from which our gigantic amounts of revenue must come, furnishes
urgent and impelling reason for insistence against action by one state
to gain fiscal advancement at a cost that is too great for the economic
health of sister states and the federal government. A wise reconciliation of these conflicting and competing demands of the state and
national interests is imperative.
Moreover, if one state in order to supply her fiscal needs or promote
the commercial and economic well-being of her citizens may shield
them from competition from sister states by the taxing process, we
have opened a Pandora's box of troubles in the nature of reprisals
and trade wars that were meant to be averted by subjecting com4
merce among the states to the power of the federal government.
Each new means of production and transportation has generated
commerce and due process clause controversy relative to the taxing
power of the states. Such controversies, of course, are unavoidable
under our federal system. As a result, very real and troublesome
problems have been encountered by the Supreme Court of the United
States as an arbiter in balancing the competing tax demands of the
states and freedom of commerce and trade across state borders, the
desire for which was one of the chief motivating forces that welded
the several states into a nation and the benefits of which are among
the greatest bulwarks of our strength.5 Later, we will consider the
issue whether the Supreme Court alone can successfully exercise
the control required for the mutual accommodation of national
interests in commercial freedom and state revenue needs.
There was a time when state and local taxes were perhaps only a
minor factor in determining where a new business would locate and
were probably not seriously considered in connection with most
locational decisions. In recent years, however, because of the need
for additional revenue on the part of state and local governments
and the resulting increases in varieties and amounts of taxes, business must give more attention to the question of state and local taxes
4. THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 7, 11, 22 (Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST, No.
(Madison); MADISON, DEBATES IN TnE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 10,
(1920); 1 ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 106-18 (2d
1888); 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 308 (rev.

42

11
ed.
ed.

1937); id. at 478, 547-48.
5. Ibid. See address by Justice Stone, Fifty Years' Work of the United
States Supreme Court, 14 A.B.A.J. 428, 430 (1928).
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in deciding where to locate and operate.6
In this discussion of state taxation of corporate income from multistate operations, we will include taxes involving net income of a corporation as well as taxes involving gross income. Also, this discussion
will cover any general tax on corporations that reaches income as a
basis for its computation, whether the tax is levied directly on that
income or whether the income is used only as a measure for computing
the amount of the tax, the legislatively designated subject of the tax
being some activity or event having to do with the corporate operations. This latter type of tax would include such exactions as franchise
and business taxes measured by corporate income.
The limitations upon taxation of corporate income imposed by the
commerce and due process clauses will be discussed somewhat fully.
There will be a survey of the tax structure of each of the fifty states
insofar as their taxes reach corporate net income from multistate
business. Some attention will be given to the tax statutes reaching
corporate gross income. Our endeavors also will include discussions
of the various steps that have been taken to untangle the tangled
skein of state taxation of corporate income from multistate operations,
as well as other proposals that have been made for that purpose.
That the problem of the commerce and due process clause curbs
on state taxation of corporate income from multistate operations is
of tremendous current importance can easily be shown by the fact
that during the last term of the United States Supreme Court, the
Court made decisions in connection with no less than six important
7
cases dealing with that subject.
PART ONE: TAXATION OF NET INCOME
I. The Commerce And Due Process Clause Limitations On

Net Income Taxes.
A. The Northwestern-StockhamDecision
No decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in recent
years in the field of state and local taxes has caused such consternation among the taxpayers and their counsel as has the Northwestern6. See Hendricks, The Influence of State and Local Taxes on Locational
Decisions, PROCED. FIFTIETH ANN. CONF. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 191 (1957). Mr.
Hendricks is Manager, Tax Department, Proctor and Gamble Company at
Cincinnati, Ohio.
7. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) (two cases); ET &WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N. C. 560, 104 S.E.2d
403, ajfd per curiam, 359 U.S. 28 (1959); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot,
236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. den., 359 U.S. 984 (1959); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958),

appeal dismissed and cert. den., 359 U.S. 28 (1959); Railway Express Agency,

Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
this article.

Each of these cases will be discussed in
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Stockham decision. 8 That case held that the interdictory force of
neither the commerce clause nor the due process clause of the federal
constitution denies to a state the power to impose a nondiscriminatory
excise tax on the net income of a foreign corporation where the
income is earned within the borders of the taxing state, although
the income is earned from exclusively interstate commerce. So
great was the impact of this decision that no less than ten separate
proposals were dropped in the legislative hopper of Congress to
limit in some fashion the scope of this decision. 9 One bill was enacted
into law, being signed by the President on September 14, 1959.10 The
Northwestern-Stockham decision consolidated two cases, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc. The facts of these two cases are
relatively simple.
The Northwestern States Portland Cement Company (taxpayer)
was an Iowa corporation with its home office and manufacturing
plant in Iowa. A Minnesota tax was involved in the case. Taxpayer
leased a sales office in Minnesota but never qualified to do business
in that state. Two salesmen and a secretary occupied the sales office
and two additional salesmen used it as a clearing house. The taxpayer
owned no real estate in Minnesota, warehoused no merchandise there
and maintained no bank account in the taxing state. Taxpayer's
activities in the taxing state consisted of a regular and systematic
course of solicitation of orders for the sale of its products there. All
orders received by the salesmen in Minnesota were transmitted to
the home office in Iowa for acceptance or rejection, and all merchandise was shipped from the Iowa plant direct to the Minnesota customers. Forty-eight percent of the taxpayer's total sales were made
to Minnesota customers. Minnesota imposed an annual tax upon the
net income of both residents and nonresidents. One of the four classes
taxed by the Minnesota statute is that of domestic and foreign corporations whose business within the state during the taxable year
consists exclusively of foreign commerce, interstate commerce, or
both. Minnesota's taxing statute utilizes a three-factor formula in
determining the portion of net income taxable under its law." The
8. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). This case has been the subject of the following comments: Cox,
Impact of the Stockham Decision, 37 TAxEs 299 (1959); Note, 47 CALiF. L. REV.
388 (1959); Note, 33 TUL. L. REv. 870 (1959); Note, 12 VAND. L. REV. 908 (1959);
Note, 2 Wm. & M. L. REV. 223 (1959); 30 Miss. L. J. 324 (1959); 57 Mcn. L.
REv. 903 (1959).
9. The following numbered bills were introduced: S. 2281, H.R. 8019, H.R.
7715, H.R. 7757, H.R.J. Res. 431, H.R. 7773; S. 2213, H.R. 7894; E.R.J.
Res. 450, H.R. 8061, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
10. Pub. L. 86-272 (1959), 73 Stat. 555. This law will be discussed in some
detail later in this article.
11. lVnu. STAT. § 290.19 (1945). Minnesota's apportionment formula will be
examined somewhat more in detail later.
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first factor is that of the taxpayer's sales assignable to the taxing
state during the year to its total sales during that period made everywhere; the second, that of the taxpayer's total tangible property in the
taxing state for the year to its total tangible property used in the
business that year wherever situated. The third ratio is the taxpayer's
total payroll in the taxing state for the year to its total payroll for its
entire business in the like period.
The taxpayer in the Stockham Valves and Fittings case was a Delaware corporation with its principal office and plant in Alabama. A
Georgia tax was involved in the case. Taxpayer maintained a salesservice office in Georgia which-served five states. This office was headquarters for one salesman who devoted about one-third of his time
to solicitation of orders in Georgia. A full-time woman secretary
was also employed there. All orders solicited by the salesmen in
Georgia were transmitted to the Alabama home office for approval
and were shipped from that office to Georgia customers. Other than
office equipment, supplies and advertising literature, the taxpayer
had no property in Georgia, stored no merchandise there, and deposited no funds there. From one to two percent of taxpayer's total
sales originated in Georgia. A Georgia statute levies a tax on net
incomes received by every corporation, foreign or domestic, owning
property or doing business in the state. The statute defines "doing
business" as including any activities or transactions carried on within
the state for the purpose of financial profit or gain, regardless of its
connection with interstate commerce. To apportion the net income
attributable to Georgia for tax purposes, the statute applies a threefactor ratio based on inventory, wages and gross receipts.1
In the Northwestern States case, as well as in the Stockham Valve
case, the taxpayer resisted the tax on both due process clause and
commerce clause grounds. Both cases were consolidated for decision
and only one opinion was written for both cases. Over both the
commerce clause and the due process clause objections, the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained the taxes in both cases by a six
to three vote. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion for the majority of the Court, consisting of five justices. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Whittaker, with whom
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Stewart joined, dissented.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
1. The Commerce Clause Question.-The Court squarely and forthrightly recognized that the question presented in these two cases was
whether a net income tax could be imposed upon that portion of a
foreign corporation's net income earned from, and fairly apportioned
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (1937). Georgia's apportionment formula will
be examined somewhat more in detail later.
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to, business activities within the taxing state when those activities are
exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce. 13 No question
was before the Court in either case as to the reasonableness of the
apportionment of net income for tax purposes under the statutory
formulas. Two passages from the Court's opinion, when taken together, seem fairly to express the pith and substance of the holding,
sustaining the taxes. Near the beginning of the opinion the Court
declared: "We conclude that net income from the interstate operations
of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided
the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local
activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support
the same."'14 Later in the opinion the Court stated the rationale of
some of the supporting authorities in this fashion: "These cases stand
for the doctrine that the entire net income of a corporation, generated
by intrastate as well as interstate activities, may be fairly apportioned
among the States for tax purposes by formulas utilizing in-state aspects
of interstate affairs."'15
Through the Northwestern-Stockham opinion seem to run three
main themes: (1) Interstate commerce should bear its just share of
state tax burdens in return for the benefits it derives from activities
within the State; (2) State taxes on net income should be sustained
when they do not discriminate against interstate commerce, either by
giving local business a direct commercial advantage, and do not subject interstate commerce to multiple tax burdens which will place that
commerce at a disadvantage relative to local business; and (3) These
challenged taxes are not prohibited levies upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The Court's opinion makes these three propositions clear. It reasoned that while "it is true that a State may not erect a wall around
its borders preventing commerce an entry,"'16 nevertheless the
founders of the Constitution "did not intend to immunize such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the state government
in return for the benefits it derives from within the State."' 7 These
taxes, thought the Court, did not discriminate against either corporation (the taxpayers) nor did they subject either to an undue burden.
Since the taxes were apportioned to income fairly attributable to the
taxing state, there were no burdens not borne by local business.
Moreover, the taxes were not regarded as privilege taxes based on
the doing exclusively interstate business in the taxing states. The
13. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,

452 (1959).

14.
15.
16.
17.

Ibid.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 461-62.
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fact that the taxing states are left to collect only through ordinary
means was thought to remove any objection that the exactions compel the taxpayers to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. The payment of these taxes was thus not made a condition
precedent to the right to carry on business, including interstate commerce. The Court was confronted with the Spector case, 18 which struck
down a tax imposed upon the privilege of engaging in exclusively
interstate commerce, using net income as the measure. Spector was
distinguished on the ground that the Northwestern-Stockham taxes
were levied "on" the net income from commerce that was exclusively
interstate, while the Spector tax was imposed "on" the privilege of
engaging in exclusively interstate commerce, with the net income
being used only as the measure of the tax.
The majority of the Court in the Northwestern-Stockham decision
believed that the matter was controlled by the rationale of several
earlier cases involving income taxes. The decision of Peck & Co. v.
Lowe,' 9 was thought to point the way. In the Lowe case, it was held
that the federal income tax on net income derived from exportation
of goods was not a tax on exported goods, so as to violate the Constitutional prohibition against a federal tax or duty on articles exported
from any state. The Lowe Court thought that, at most, exportation
would be affected only indirectly and remotely. By analogy, the
Northwestern-Stockham Court thought that a state tax on net income
derived from interstate commerce is not a forbidden tax on interstate
commerce itself. The Court was also influenced by the case of U. S.
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,20 which was the first case in the Supreme Court applying that doctrine to sustain state taxes levied on
net income from interstate commerce.
The Court has almost always thought that the difference between
a tax on gross income and a tax on net income from interstate operations called for a different result when resisted on commerce clause
grounds. A tax on gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion to its magnitude, irrespective of whether it is profitable. On the
other hand, a tax on net income does not arise unless a gain is shown
over expenses and losses.
The following language of the Glue opinion is pertinent in pointing
out what the Court has long regarded as the distinction between a
valid tax levied on net income from interstate commerce and a forbidden tax levied on the gross receipts from that commerce.
The difference in effect between a tax measured by gross receipts and
one measured by net income, recognized by our decisions, is manifest
18. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
19. 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
20. 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
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and substantial, and it affords a convenient and workable basis of distinction between a direct and immediate burden upon the business
affected and a charge that is only indirect and incidental. A tax upon
gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion to its magnitude and
irrespective of whether it is profitable or otherwise. Conceivably it may
be sufficient to make the difference between profit and loss, or to so
diminish the profit as to impede or discourage the conduct of the commerce. A tax upon the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since
it does not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses
and losses, and the tax cannot be heavy unless the profits are large. Such
a tax, when imposed upon net incomes from whatever source arising, is
but a method of distributing the cost of government, like a tax upon
property, or upon franchises treated as property; and if there be no discrimination against interstate commerce, either in the admeasurement of
the tax or in the means adopted for enforcing it, it constitutes one of
the ordinary and general burdens of government, from which persons
and corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the States are
not exempted by the Federal Constitution because they happen to be
engaged in commerce among the States. 2 1
In support of the Northwestern-Stockham decision, the Court also
cited cases other than the Glue decision where the Court had previously sustained a tax on the net income of domestic corporations,2
or where the Northwestern-Stockham Court thought the foreign corporation had established a commercial domicile, 23 although the income
was derived in part from interstate commerce. The fact that the corporation was a domestic one, or had acquired a commercial domicile in
the taxing state, was not thought to be controlling, as is shown by
the fact that the Court also had sustained taxes on net income from
interstate commerce where the taxpaying corporation was not a
domiciliary of the taxing state, was not incorporated there, and did
not have its principal place of business in the taxing state. Thus,
state franchise taxes reaching net income for the privilege of doing
business were sustained to the extent they were apportioned to the
business done within the taxing state by a foreign corporations in
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 4 and Norfolk
& Western R. Co. v. North Carolina.25 Sustaining the assessment of
New York's franchise tax measured on a proportional formula against
a British corporation selling ale in New York, the Court had held in
the Bass case that it did not violate the commerce clause to attribute
to New York a just proportion of the profits earned by the taxed corporation from the sales, although part of the business was interstate
commerce. In the Norfolk & Western case, North Carolina had been
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 328-29.
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
266 U.S. 271 (1924).
297 U.S. 682 (1936).
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permitted to tax a Virginia corporation on net income apportioned to
North Carolina on the basis of mileage within the state, which was
the formula designed to attribute a portion of the interstate hauls to
the taxing state.
After examining the foregoing cases sustaining taxes on net income
from interstate commerce where the taxpayer was a domestic corporation, as well as cases sustaining the tax where the taxpayer was a
foreign corporation, carrying on substantial interstate and local activity in the taxing state, the Northwestern-Stockham opinion draws
this conclusion: "These cases stand for the doctrine that the entire net
income of a corporation, generated by interstate as well as intrastate
activities, may be fairly apportioned among the states for tax purposes
26
by formulas utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs."
The Court thought that any doubt as to the validity of the taxes in
the Northwestern-Stockham case was entirely removed by the unanimous per curiam opinion in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan.27 In
that case California had applied her apportioned net income tax to a
foreign corporation, not qualified to do business in California, whose
only connection with California was through its salesmen, who
solicited orders which were filled at the extrastate offices of the taxpayer. Taxpayer had four solicitors employed in the taxing state
on a full time basis. They were authorized to receive payments on
orders taken by them, to collect delinquent accounts and to make adjustments of customer complaints. These salesmen occupied space in
offices of California attorneys in return for use of the taxpayer's books
stored in the offices. These offices were advertised in legal newspapers,
published and circulated in the taxing state, as the offices of the taxpayer. On these facts the Northwestern-Stockham Court found no
local commerce in the West Publishing case and treated the case as
holding that an apportioned tax on net income may be imposed on a
foreign corporation doing a business that is exclusively interstate. The
Court thought the West Publishing case was "not grounded on the
triviality that office space was given"' to taxpayer's solicitors by the
attorneys in the taxing state.
The Northwestern-Stockham opinion thus makes it clear that it
will sustain a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on net income from
commerce that is exclusively interstate. However, the Court requires
that the net income from the interstate operations be fairly apportioned to activities within the taxing state so that the same income
would not be subjected to taxation by another state, thus resulting in
26. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
460 (1959).
27. 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
28. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
461 (1959).
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multiple tax burdens to which income from local business would not
be subjected. By following this procedure, the taxing state can reach
only its fair share of the interstate operations with its tax. It will be
recalled that neither of the objecting taxpayers in the NorthwesternStockham decision raised any question as to the reasonableness of
the apportionment of the net income under the statutory formulas
employed by the taxing states. Hence, there was no showing that the
taxed income was subject to a tax by another state. A possible risk
of a multiple tax burden was not considered enough to call for the
invalidity of the tax. The following excerpt from the Court's opinion
makes it plain that while the commerce clause requires an apportionment of the income to operations properly attributable to the
taxing state, nevertheless, the risk of tax duplication by another state
is not enough to render the tax inimical to the commerce clause; there
must be a showing of cumulative tax burdens on the same income:
While the economic wisdom of state net income taxes is one of state
policy not for our decision, one of the "realities" raised by the parties is
the possibility of a multiple burden resulting from the exactions in question. The answer is that none is shown to exist here. This is not an unapportioned tax which by its very nature makes interstate commerce
bear more than its fair share. As was said in Central Greyhound Lines v.
Mealey.. . "it is interstate commerce which the State is seeking to reach
and .

.

. the real question [is] whether what the State is exacting is a

constitutionally fair demand by the State for that aspect of the interstate
commerce to which the state bears a special relation." The apportioned
tax is designed to meet this very requirement and "to prevent the levying
of such taxes as will place the interstate commerce at a disadvantage
relative to local commerce." Id. at 670. Logically it is impossible, when
the tax is fairly apportioned, to have the same income taxed twice. In
practical operation, however, apportionment formulas being what they
are, the possibility of the contrary is not foreclosed, especially by levies
in domiciliary states. But that question is not before us . . . . There is
nothing to show that multiple taxation is present. In this type of case the
taxpayers must show that the formula places a burden upon interstate
9
commerce in a constitutional sense. This they have failed to do.2

This case seems to be the first occasion where the "multiple burdens" test of tax invalidity has been applied to net income taxes. A
little later, we will see that that doctrine has been applied when a
gross income tax was challenged on commerce clause grounds.
Also, when the "multiple burdens" test has been applied to taxes on
gross income, the levy has been invalidated on commerce clause
grounds when the taxpayer could show that there was a possibility
29. Id. at 462-63. Later, we will see that, at one time, the risk of a multiple
tax burden was enough to invalidate a tax under the commerce clause. E.g.,
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). The multiple
burdens doctrine is discussed in detail later.
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or risk that a tax on the same income could be repeated by another
state, thereby subjecting interstate commerce to cumulative tax
burdens not borne by local business. 30
2. The Due Process Clause Question.-Although the NorthwesternStockham tax craft sailed safely past the Scylla of the commerce
clause, it was still necessary to steer past the Charybdis of the due
process clause in order to reach the calm harbor of constitutionality.
As we know, the due process clause has long been recognized as a
limitation on state taxing power. The absence of any connection in
fact between the taxed commerce and the state is sufficient for invalidating a tax on due process grounds. 31 In sweeping due process
language the Court has declared that a "state may not tax real property or tangible personal property lying outside her borders; nor may
she lay an excise or privilege tax upon the exercise or enjoyment of
a right or privilege in another state derived from the laws of that
state and therein exercised and enjoyed. '32 Very briefly, then, due
process is concerned with whether the tax in practical operations has
relation to opportunities, benefits or protection conferred or afforded
by the taxing state on the taxpayer. In short, due process is concerned
with whether the taxing state has given to the taxpayer anything for
which it can impose a charge.3
In language that is plain and certain the Northwestern-Stockham
opinion gives short shrift to the due process clause objection to the
taxes in this excerpt:
Nor will the argument that the exactions contravene the Due Process
Clause bear scrutiny. The taxes imposed are levied only on that portion
of the taxpayer's net income which arises from its activities within the
taxing state. These activities form a sufficient "nexus" between such
a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is an exaction.
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co ..... It strains reality to say, in terms of
our decisions, that each of the corporations here was not sufficiently involved in local events to forge "some definite link, some minimum con30. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1949). The "multiple
burdens" doctrine as applied to gross income taxes is discussed in detail at
notes 271-82, infra. Moreover, the showing of the possibility of multiple
property taxes has been enough to find a violation of the due process clause.
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
31. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929). Even before the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, containing the due process clause, the Supreme
Court had imposed territorial limitations on the power of a state to tax. E.g.,
Case of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872);
Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868); Hays v. The Pacific
Mail S. S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
32. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 424 (1937).
33. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949);
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
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nection" sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. Miller Bros. v.
Maryland ....
The record is without conflict that both corporations engaged in substantial income-producing activity in the taxing States ...
As was said in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny Co., supra, the "controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask

return." Since by "the practical operation of [the] tax the state has
exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred ....

" it "is

free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarassed by the Constitution.. . ." Id. at 444.34

The exploitation of the market for the capture of profits, along with
the protection afforded by the state of the market during the process,
were enough for the state to demand something in return, thus satisfying the requisites of due process.
3. The Northwestern-Stockham Dissenting Opinions.-The three35
Justice dissent was of the opinion that the Northwestern-Stockham
taxes levied on the net income contravened the commerce clause since
the business in each instance was exclusively interstate commerce.
They thought the challenged taxes were laid directly on, and thereby
regulated, exclusively interstate commerce. Moreover, these dissenters
were of the persuasion that none of the cases relied on by the majority
were authority for upholding the questioned tax.
In a somewhat protracted effort to demolish the majority opinion,
this dissent first assails Peck & Co. v. Lowe,u which the majority
thought pointed the way to upholding the Northwestern-Stockham
tax, against the charge that it was levied on interstate commerce. As
we saw, the Lowe case involved a federal income tax upon the "entire
net income arising or accruing from all sources," 3 as applied to the
whole net income of the taxpayer, where three-fourths of his income
came from exporting goods. Over the objection that the federal tax
on the entire net income violated that provision of the Constitution
which prohibits the federal government from levying a tax on articles
exported, the Supreme Court upheld the tax. The Court was of the
opinion that the export clause only prohibited taxation of articles
in the course of exportation, and therefore a tax on the net income
received from the exporting business did not violate the constitutional
prohibition. The three Northwestern-Stockham dissenters were of
the opinion that the Lowe case did "not in any sense 'point the way'
for" upholding the Northwestern-Stockham tax on net income derived
34. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
464-65 (1959).
35. Id. at 477. Mr. Justice Whittaker, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and Mr. Justice Stewart joined, dissented.
36. 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
37. Id. at 172.
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from exclusively interstate commerce.1
To be sure, the Lowe case is not a "white horse" case, directly in
point. Nevertheless, if a tax imposed upon the entire net income from
a taxpayer whose income is derived, to a large extent, from the exporting business is not a constitutionally forbidden tax upon the exportation business, then by analogy, it seems somewhat persuasive
that a tax upon the net income from interstate commerce is not a
prohibited tax upon that commerce. In upholding the income tax, as
applied to the entire net income of the taxpayer in the Lowe case,
the Court treated the exaction as a constitutionally permissible "indirect burden" on the business of exporting. The Lowe opinion reasoned that "exportation is affected only indirectly and remotely. The
tax is levied after exportation is completed, after all expenses are paid
and losses adjusted, and after the recipient of the income is free to
use it as he chooses." 39 The Court that decided the Lowe case thus
uses exactly the same rationale which the Court has used over the
years to differentiate between valid state taxes imposed on net income,
which included income from interstate commerce, and invalid state
taxes levied on gross income, which included receipts from interstate
commerce. The state tax on the net income has been regarded as an
"indirect burden" on the interstate commerce and therefore not violative of the commerce clause, while the taxes on the gross receipts
have been treated as invalid "direct burdens" upon interstate commerce.40 Bearing in mind that the Constitution expressly prohibits
taxation of exports, while the interdictory force of the commerce
clause arises only by implication, perhaps the use of the Lowe analogy
by the majority in the Northwestern-Stockham decision is not as far
off base as the dissenters ostensibly think, when the majority states
that the Lowe case does point the way for upholding the tax.
This Northwestern-Stockham dissent then examines the cases relied
on by the majority, upholding apportioned state net income taxes,
where the taxpayers were engaged in interstate commerce that was
mingled with local business. The dissent concludes that these cases do
not hold that "exclusively interstate commerce may be taxed by a
state." 41 In fact, these dissenters go so far as to say expressly that
these cases "hold" the "contrary." 42 The first case analyzed is the U. S.
Glue case, which sustained a tax on net income "derived from transaction in interstate commerce," where it was apportioned to that "proportion of their (the taxpayers) income derived from business trans-

38. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
488 (1959).
39. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 175 (1918).
40. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1918).
41. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
488 (1959).
42. Id. at 488, 490.
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acted... within the State. '43 This case is explained by the dissent on
the ground that the tax was sustained because the apportionment
formula limited the tax to that part of the net income derived solely
from "intrastate commerce," and excluded the income from the "interstate" aspects of the multistate business 4 In short, the dissent seems
to say that "business transacted within the State" means only "local
business," although the Court expressly says that the income was
'45
Morederived, in part, from a "transaction in interstate commerce.
expressions.
two
over, the Glue opinion at no place equates the
The dissent makes essentially the same analysis of the Underwood
48
Typewriter case,46 the Bass case,47 the Beeler decision, and the Nor49
folk & Western case, as it did the Glue case. In all of those cases
the taxpayer's business consisted of both local and interstate business,
and in all of them a tax on net income was sustained where apportioned to earning within the state. In each case the dissent concludes,
however, that the tax was applied only to that income derived solely
from local business. The Beeler decision and possibly the Bass case
are correctly analyzed by the dissent,5° but there is serious question
as to the correctness of the dissent's analysis of the Glue case, the
Underwood Typewriter case and the Norfolk & Western decision.
The dissent's treatment of these last three cases raises the question,
what do these statutory apportionment formulas mean? Do they mean
apportionment between income from local and interstate commerce,
with the tax imposed only on net income from local business? Or do
these formulas simply segregate and tax that part of the total income,
including income from interstate commerce, that is fairly attributable
to the taxing state where the taxpayer did business? Neither the
statutory formulas nor the opinions in the Glue case, the Typewriter
case, nor the Norfolk & Western case indicate that the formulas
were designed to segregate and tax only the income from "local business." To illustrate, the Glue opinion, as we have just seen, designates
as taxable income the "net income derived from transactions in interstate commerce" apportioned to that "proportion of their (taxpayers')
43. U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326, 329 (1918).
44. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
489-90 (1959).
45. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326, 329 (1918).
46. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
47. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).

48. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
49. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682 (1936).
50. The Beeler statute taxed only the net earnings arising from business
done wholly within the state, expressly excluding earnings arising from interstate commerce. The Bass tax was levied on the privilege of doing business;
hence it would have to be confined to local business under a long line of

decisions represented by the Spector doctrine. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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income derived from business transacted . . . within the State."5 '
True, the Glue tax was imposed upon the net income of a domestic
corporation, but that does not appear to control the decision. Also,
taxes in other cases cited by the Court, including the Underwood
case, were levied upon the income of a foreign corporation. In sustaining the Underwood tax, which was imposed upon the net profits
earned within the state, the Court declared: "That a tax measured
by net profits is valid, although these profits may have been derived
52
in part, or indeed mainly, from interstate commerce is settled."
It is somewhat difficult, therefore, to agree with the dissent's conclusion that the taxes sustained in these cases were sustained only because the levies were confined to income from only "local business."
These apportionment formulas seem designed to apply the tax to
income fairly attributable to "in-state" activity, whether the activity
is regarded as local business or the "in-state" segment of interstate
commerce. Even commerce that is exclusively interstate must be
"transacted within a state."
Moreover, it is impossible to agree with the dissent's charge that
these cases hold "just the contrary" 53 to the Northwestern-Stockham
decision. Even if these cases are not authority for the validity of the
Northwestern-Stockham taxes, certainly they do not "hold" the "contrary," for in none of these cases was any tax struck down.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered a separate dissenting opinion in
the Northwestern-Stockham case.M For him the result of the decision
is "to break new ground," because he felt that the Court had "never
decided that a State may tax a corporation when that tax is on income
related to the State by virtue of activities within it when such activities are exclusively part of the process of doing interstate commerce." 55 That, of course, was what the three-Justice dissenting opinion also said. Likewise, he took the very realistic view that small or
moderate sized corporations doing exclusively interstate business
would now be faced with new and pressing problems arising from the
fact that such concerns will be required to file tax returns in many
more states than heretofore, all of which will involve large increases
in bookkeeping, accounting and legal paraphernalia to meet these
new demands. The cost of such added burdens, he thinks, may well
suffocate much interstate business. Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of the
opinion that the problem is one that calls for solution by devising a
congressional policy.
51. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326, 329 (1918).
52. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920).
53. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
488, 490, 491 (1959).
54. Id. at 470.
55. Ibid.
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II. Summary and Appraisal
Of The Current Net Income Tax Situation
A. Judicial Developments Through the Northwestern-Stockham Case
The taxes by both states in the consolidated Northwestern-Stockham decision were levied directly "on" the net income, rather than an
excise tax for the privilege of doing business, "measured by" net income. The taxpayers, as we have seen, contended that the Spectors
case required nullification on commerce clause grounds of the Northwestern-Stockham taxes, as excises for the privilege of doing business,
measured by net income, since the taxpayers' businesses were exclusively interstate commerce, although each tax was fairly apportioned
to business done within the taxing state. That was the Spector holding. Spector was distinguished by the Northwestern-Stockham Court
on the purely artificial, ritualistic ground that the Spector tax was
imposed upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege
of doing business within the state, with the net income used as the
measure of the tax, and was not a levy on the net income; whereas
the Northwestern-Stockham taxes were imposed on the net income.
Under this purely formal distinction, it becomes necessary to make
a sharp distinction, when the commerce clause is involved, between
taxes levied "on" net income and excise taxes for the privilege of
doing business "measured by" net income, which are treated as a
forbidden price of doing business which is interstate commerce.
The constitutionality of net income taxes from business that is emclusively interstate, when called into question on commerce clause
grounds, therefore, seems to depend entirely upon statutory formula.
A tax levied directly "on" the net income from a multistate business
will be sustained even if the business is exclusively interstate, if
fairly apportioned to business done within the state so as to avoid
multiple tax burdens by other states. That is the teaching of Northwestern-Stockham case. On the other side of the shield, a tax measured by net income will fall before the commerce clause where the
statute is less felicitously drawn so that the subject of the tax is
treated taxwise as the untouchable privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. In the Spector opinion the Court left no doubt that where
the tax is levied "on" the privilege of doing interstate commerce,
measured by net income, that the "constitutional infirmity of such a
tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done
within the State."5 7 This judicial distinction between Spector and
Northwestern-Stockham, by Mr. Justice Clark, becomes somewhat
amusing when we remember that in a most trenchant and realistic
dissent in the Spector case he declared that "there is no reasonable
56. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).

57. Id. at 609.
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warrant for cloaking a purely verbal standard with constitutional dignity,"58 and that "exclusively interstate commerce receives adequate
protection when state levies are fairly apportioned and nondiscrimina59
tory."
From the standpoint of the economic effect of the tax, the Court is
drawing a distinction that not only is artificial but apparently is meaningless, in distinguishing Northwestern-Stockham from Spector. A tax
imposed "on" net income from interstate commerce would seem to
have, in practical results, the same consequences for suppressing or
disrupting the commerce as one laid directly on the privilege, with
the net income used to fix the figure of the tax.
The Northwestern-Stockham decision does, of course, open an avenue for circumventing the Spector doctrine, as such. All that is necessary for a state to do to get around the specter of Spector is to change
its fiscal formula from a tax levied on the tax-immune privilege of
engaging in interstate business, measured by net income, to a tax
levied directly on the net income from that business. The tax collector
can then mow a revenue swath just as wide as he could if the Spector
type tax had been sustained.
In a very forthright manner the Northwestern-Stockham Court
takes the commendable position that interstate commerce should bear
its fair share of the burdens of the states whose privileges the commerce enjoys and whose protection it receives. It echoed the same
thinking of a great jurist of an earlier day who had pioneered in the
thinking that "it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of
state tax burden even though it increased the cost of doing business. '60
At the same time, of course, the states should not be permitted to utilize their taxing power as an impediment to the country's economic
welfare. There must be a reconciliation of the conflicting demands of
the states to lay taxes for the maintenance of their governments and
the demands of the national interests that commerce shall not be
unduly curtailed by state taxation. The Northwestern-Stockham opinion purports to recognize the necessity of this balancing of state and
61
national interests.
However, when the Northwestern-Stockham opinion declares that
the states are powerless to tax the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce, 62 it shields completely a part of that commerce from
paying its just share of state revenue. By the same token it grants
58. Id. at 614.
59. Id. at 614-15.
60. Justice Stone speaking for the Court in Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
61. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. AMinnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
461-62 (1959).
62. Id. at 458, 463-64 (1959).
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a preference to interstate commerce, giving interstate commerce a
competitive advantage over local businesses which are saddled with

the tax.
A fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory net income tax of a multistate business would appear to offer one of the best and fairest ways
of requiring that business to pay its way.63 A business has no tax
burden to bear unless there is a profit, and the tax will not be heavy
unless the 'profits are large. It should make no difference whether the

net income is used as the subject or the measure of the tax. Skillful
statutory draftmanship should not be made the sole touchstone for
determining such great principles of constitutional law. The pivotal
point should be whether the tax, in essence, discriminates against interstate commerce by subjecting it to a heavier tax burden than local
business. Obtaining an acceptable answer to this question should be
no more difficult to find than weighing all the varied factors in arriving at a judgment whether a particular tax discriminates against
interstate commerce in the commonly accepted sense. The Court
has always been willing to wrestle with the knotty problem of tax
discrimination, whether the discrimination was forthright or devious.p
That a state may not impose a tax upon the privilege of carrying on
interstate commerce, regardless of the amount of the tax, as Spector
held, and Northwestern-Stockham affirmed, has been determined by
a plethora of decisions during our constitutional history, however. 65
This doctrine is based on the postulate that the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce is one given by the constitution and not by
the state governments. "No State," says the Court, "can compel a
party, individual, or corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce." 66 As if to accentuate the point, the Court
has declared that "Any such excise burdens interstate commerce
67
and is therefore invalid ... without regard to measure or amount.1
Nor will such a tax be saved from commerce clause condemnation
by apportionment. The "constitutional infirmity of such a tax persists
no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done within the
state." 68 This commerce clause barrier is present whether the taxpayer is engaged in interstate commerce exclusively, 69 or whether a
63. See Pierce, State FiscalNeeds and Interstate Commerce, 18 OHIO ST. L.J.
43, 54 (1957).

64. See Best &Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940).
65. E.g., West Point Grocery v. Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957); Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line
Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v.
Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S.
147 (1918).
66. Atlantic &Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162 (1903).
67. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217 (1925).
68. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951).
69. E.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951);
State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931).
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portion of the taxed business is local with the tax levied either upon
the interstate branch or upon the whole business.70 Although a portion
of a business is local, and therefore taxable, that has not justified a
tax which is also levied on the privilege of engaging in the interstate branch of the business. A privilege or occupation tax imposed
by a state with respect to both interstate and intrastate business,
through an indiscriminate and inseparable application to instrumentalities common to both sorts of commerce, frequently has been nullified by the commerce clause.71 To get the tax across the commerce
clause hurdle, the statute must be of a separable nature so that the
levy on the interstate privilege can be eliminated from the assessment.7 2

In specifying the types of forbidden taxes on the privilege of interstate commerce, the Northwestern-Stockham opinion continues the
ban on direct levies for the privilege of soliciting interstate business,
whether the levy takes the form of a flat fee imposed upon the privilege, of soliciting,73 or a corporate excise on the out-of-state seller.7 4
70. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389
& Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924);
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Askren v. Continental
Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920); McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890).
71. Cases cited note 70 supra. In addition, see the following cases: Cooney
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Pickard v. Pullman So. Car Co., 117
U.S. 34 (1886).
72. E.g., Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Ratterman
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888).
73. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 458 (1959). The Court has uniformly given the constitutional coup de
grace to state statutes and municipal ordinances to the extent they levied a
license tax of a fixed amount on the occupation of soliciting orders for the
purchase of goods to be shipped into the taxing state. E.g., Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940);
Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Caldwell v. North
Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120
U. S. 489 (1887). The Court usually finds that the tax is aimed at suppression
or placing at a disadvantage this type of interstate business when brought
into competition with competing intrastate sales, usually made at a retail
store, and not, subject to the license tax. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 55-56 (1940).
74. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, note
73 supra. If the foreign corporation chooses to remain at home in all
respects, except to send abroad into other states its own advertising or itinerant salesmen to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office of the
selling foreign corporation where they are accepted and filled, the state of
the buyer has no taxable grip on the out-of-state seller by way of occupation
or privilege taxes. See Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537
(1951). Twice the Court has struck down corporation excise taxes for the
privilege of doing business, when applied to a foreign corporation engaged
in the solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods to be shipped into the
taxing state. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925)
(tax measured by property and assets employed within the state, plus a
percentage of the net income from business done within the state); Cheney
Brothers v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918) (capital stock used as measure).

(1952); Texas Transp.
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As the Northwestern-Stockham opinion indicates, the method of
collecting the tax may have considerable significance in determining
whether the tax is imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce, where the taxed business includes such commerce. In
holding that the levies there were not for the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce, although the business was exclusively interstate,
the Court gives weight to the fact that the "States are left to collect
only through ordinary means. ' 75 If the payment of the tax is compulsory before any business within the state can be carried on, or if
the statute provides for an eviction of the taxpayer for nonpayment
of the tax, such collection methods apparently would cause the Court
to conclude that the levy of a tax on net income is a forbidden price
for engaging in interstate commerce, where such commerce is involved. The state would then be demanding the tax as a condition
precedent to engaging in interstate commerce.
The method of collecting the tax also becomes important where a
privilege tax is levied on a business consisting of both interstate commerce and local business. A tax may validly be imposed for the privilege of engaging in the local aspects of the business, even inseparably
connected with the interstate business, if the tax is not demanded as
a condition of doing any business in the taxing state.76 Unless collection of a privilege tax is left to the ordinary means of collection by a
money judgment in a suit at law, rather than eviction for nonpayment,
where both interstate and intrastate commerce are inseparably connected, it would seem to be open to the objection that it is made a
77
prohibited condition of continuing to do interstate business.
In Northwestern-Stockham the Court not only seems to have applied the "multiple burdens" doctrine to net income taxes for the
first time; but, by implication at least, the Court has come out with
a revised version of that doctrine. Whereas a showing of a possibility
or risk of multiple taxation has been enough to call for nullification
of taxes on gross income, Northwestern-Stockham seems to require a
showing of actual tax duplication before the Court will strike down
a net income tax under the "multiple burdens" doctrine. The Northwestern-Stockham taxpayers had argued that if the taxes there were
sustained then the income would be exposed to the risk of multiple
taxation by other states. As we have seen, the Court disposed of that
argument by pointing out that there was no showing that multiple
75. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450,
462 (1959).
76. Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937); Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Southern Ry v. Watts &
Watts, 260 U.S. 519 (1923).

77. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403, 414 (1936);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119-20 (1920);
St. Louis, S. W. Ry v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 368 (1914).
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taxation was present. If the Court makes it a requirement that there
must be a showing that the income from multistate business actually
has been taxed elsewhere, rather than a risk or possibility of tax
duplication, in order to warrant striking down a tax by the "multiple
burdens" test, that conceivably could produce some strange and
unsatisfactory results. Could not a particular tax then be valid
with respect to one state and invalid elsewhere, depending upon
whether the other states had actually applied a tax to the income
in question? Moreover, under this approach, the state first applying
its tax to the particular income from interstate commerce would

seem to have preempted the field from the standpoint of the commerce clause, and other states must then hold their taxes in abeyance
with respect to this income. Also, it may be most difficult for the
taxed corporation to show that the income in question actually has
been taxed elsewhere, especially if the states involved have made
some effort, although unsatisfactory, at apportionment of the income
to activities within the state. The apportionment formulas now in
existence will be discussed in considerable detail presently.
B. Post Northwestern-StockhamJudicial Developments
In a series of decisions shortly after the Northwestern-Stockham
decision, the Court may have extended further the horizon of state
taxing power when resisted by the interdictory force of the commerce
and due process clauses. Within a week after the NorthwesternStockham decision, the Court, in a per curiam, decided ET & WNC
8
affirming a judgment of the North
Transportation Co. v. Currie,7
Carolina Supreme Court, which upheld a state tax as applied to the
net income of an interstate freight motor carrier company, whose
income was derived exclusively from interstate commerce. Taxpayer,
a foreign corporation, was engaged exclusively in interstate transportation and had no offices in the taxing state, except those incident
to its freight terminals. The tax was applied only to that part of the
income reasonably attributable to the interstate business performed
within the taxing state. The United States Supreme Court cited only
Northwestern-Stockham as authority for their affirmance. The Court
has thus brought the instrumentalities of interstate transportation
within the scope of the same rule as manufacturers and sellers.
Suppose the taxpayers in the Northwestern-Stockham cases had not
had offices in the taxing states, would the taxes have been inimical to
the commerce clause, and would there have been a "sufficient nexus"
to satisfy due process requirements for a tax imposed upon the net
income? Subsequent developments perhaps shed some light on these
questions.
78. 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403, ajfd per curiam, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
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At the same term as Northwestern-Stockham, the Court granted
the motion to dismiss the appeal and refused certiorari in the case of
Brown-FormanDistillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue.79 The Louisiana Supreme Court had held that the imposition of the state income
tax upon a Kentucky distiller does not unconstitutionally interfere
with interstate commerce, although the taxpayer did not maintain a
warehouse or stock of goods in Louisiana; and taxpayer's activities in
the taxing state were limited to the presence of "missionary men"
who called upon wholesale dealers and, on occasion, accompanied the
salesmen of these wholesalers to assist them in displaying the merchandise of taxpayer at the business establishments of retailers. This
case has a significant difference from Northwestern-Stockham in that
there was no sales office in the taxing state, and taxpayer's "missionary men" did not have authority to solicit sales.
On May 4, 1959, the Court denied certiorari in the Case of International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot,80 which also involved a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate operations in Louisiana. Taxpayer employed fifteen salesmen who regularly and systematically
solicited shoe retailers in Louisiana, but the taxpayer had no office,
storage space, warehouse or other place of business in the taxing
state; nor had it qualified to do business there. Samples of shoes in
the custody of its salesmen and the company-owned automobiles
used by the salesmen constituted all the property which taxpayer
had in the taxing state. All orders for merchandise were sent out of
the taxing state for acceptance or rejection, and all orders were filled
by shipments from an out-of-state source of supply. The salesmen
displayed samples in Louisiana, using hotel rooms or rooms of public
buildings. The expense of such displays was paid by the taxpayer.
Any complaints by customers and delinquent accounts were handled
at the home office outside the taxing state. Over commerce clause and
due process clause objections, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held
that the imposition of her tax on net income was valid. The Supreme
Court of the United States denied certiorari.
Since the denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits, the
cases disposed of in this manner here cannot, of course, be given
much weight.
79. 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. den., 359
U.S. 28 (1959). In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335
(1944), the requisites of the commerce and due process clauses were satisfied,
for the purpose of making an extra-state seller collect a use tax, even though
the only connection of the taxing state with the seller was the sending of
seller's traveling salesmen into the taxing state. For the purpose of satisfying
due process requirements in acquiring judicial jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation there was a sufficient nexus where the corporation sent salesmen
into the forum state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
80. 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. den., 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
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Suppose the out-of-state Northwestern-Stockham sellers had stayed
at home and had sold only by shipping the goods into the taxing state
in response to mail orders from customers. Would there have been
sufficient nexus between the extra-state seller and the customer's
state to satisfy due process requirements for tax purposes? The cases
have not answered that question in so far as the due process clause is
concerned, but the Court has made it plain that a sale made in such a
fashion is regarded as a nontaxable interstate commerce activity that
cannot be reached by the customer's state through an occupation
tax on the out-of-state seller.8 ' Unanswered is the question whether
a tax levied on the net income from such a sales transaction, rather
than on the occupation of selling, could escape commerce clause condemnation.
With the great expansion of ways of merchandising vastly different
from those when the Court developed many of its ideas of due process,
perhaps there should be a revamping of the notion of what constitutes
sufficient "nexus" to satisfy due process, as well as what the commerce
clause will permit by way of state taxation. Should not the exploitation of a state's markets for the capture of profits be enough for that
state to demand something in return, thus satisfying the requisites of
the due process clause? Several hundred travelling salesmen, no matter how avidly they hawk their wares, are not nearly as effective a
"nexus" for an exploitation or invasion of a consumer market as a
Dinah Shore or a Pat Boone as they croon their sponsor's products
into the hands of thousands of purchasers on interstate television and
radio. Is the state of market to be denied a tax from either the out-ofstate seller or the broadcasting company because the contacts of
such out-of-state sellers and broadcasters are ethereal only? 82 Or,
should a well known milk company be permitted to milk the consumer
market with the sonorous singing of ballads by hillfolk and western
singers without paying its tithe to the state of market on the ground
that the interstate radio and television milking process is too ethereal?
C. New Congressional Limitations on Net Income Taxes
Regardless of whether the Northwestern-Stockham decision represents the "breaking of new ground," as Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent says, 83 or whether it is merely a reiteration of previously well81. Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
82. Newspaper and radio advertising, the mailing of circulars and deliveries of purchases into the taxing state were held, by a 5 to 4 decision, to
be insufficient nexus to satisfy due process requirements when the taxing state
sought to make an out-of-state seller collect its use tax, in Miller Bros. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). For adverse comment by this writer, see
Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VA=. L. REV. 138, 173
(1956).

83. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
470 (1959).
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settled principles, as was claimed by the majority, the decision
touched off an uproar.
Representatives of business voiced their consternation to Congress
over the matter, asking Congress to curtail the sweep of the Northwestern-Stockham decision, as well as those cases that followed it,
especially the Brown-Forman situation where the extra-state seller
had no office in the taxing state.8 4 In response to this pressure, somewhat extensive hearings were held by the Senate Select Committee
on Small Business and the Senate Committee on Finance, as well
as hearings by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. At these hearings the fears and apprehensions of businessesboth large and small-rang like an anvil chorus, with only a pianissimo refrain from the tax collectors counselling congressional
caution.8 5 Not only were multistate businesses apprehensive over
increased taxation by additional states, but also over the inescapable
fact that they would incur substantial expenditures in complying
with the diverse tax laws of almost every state in which they
made a sale or to which they shipped goods. This would require
the maintenance of records for each jurisdiction, requiring large increases in bookkeeping and accounting, as well as the retention of
legal counsel and accountants who are familiar with the tax practices
of each jurisdiction. For the large corporations all of this may perhaps
84. ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403, af'd per
curiam, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), discussed in connection with note 78 supra;
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So.
2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. den. 359 U.S. 28 (1959), discussed
in connection with note 79 supra. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La.
279, 197 So. 2d 640, cert. den., 359 U.S. 984 (1959), discussed in connection with
note 80 supra.

85. See Report of the Select Committee on Small Business United States

Senate, Sparkman, The Problems Faced by Small Business in Complying with
Multi-State Taxation of Income Derived from Interstate Commerce, H.R.
REP. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearing before the Select Committee on Small Business United States Senate, "State Taxation on Interstate
Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., parts 1, 2 & 3 (1959); Report of Committee
on Finance United States Senate, Byrd, State Taxation of Income Derived
from Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 658 (1959); Hearings before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); and Report from the Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, Willis, State Taxation of Income Derived
from Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 936, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
Interspersed throughout these hearings and the reports will be found expressions of the various apprehensions of business men over these decisions. A
few voices were raised in support of the taxing authorities. See, e.g., Statement
of Fred L. Cox, Georgia Department of Revenue, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Small Business United States Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1
at 34 (1959), and at Hearings before the Committee on Finance United States
Senate, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 206
(1959); Statement of James E. Luckett, Commissioner of Revenue of Kentucky, at Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business United
States Senate, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 1 at 26 (1959); Statement of Robert L. Roland, Collector of Revenue State
of Louisiana, Hearings before the Committee on Finance United States Senate,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 223 (1959).
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be just another chore for their staff, but the small and medium sized
businesses felt that they could be seriously hampered with these additional hobbles. Such increases in overhead charges in some instances
likely would make it uneconomical for a small business to sell at all in
areas where volume is small. Thus, there were forebodings that businesses, particularly small and medium sized, might be hesitant to
develop new markets in some states by extending their solicitation
activities to such states, or there might be a withdrawal of such activities from some existing markets in other states, if solicitations continued to give a taxable grip. The danger of liability for back taxes in
states where a business had made some sales but where it had never
filed returns furnished additional grist for the hearing mills.
At these hearings business men asked Congress to remove what they
regarded as a tapestry of uncertainty and confusion and to establish
clear guide lines as to the amount of activity in which they could
engage without becoming liable for state taxes. Among other things,
Congress was asked to enact a law which would ban state income
taxes on businesses whose only activity in a particular state was solicitation of orders.
Congress was galvanized into action. The upshot of the whole matter was the passage by Congress of Public Law 86-272, which was
signed into law by the President on September 14, 1959.86 The gist of
this new law is to curtail the Northwestern-Stockham decision by
permitting a person or company to go or to send a representative into
another state to solicit orders for the sale of tangible personal property
without paying a state or local net income tax to the state of solicitation. For the purposes of this congressional prohibition, the term "net
income tax" means any tax imposed on, or measured by, net income.
By what is perhaps an over-simplification, this congressional enactment divides businesses between sales and services for tax purposes.
Congress has exempted from state and local net income taxes only
where an out-of-state seller is engaged in the sale of tangible personal
property, but has not granted an exemption from taxation where the
income is received from services. 87 Moreover, Congress has not immunized from taxation the income derived from the sale of tangible
personal property, unless the only contact of the seller with the taxing
state is simply the solicitation of the order for the sale of that property
by the seller or his representative. Before the extra-state seller can
come within the pale of congressional protection against the levy of
a net income tax by the customer's state, the order solicited must be
86. 73 Stat. 555 (Pub. L. No. 86-272), United States Code Congressional And
Administrative News at 3609 (No. 16, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959). For a detailed analysis of this statute, along with the decisional law leading up to it,
see 20 CCH STATE TAx REv. No. 35 (Sept. 3, 1959).
87. 73 Stat. 555 (Pub. L. No. 86-272), tit. I, § 101 (1959).
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sent outside the state for acceptance or rejection. Still another requisite for admission to this privileged sanctuary of immunity from the
net income tax is that the orders must be filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the state. There is one exception that
should be noted here. An out-of-state seller can make sales through
an independent contractor and still retain freedom from net income
taxes by the customer's state.8 The independent contractor can maintain its own offices within the customer's state and accept orders there
without exposing the out-of-state seller to the tax.
While the act permits the independent contractor to maintain offices
solely for the purpose of making sales or soliciting orders for sales
of tangible personal property belonging to the out-of-state seller, it
is silent with respect to the storage of seller's goods by the independent contractor. There may, therefore, arise questions whether
such storage will destory the tax immunity which Congress has
accorded the seller. Moreover, questions almost certainly will arise
as to whether the particular in-state dealer actually is an independent
contractor or simply a "dummy" set up to evade tax consequences
on the part of the extra-state seller.
Since a taxpayer providing a service has not received shelter from
the net income tax, the Currie8 case, which upheld a net income tax
assessed against a motor carrier engaged in interstate transportation,
apparently is still a precedent in the field of income taxes on transportation companies, because solicitation of freight and passenger business would not fall within the purview of the tax immunity given by
Congress. Apparently, therefore, there would be no tax relief in this
new law from an otherwise valid tax on net income for trucking
companies, taxicabs, railroads, pipelines, newspapers, radio and television stations, telephone and telegraph companies, water transportation and insurance. 90
One of the pivotal points in litigation that almost certainly will arise
under this new law, then, will be the determination of whether the
item sold is tangible personal property. The law itself makes no attempt to define this term. There will, of course, arise borderline cases.
What about fabrication and installation, when will they be regarded
as tangible personal property? Moreover, by whose law will the courts
88. Ibid.
89. ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403, aff'd per
curiam, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), discussed in connection with note 78 supra.
90. This new act has been criticized because it does not offer a solution
regarding most of these businesses. See the Report from the Committee on
Finance United States Senate, Byrd, State Taxation of Income Derived from
Interstate Commerce (Minority views), S. RE-P. 658 at 10 (1959). The states,
of course, have been given the power to tax and regulate interstate insurance
operations by the McCarron Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. 1012(a)
(1958). That act was sustained, over a commerce clause attack, in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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determine whether the property sold is tangible personal property?
Will it characterize as a matter of federal law the nature of the property involved or will it treat this as a matter to be settled by the varying laws of the different states?
Conceivably, there may be some question whether the congressional
enactment actually abrogates the precise holdings of NorthwesternStockham. To be sure, the act gives tax immunity where the out-ofstate seller engages only in the solicitation of orders for the sale of
goods; but does that immunity also extend to cases where that seller
only solicits from its own offices established within the taxing state,
which was the Northwestern-Stockham situation? One circumstance
that would seem to point to the conclusion that immunity is given
even where the solicitation is from seller's offices in the taxing state
is the fact that, as we have seen, the thrust of much of the congressional hearings leading to the passage of this statute was aimed expressly at the elimination of the effect of this case, as well as at other
cases, including Brown-Formanwhere the seller maintained no offices
in the taxing state.
Since the congressional curb on the power of the states to levy net
income taxes is limited to the situation where the extra-state seller
engages "only" in the business activities of "solicitation" of orders
within the state, there necessarily will arise questions concerning
the meaning of "solicitation only." Is the tax-exempt activity of
"solicitation only" limited to the taking of orders, or can the seller
engage in aggressive and extensive sales promotional activities within
the state and still escape the income tax on the ground that he is
engaging in "solicitation only"?
The mentioning of some of the more obvious questions that almost
certainly will arise under this congressional enactment, while in no
sense intended to be exhaustive, should indicate the existence of a
number of troublesome problems with which the courts will be
required to wrestle as they apply this statute.
The provisions of this congressional enactment exempting from
taxation have no application to the imposition of a net income tax by
any state or political subdivision thereof where the seller is a domestic
corporation of the taxing state, or an individual domiciled in, or a
resident of, the taxing state.9 '
This new congressional enactment contains two additional provisions that should be noted here. It has a retroactive application to
calm the fears over possible back taxes where business had been
transacted but no tax returns had been filed. The act expressly provides that if the states or any political subdivisions have not assessed
income taxes which are prohibited by this law after the date of enact91. 73 Stat. 555 (Pub. L. 86-272), § 101 (b) (1959).
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ment, then the states cannot go back and assess taxes for income from
sales made in the past.92 Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee are required to make full and complete studies of state taxation of income derived from interstate commerce, for the purpose of proposing "legislation providing uniform
standards to be observed by the states in imposing income taxes on
income" from interstate commerce. 93 The Committees are required by
the Act to report to their respective Houses the results of such studies
not later than July 1, 1962.9
Congressional curbs on state power to tax net income were vigorously criticized by the minority report of the Senate Committee on
Finance. 95 Such action by Congress was thought to be an invasion of
the powers of the states, which they now have for raising necessary
revenue, without which they must become powerless wards of the
national government. Likewise, such restrictions were thought to
discriminate against many small local businesses, which must compete
with the large multistate operators who can escape a large share of
state income taxes under these congressional limitations by conducting many of their interstate operations by solicitation only. The minority also felt that many small business enterprises will suffer, because
local warehousemen, for example, will certainly lose much of their
business as multistate operators concentrate their warehouse activities
in order to escape taxes of as many states as possible. Also, it was felt
that the congressional proposals to limit state taxing power failed to
attack the problem positively. The congressional curbs were thought
to be nothing more than a protective measure for a few manufacturing
states and a few companies which do a multistate business of a specified type. The minority felt that what is needed is proper allocation
of taxes among the various states, not a prohibition against certain
state taxes.
At a later place in this article, there will be a discussion of the
ability of Congress to displace state taxing power in an area where
that power already exists, as well as the ability of Congress to consent
to state taxes that otherwise would be prohibited by the commerce
6
clause.9
92. 73 Stat. 556 (Pub. L. 86-272) tit. I, § 102 (1959).
93. 73 Stat. 556 (Pub. L. 86-272) tit. II, § 201 (1959).
94. 73 Stat. 556 (Pub. L. 86-272) tit. II, § 202 (1959).
95. Report from the Committee on Finance United States Senate, Byrd,
State Taxation of Income Derived from Interstate Commerce (Minority
views), S. REP. 658 at 10-12 (1959). The minority report was given by Senator Albert Gore and Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. The same report, at 14,
also contains the individual views of Senator Russell B. Long, who also opposed the bill.
96. See material discussed under the caption "The Power of Congress To
Control State Taxation" beginning at note 353 infra and going through note
363 infra.
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III. Determining The Net Income From A Multistate Business
AttributableTo A Taxing State
When a corporation engages in a multistate business, there inevitably arises the question of how to determine that portion of the
total amount of income of the business which may be attributed to a
particular state for tax purposes. In the first part of this article, attempt was made to mark out some of the lines of demarcation between
permissible and nonpermissible net income taxes insofar as the commerce and due process clauses were concerned. Some further application of those constitutional limitations must necessarily be noticed as
we discuss the various techniques used to assign to a particular state
its portion of corporate net income. However, discussion of constitutional questions will be minimal. Rather, our primary concern will
now be with an analysis of the tax structure of all of the states in order to get a clearer picture of the various facets of taxation of corporate net income, including the main problems that are present. In so
doing, we will survey and analyze the statutes and regulations of all
states utilizing a corporation net income tax or a corporate franchise
tax measured by net income. These provisions have here been reorganized into certain broad classifications, with citations to the pertinent statutory provisions. Classification of the statutes and regulations
is made upon the basis of three aspects: (1) the nature and structure
of the tax; (2) ascertaining the corporations subject to the tax; (3)
methods of assigning income to the states for tax purposes. At the
conclusion of this article, the most essential features of the various
statutory provisions will be noted in an appendix of two tables.
A. Nature and Structure of the Tax
1. Subject and Measure.-Thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia have provisions imposing taxes either upon or measured
by the net income of both domestic and foreign corporations doing
business within the state.
The statutes of twenty-two of these states impose the tax directly
upon the net income attributable to the state, thus constituting net
income as both the subject and measure of the tax.97 Seven states and
97. Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 400 (1940); Alaska-ALAsKA CovMP.
LAws ANN. § 5(a) (1949); Arizona-ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-102 (1956); Arkansas-APK. STAT. § 84-2204 (1947); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-3
(1953); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902 (Supp. 1958); Georgia-GA.
CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (1937); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3001 (Supp. 1959);
Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1949); Kansas-KA-N. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
79-3203 (Supp. 1957); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (Supp. 1959);
Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:31(3) (1952); Maryland-AID. ANN. CODE

art. 81, § 288(b) (1957); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.030 (1949); New
Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-1 (1953); North Carolina-N.C.GEN. STAT.
§ 105-134 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3830 (1943); Oklahoma
-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 876 (1954); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
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the District of Columbia denominate their provisions as franchise,
excise or privilege taxes and utilize net income as the measure, not the
m98
subject, of the tax.
Four states supplement their franchise tax with
a direct tax upon net income.99 One state, Montana, imposes an excise
tax in the form of a "license fee" for carrying on business within the
state.100 We have already seen that these differences in statutory
draftsmanship may lead to a different result when a net income tax
is challenged on commerce clause grounds. 101 The particular type of
tax adopted by each state is set forth in tabular form as an Appendix,
Table II, at the end of the article, and the amount of revenue derived
by each state is contained in Table I in the Appendix.
2. Definitions of Net Income.-The phrase "net income" is a common
element in the provisions of all the taxing statutes, as either the subject or measure of the tax. Thus, it becomes essential to know the
various statutory definitions ascribed to this phrase.
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia define net income
as "gross income less allowable deductions."' 02 Under such a provision, the problem of determining what is net income resolves itself
into the rather simple mechanical determinations of what is "gross
income" and what are "allowable deductions." Further treatment of
this will be given below.
§ 44-11-2 (Supp. 1958); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-222.1 (Supp. 1958);
§ 71.01
(1957).
98. Connecticut-CoNN. GEN STAT. § 12-214 (Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1571 (1951); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c.63,
§ 32-39 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54-1OA-2 (Supp. 1958);
New York-N.Y. TAx LAW § 209 (1944); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. § 672701 (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-3 (Supp. 1959); VermontVirginia-VA. CODE ANN.§ 58-128 (1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN.

VT. STAT. ANN.§ 32-5902 (1959).
99. California-CALIF. REV. AND TAx CODE §§ 23151, 23501 (1958); Minnesota
-MN. STAT. ANN. § 290.02 (1945); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 317.010(8),
318.020 (1957); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420 (a-c) (Supp.

1958).

ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958).
101. See discussion of Northwestern Cement case in text supported by note
56 through note 61 supra.
102. Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 400 (1940); Arizona-ARiz. CODE
ANN. § 43-111 (1956); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2007 (1947); California100. MONT. REV. CODE

CALiF. REV. AND TAX CODE § 24341 (1958); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 138-1-17 (1953); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-213 (Supp. 1958);
District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1557 (1951); Georgia-GA. CODE
ANN. § 92-3108 (1937); Kansas--KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3209 (1949); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(11) (1955); Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 47:41 (1952); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 285 (1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c.63, § 30(5) (1953); Minnesota-MINN. STAT.
ANN.§ 290.01(19) (1945); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143 (1949); MontanaMONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 84-1502 (1947); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. §
72-15-6 (1953); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-140 (1958); North
Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3821 (1943); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

68, § 877 (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 317.155 (1957); South CarolinaS.C. CODE § 65-255 (1952); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-6 (1953); Virginia
-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-79 (1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.02(1)
(1957).
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Seven states declare that net income shall be computed in the same
manner as it is for the federal corporate income tax, with certain
modifications. 03 That is, the net income figure arrived at for purposes
of the federal income tax will be considered as the state net income
figure, with certain adjustments being made for the items of: net
operating losses, dividends, interest income, and gains and losses from
the sale of intangibles not held for sale.
Three states, Tennessee, Alaska and New Jersey, provide no statutory definition of net income. Tennessee does indicate, however, that
good corporate accounting techniques will be recognized in making
this determination. 104
(a) Definitions of Gross Income.-As noted above, most statutes define net income in terms of gross income less certain statutory deductions. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine the statutory
meaning of gross income.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia define gross income
very broadly to include "income derived from any source whatever." 0 5 Connecticut has a unique provision relating to gross income
which is worth noting:
[G]ross income as defined in the federal corporation net income tax law
inforce ...and, in addition, means any interest received or interest paid
by the taxpayer or losses of other calendar or fiscal years, retroactive to
include all calendar or fiscal years beginning after January 1, 1935,
incurred by the taxpayer which are excluded from gross income for
purposes of assessing the federal corporation net income tax.106
Of course, those states relying upon the federal tax provisions for
103. Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (Supp. 1958); Idaho-IDAr~o

CODE ANN. § 63-3022 (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.35 (Supp.
1958); New York-N.Y. TAx LAW § 208 (1944); Pennsylvania-PA.STAT. ANN.

tit. 72, § 3420 (a) (Supp. 1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS Alm. § 44-11-11
(1956); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5901(3) (1959). Of course, if the cor-

poration is a foreign one, only that portion of net income attributable to the

taxing state is included under such provisions.
104. Tenn. Franchise & Excise Tax Reg. rule 25 (1956).
105. Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 401 (1940); Arizona-Apaz. CODE

ANN. § 43-112 (1956); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2008 (1947); CaliforniaCALIF. REV. AND TAx CODE § 24271 (1958); Colorado-CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 138-1-9 (1953); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1557(a) (1951);
Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3107 (a) (1937); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 79-3205 (Supp. 1957); Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:42A (1952);
Maryland-MD.ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280 (Supp. 1958); Minnesota-MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 290.01 (1945); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.100 (Supp. 1958); New
Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-4 (1953); North Carolina-N.C.GEN. STAT.
§ 105-141 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3817 (Supp. 1957);
Oregon-ORE. REv. STAT. § 317.105 (1957); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN.LAWS ANN.
§ 44-11-11 (1956); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-251 (1952); Utah-UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 59-13-5(1)

(1953); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-78(a)

(1959);

Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.03(1) (1957); Oklahoma-OKA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 68, § 878 (1954).

106. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-213 (Supp. 1958).
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the meaning of net income need no separate definition of gross in07
come.1
Though gross income is generally defined in a broadly-inclusive
fashion, all but ten states'08 provide that certain types of income shall
be exempt from inclusion therein. 109 Although by no means uniform,
the more common provisions exempt the following classes of income:
various types of insurance, annuity and endowment proceeds; property received by a gift, demise or bequest; and interest on obligations
of the state or United States government or its political subdivisions.
This list is not exhaustive and reference should be made to the footnoted provisions if specific information is desired.
(b) Allowable Deductions.-As we saw, "net income" is often defined as "gross income less allowable deductions." Having considered
the more common meanings of gross income, it now becomes necessary
to ascertain the allowable statutory deductions in order to complete
the definition of "net income" for tax purposes.
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have provisions
enumerating various deductions." 0 Those typically allowed are, in
general, coincident with those permitted by the federal tax provisions.
These deductions include such items as ordinary and necessary business expenses; interest paid; bad debts; allowances for depreciation,
depletion and obsolescence; charitable contributions up to a certain
percentage of net income (between 5% and 15%); and uninsured
losses.
Six states-Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, Tennessee and Vermont-have no provision enumerating allowable deductions.
3. Tax Rates Imposed.-Once the taxable "net income," or tax base,
107. So, in Alaska; Delaware; Idaho; Iowa; Kentucky; Massachusetts; Montana; New Jersey; New York; Pennsylvania; Tennessee; and Vermont.
108. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Vermont.
109. Alabama-ALA. CODE AwN. tit. 51, § 384 (1940); Arizona-ARiz. CODE
ANN. § 43-112 (1956); Arkansas-ARic. STAT. § 84-2007 (1947); CaliforniaCALIF. REV. AND TAX CODE § 24301-310

(1958); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 138-1-11 (1953); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1557(a)
(1951); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3107(b) (1937); Kansas-KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-3205(b) (Supp. 1957); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §

47:42 (1952); Maryland-MID. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280 (Supp. 1958); Minnesota-Mmx. STAT. ANN. § 290.08 (1945); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.150
(1949); Montana-MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey
-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54-1OA-4 (Supp. 1958); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-15-5 (1953); New York-N.Y. TAX LAW § 208,9(a) (1944); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141

(1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE §

57-3818 (1943); Oklahoma-OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 678 (Supp. 1958);
Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 317.110 (1957); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 44-11-12 (1956); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-253 (1952); Utah-UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-13-5(2) (1953); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-78(b) (Supp.
1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.03(2) (1957).
110. Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 402 (1940); Alaska-ALAsxA Comv,.
LAws ANN. § 5 (A) (1949); Arizona-Aniz. CODE ANN. § 42-123 (1956); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2016 (1947); California-CALIF. REV. AND TAX CODE §§
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has been determined there remains generally only the mechanical
function of applying the tax rate thereto in order to determine the
amount of tax payable to the state.
There is great diversity among the state provisions as to tax rates.
In general, however, the rate provisions are of two types: (1) those
imposing a flat percentage upon allocable net income; (2) those utilizing a progressive rate which increases commensurately with net income. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia employ the
former method. Among these, the rate varies from 2% in Iowa, Missouri and New Mexico to 9 % in Idaho."' Five states adopt the
progressive rate structure and variations within these are from as low
as 1% to as high as 8%.112 The remaining five states have more in24343-24601 (1958); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-12 (1953); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-217 (Supp. 1958); District of ColumbiaD.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1557(b) (1951); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3109
(1937); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3206 (Supp. 1957); KentuckyKY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010 (Supp. 1959); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:54-47:78 (1952); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 281 (1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c.63, § 30(5) (1953); Minnesota-MlN. STAT.
ANN. § 290.09 (1945); Missouri--Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.160 (1949); MontanaMONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1502 (Supp. 1958); New Mexico-N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-15-7 (1953); New York-N.Y. TAX LAW § 208,9(b) (1944); North
Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE
§ 57-3822 (1943); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 880 (1954); Oregon.ORE. REV. STAT. § 317.255 (1957); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
3420 (Supp. 1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-11 (1956);
South Carolina-S.C.CODE § 65-259 (1952); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-7
(1953); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-81 (1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 71.04 (1957).
111. Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1949); Missouri--Mo. ANN. STAT. §
143.030 (1949); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-31 (1953). Three per
cent of net income: Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 398 (1940); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-214 (Supp. 1958); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-3203(b) (Supp. 1957). 3.75% of net income: Tennessee-TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1958). Four per cent of net income: California-CALIF.
REV. AND TAX CODE § 23151, 25101 (1958); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102
(Supp. 1958); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:32 (c) (1952); OkZahomaOKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 876 (1954). Five per cent of net income: Colorado-COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-3 (1953); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
30, § 1902 (Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1571(a)
(1951); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288 (Supp. 1958); MontanaMONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-222.1 (Supp.
1958); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5902 (1959); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-130 (1959). Six per cent of net income: Minnesota-MAn.
STAT. ANN.
§ 290.06(1) (Supp. 1958); North Carolina-N.C.GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958);
Oregon-ORE. REv. STAT. § 318.020 (1957). Nine per cent of net income:
Alaska-ALAs,
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 5(A) (1949). Nine and one-half per
cent of net income: Idaho-IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3025 (Supp. 1959).
112. One per cent on the first $1000 increasing to five per cent on amounts
over $6000: Arizona-Ajz. CODE ANN. § 43-102 (1956); one per cent on the
first $3000 increasing to five per cent on the excess of $25,000: Arkansas-

ARK. STAT. § 84-2004 (1947); five per cent on the first $25,000 increasing to
seven per cent on amounts in excess of $25,000: Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 141.040 (Supp. 1959); three per cent on the first $3000, four per cent
on $3000 to $8000, five per cent on $8000 to $15,000 and six per cent on all
above $15,000: North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3830 (1943); two per cent
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volved rate provisions which do not fit within either of the above classifications.113 Generally, they apply rates which vary in accordance
with the particular type of corporation being taxed and the particular
business situation or nature of income. Table I, which is found in the
Appendix at the end of this article shows the divergent rates found
among the states.
Only ten of the taxing states have provisions allowing credits
against the tax payable. The provisions of these few states are outlined in the footnotes." 4
B. Corporations Subject to the Tax
Having determined generally the basic tax structure of the various
taxing states, we now turn to the question of what corporations are
made subject to the tax. In general, the statutes are broadly worded
to include within the scope of taxing power every corporation domion the first $1000 increasing to seven per cent on the excess of $6000: Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09 (2) (1957).
113. Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c.63, § 38-39 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54-10A-5 (Supp. 1958); New York-N.Y. TAx LAW

§ 210 (1944); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-2 (Supp. 1958);

Utah-UTAH CODE AN. § 59-13-3 (Supp. 1959).
114. Alabama allows credit for interest on obligations of the United States
and bonds of the war finance corporation, included in gross income; dividends
from banks subject to the state excise tax and as to domestic corporations;
a credit for taxes paid on income from sources without the state. ALA. CODE
ANN. tit. 51, § 405 (1940). Colorado allows a credit against the tax equal to
fifteen per cent of the net tax and allows domestic corporations a credit for
taxes paid another state because of dividends received from a foreign corporation which it owns. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 138-1-3, 138-1-41 (1953).
Louisiana allows domestic corporations credit for taxes paid to another state.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:32, 47:33 (Supp. 1958). Maryland allows domestic
corporations a credit for amounts in excess of $25 payable as franchise tax
during the year. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 292 (1957). In Minnesota each
corporation gets a credit of $500 and there is also allowed a credit of eightyfive per cent of dividends received by one corporation from another when
such stock does not constitute stock in trade of the taxpayer. MmN. STAT.
ANN. § 290.21 (Supp. 1958). In Missouri credit is allowed a stockholder of
any corporation or joint stock company in an amount obtained by multiplying
the corporate income tax rate by the amount of dividends or net earnings
of any such corporation or company upon which the income tax has been
paid for the last preceding taxable period. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.180 (1949).
Oklahoma gives credit for dividends received from any corporation, provided
five per cent or more of the entire gross income of such corporation was
attributable to Oklahoma and subject to tax. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 882
(1954). In Oregon an offset against the tax is allowed mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations for personal property taxes, and is limited
to the lesser of the tax paid on work in process and finished manufactured
goods or one third of the excise tax due. ORE. REv. STAT. § 317.070 (1957).
South Carolina provides a credit to nonresidents for tax paid in home state
to a certain extent, but it is not clear whether 'nonresident" also applies to
foreign corporations. S.C. CODE § 65-241.1 (Supp. 1958). Tennessee allows a
credit to state banks for sums paid into the state treasury for use of the
State Banking Department and gives insurance companies a credit for gross
premiums tax against the excise tax. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2703 (1955).
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ciled in the state and every foreign corporation "doing business"
therein.115
The meaning of the term "doing business" has been the subject of
voluminous litigation, but no extended discussion of that complex subject will be attempted here. It is enough to say that the commerce
and due process clause requirements are satisfied even though "doing
business" consists only of solicitation of orders. 116
Georgia has enacted a provision specifically setting forth what is
considered "doing business" within the state. It provides:
Every such corporation shall be deemed to be doing business within
this state if it engages within this state in any activities or transactions
for the purpose of financial profit or gain, whether or not such corporation qualifies to do business within this state, and whether or not it

maintains an office or place of doing business within this state and
whether or not any such activity or transaction is connected with interstate or foreign commerce.117

115. Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 373 (1940); Alaska-ALAsKA Corvip.
LAws ANN. § 5(a) (1949); Arizona-ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-102 (1956); Arkansas-Anx. STAT. § 84-2003 (1947); California-CAI.n REv. AND TAX CODE §
23151 & 23501 (1958); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-3 (1953);
Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-214 (Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902 (Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN.

§ 47-1571 (a) (1951); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (1937); Idaho-IDAHo
CODE ANN. § 63-3025 (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1949);
Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3203(b) (Supp. 1957); Kentucky-Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (Supp. 1959); Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §

47:31 (1952); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288(e) (1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAws c.63, § 32 & 39 (Supp. 1958); Minnesota-lNm.
STAT. ANN. § 290.02 (1945); Missouri--Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.030 (1949);
Montana-MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54-1OA-2 (Supp. 1958); New York-N.Y. TAX LAW § 209 (1944);
New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-30 (1953); North Carolina-N.C.GEN.
STAT. § 105-134 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3830 (1943);
Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 874(d) (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 317.070 (1957); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp.
1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-2 (Supp. 1958); South
Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-222.1 (Supp. 1958); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-2701 (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-3 (Supp. 1959); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5902 (1959); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-128
(1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.01 & 71.02 (1957).

116. In General Trading Company v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U. S. 335
(1944), the requirements of both clauses of the Constitution were satisfied,

for the purpose of making an extra-state seller serve as a tax collector of a
use tax, even though the only connection of the taxing state with the seller
was the sending of seller's travelling salesmen into the taxing state. Of

course, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) held that solicitation from a sales office in the taxing state satisfied

commerce and due process clause requirements. That case is discussed, beginning at note 8 supra. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) held that the requisites of due process were met for the purpose of
acquiring judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where process was
served on salesmen soliciting business in the forum state. In McLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), solicitation of sales was held not to be a taxable event, where there was no sales office in the taxing state, although it is not
clear from the opinion whether the attempted sales tax offended the com-

merce or the due process clause.
117. GA.

CODE ANN. §

92-3113 (Supp. 1958).
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One other state, New York, has a provision stating what foreign
corporations are not considered to be doing business therein.1 1 8 Although the states may tax the income of every corporation domiciled
in the state or every foreign corporation doing business there, as
would be expected, there are variations among the statutes.1 1 9 However, all states but Alaska exempt certain corporations from the taxgenerally those engaged in nonprofit activity within the state. Organizations ordinarily exempted include labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations; certain fraternal benefit societies; nonprofit civic
and business organizations; nonprofit pleasure and recreation clubs;
certain farmer's marketing associations; federal land banks and national farm loan associations; building and loan associations; teacher's
retirement funds; and nonprofit cemetery and insurance companies. 120
C. Methods of Assigning Income for Tax Purposes
Having determined the general stucture of the tax and the corporations subject thereto, there still remains the problem of analyzing the
methods employed by the various taxing states to assign to each state
that portion of net income of the corporation which may be deemed to
be fairly attributable thereto. Such determination is necessary only if
118. N.Y. TAx LAws § 209 (1944).
119. Alabama subjects those corporations acting in a fiduciary capacity to
the tax. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 373 (1940). Arkansas subjects domestic and
foreign public utilities to the corporate tax. ARK. STAT. § 84-2003 (1947).
Idaho defines corporations subject to the tax as any corporation formed under
the laws of any government, any common law trust and any association of
whatever kind, other than a partnership. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3006 (Supp.
1959). Pennsylvania includes domestic and foreign corporations having
capital stock, joint stock associations or limited partnerships. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 3420 (b) (Supp. 1958).
120. See Alabama-ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 399 (1940); Arizona-Amiz.
CODE ANN. § 43-147,149 (1956); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2006 (1947);
California-CALiF. REV. AND TAX CODE § 23701 (1958); Colorado-CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 138-1-8 (1953); Connecticut-CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-214 (Supp.
1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b) (Supp. 1958); District of
Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1554 (1951); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 923105 (1937); Idaho-IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3026 (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA
CODE ANN. § 422.34 (1949); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3204 (1949);
Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (Supp. 1959); Louisiana-LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:121 (1952); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288(g)
(1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c.63, § 30 (1953); Minnesota-MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 290.05 (Supp. 1958); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.120 (1949);
Montana-MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54-1OA-2 (Supp. 1958); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-30
(1953); New York-N.Y. TAX LAw § 209 (1944); North Carolina-N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-138 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3809 (1943);
Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 912 (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 317.080 & 318.040 (1957); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420(b)
(Supp. 1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-1 (a) (1956); South
Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-226 (Supp. 1958); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. §
67-2701 (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-4 (1953); VermontVT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5908 (1959); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-128 (1959);
Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.01 (1957).
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the corporation carries on multistate operations and does not restrict
its trade or business to the taxing state.
The complete lack of uniformity of allocation and apportionment
methods used by the taxing states precludes the statement of a rule of
universal application. There are, however, three rather general methods for assigning income to a particular state for tax purposes. They
are (1) specific allocation, i.e., the allocation of particular classes of
income to a particular state wherein the income is said to have a
taxable situs; (2) separate accounting as a method properly reflecting
a reasonable attribution; (3) apportionment by means of a statutorily
prescribed mathematical formula. Each of these methods will now
be examined in some detail.
1. Specific Allocation.-The taxing statutes often require that particular items or classes of income be allocated or assigned in toto to
that state wherein the income can be said to have a taxable situs. The
allocation may be either on the basis of the recipient of the income
or its source.
For anything that the due process or commerce clauses have to say
about thematter, a state has power to tax residents upon their entire
net income, wherever earned. 1 1 The enjoyment of the privilege of
residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection
of its laws are said to be inseparable from sharing the cost of government. 12 Similarly, the state is the creator of a domestic corporation and for that privilege it can impose a tax upon its net income
wherever earned.12 It is obvious that this can lead to the inequity of
"double taxation" when a tax is also imposed upon the same income
12 4
by the state wherein the income producing property is located.
Also, a foreign corporation can acquire a "commercial domicile,"
separate and apart from the state of incorporation, for tax purposes.'2
Again, multiple taxation could result since the state of incorporation
could also constitutionally reach the same income.
121. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) (rent from
extra-state land); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932) (compensation for personal services rendered outside taxing state); Maguire v.
Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) (net income from bonds held in trust and administered in another state).
122. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
123. Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936) (tax
measured by net income); cf. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549
(1915) (gross receipts from business transacted within state). There has
been considerable commerce clause trouble when the state tries to tax the
gross income when the corporation it has created engaged in interstate commerce. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), discussed beginning at n. 276 infra.
124. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938).
125. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936) (property tax on
intangibles).
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Too, the source of the income is often made the basis of allocation
to a particular state, irrespective of the domiciliary or residence status
of the recipient.126 Although the owner of intangibles may neither be
domiciled in nor a resident of the taxing state, nevertheless it is
possible that the income may be treated as having its source therein
and taxable on the ground that the taxing state has jurisdiction over
the income though it has none over the recipient thereof.1 2 The due
process clause is said not to forbid a tax by the state where the income
is earned, since the taxing state affords the protection and security
128
enabling the taxpayer to earn income therein.
The classes of income commonly said to be specifically allocable by
source are designated "nonbusiness" income and generally include
(a) rents; (b) dividends and interest; (c) compensation for personal
services; (d) royalties from patents and copyrights; and (e) gains and
losses from the sale of capital assets. These classes and the statutory
provisions relating thereto will now be analyzed in more detail. The
states making provision for specific allocation are shown in Table II
of the Appendix.
(a) Rents.-Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia specify
rentals from real estate, including royalties from oil or minerals, as a
type of nonbusiness income that can be specifically allocated to its
source. 129 Location of the real estate is the controlling factor to determine the source of rental income. Related expenses in the production
of this income may generally be deducted from the total rental income
figure. It is apparent that double taxation may result since the state of
taxpayer's residence also has power to tax this income.
(b) Dividends and Interest.-The specific allocation of dividend income is provided for in the statutes of fifteen states and the District
126. E.g. New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 360 (1937) (income
from sale of right to seat on stock exchange located in taxing state).
127. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
128. Ibid.
129. Alaska-ALAsKA CoMP. LAws ANN. § 5(B) (1949); Arizona-ARIz.
CODE ANN. § 43-135(g) (1956); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2020 (1947); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN.
STAT. § 12-218 (Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b)
(Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. INCOME AND FRANCmSE TAx LAW
§ 10.2(c) (3) (1956); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (1937); Idaho-IDAHo
CODE ANN. § 63-3027(a) (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33(1)
(1949); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218 (Supp. 1957); Kentucky-

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(3) (1955); Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
47:242 (Supp. 1958); Maryland-MD. ANN.CODE art. 81, § 316(a) (1957); Minnesota-MiNw. STAT. ANN. § 290.17 (1945); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.100
(Supp. 1958); New York-N.Y. TAx LAW § 210 (1944); North Carolina-N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3812 (1943);
Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 68, § 878 (1954); South Carolina-S.C.CODE
§ 65-279.3(4) (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20(1) (Supp.
1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(1) (1957).
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of Columbia. 30 Most provide that such income is allocated to the state
wherein the taxpayer has its principal place of business. Others apparently would allocate dividends only to the state of taxpayer's
domicile. Wisconsin seems to so indicate.13 1
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia provide for the specific
allocation of interest income. 132 Interest derived from transactions
not connected with the business of the corporation is generally allocated to the state where the corporation has its principal place of
business. Yet two states, Delaware and Iowa, provide that it is to be
allocated to the state wherein the obligation is created. 133 The Massachusetts provision seems unusual in that it allocates therein only
interest received from a corporation organized under Massachusetts
law.13 4

Again, it is apparent that multiple taxation could result here with
respect to dividends. States have power to consider that dividends are
derived from sources within their borders and can impose a tax on the
dividend in the proportion which the declaring corporation derives its
income from sources within the state even though the dividend is declared by a foreign corporation outside the taxing state to recipients
who also are nonresidents1 35 The state of the recipient's residence
130. Alaska-ALsKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 5(B) (1949); Colorado-CoLo.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218
(Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. INcoME AND FRANcmsE TAX LAW

§ 10.2(c) (3) (1956); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (Supp. 1958); IdahoIDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3027(a) (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. §
422.33(1) (1949); Kansas-KAx. GEN. STAT. ANx. § 79-3218 (Supp. 1957);
Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:242 (Supp. 1958); Missouri-Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 143.100 (Supp. 1958); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134
(1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 (1943); Oregon-ORE. REv.
STAT. § 314.280(1) (1958); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-279.3(2) (Supp.
1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20(1) & (3) (Supp. 1959); ArkansasARK.STAT. § 84-2020 (1947).
131. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(1) (1957).
132. Alaska-ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 5(B) (1949); Arkansas-ARK.
STAT. § 84-2020 (1947); Colorado-CoLo. REv.' STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958);
Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218 (Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C. INCOME AND
FRANCHISE TAX LAW § 10.2(c) (3)

(1956); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113

(Supp. 1958); Idaho-IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3027(a) (Supp. 1959); IowaIOWA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1) (1949); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218
(Supp. 1957); Louisiana-LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:242 (Supp. 1958); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 63, § 37 & 41 (1953); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 143.100 (Supp. 1958); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958);
North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 (1943); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT.
ANN.

tit. 68, § 878

(1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1)

(1958);

South Carolina--S.C.CODE § 65-279.3(1) (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 59-13-20(1) & (3) (Supp. 1959).
133. Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (b) (6) (Supp. 1958); IowaIOWA CODE ANN. § 422.33(1) (1949).
134. MASS. ANN. LAWS c.63, § 41 (1953).
135. International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S.
435 (1944) (tax phrased in terms of privilege of declaring and receiving dividends); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (to same effect);
Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940) (to same

effect, where commerce clause invoked).
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can, of course, also tax the dividend,13 6 and so can the state of the de137
claring corporation's domicile.
(c) Compensation for Personal Services.-Six states'3 8 have statutory provisions requiring the specific allocation of this class of income.
The source of such income is considered to be the place where the
service is rendered, irrespective of the residence or domicile of the
taxed employee, employer or place where the income is paid. This, of
course, can result in double taxation of the same income because the
state of the taxpayer's residence also has power to tax residents upon
their entire net income wherever earned.
(d) Royalties from Patents and Copyrights.-There is specific allocation of royalties from patents and copyrights in twelve states and
the District of Columbia. 139 Again, the principal place of business of
the taxpayer generally determines the state to which such income
shall be allocated, the property being considered to have its situs
there. There are, however, at least two other viewpoints. Delaware
allocates the income proportionately to the state in which the product
protected by the patent is manufactured or used, or in which the
publication protected by the copyright is produced or printed. 140 This,
in effect, seems to reject the principal place of business concept. Louisiana allocates royalties or similar revenue to the state or states in
which such rights are used.141
(e) Gains and Losses from the Sale of Capital Assets.-Situs of
the asset determines whether allocation of a capital gain or loss is
to be made to a state. There seems to be no disagreement on this
among the fifteen states providing for allocation of this, type of
income. 142
136. See cases note 121 supra.
137. See cases note 123 supra.

138. Alaska-ALAsKA Covivp. LAWS ANN. § 5(B) (1949); Arkansas-Anx.
STAT. § 84-2020 (1947); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3027(a) (Supp. 1959);
Minnesota-InN. STAT. ANN. § 290.17 (1945); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 143.100 (Supp. 1958); New York-N.Y. TAx LAW § 210 (1944).
139. Alaska-ALAsA Cor". LAWS ANN. § 5(B) (1949); Colorado-COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218
(Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (Supp. 1958);
District of Columbia-D.C. INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAx LAw § 10.2(c) (3)

(1956); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3027 (a) (Supp. 1959); Iowa-IowA COnE
ANN. § 422.33(1) (1949); Louisiana- LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:243 (Supp.
1958); New York-N.Y. TAX LAW § 210 (1944); North Carolina-N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-134 (1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 (1943);
Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1) (1958); South Carolina-S.C. CODE §
65-279.3(3) (Supp. 1958).
140. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (2) (Supp. 1958).
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:243 (Supp. 1958).
142. Arkansas-ARK. STAT. § 84-2020 (1947); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218 (Supp.
1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (Supp. 1958); GeorgiaGA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (1937); Idaho-IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3027(a) (Supp.
1959); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218 (Supp. 1957); Louisiana-
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A few states have provisions for specific allocation which seem
broad enough to include the above types of "nonbusiness" income
though not specifically mentioned in the statutes. Brief mention is
143
made of each of these in the footnotes.
Two states have unusual statutory provisions. In New Jersey, no
corporation, foreign or domestic (other than a taxpayer entitled to
report as an investment company), can allocate any of its income to
a state other than New Jersey unless it maintains a regular place of
business outside New Jersey. A corporation which is entitled to
report as an investment company is one whose business consists of at
least 90% of holding or investing in stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages
and other such securities for its own account. 144 The statute makes
no mention of any types of nonbusiness income specifically allocable
to source. 145 Pennsylvania's code provision makes specific allocation
available only when there is a gain or loss from the sale of capital
assets.

146

It should be noted that most of the above statutes give the state
tax commission discretionary power specifically to allocate other
items as may be deemed necessary.
Eight states-Alabama, California, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia-have no provision for
specific allocation. 147
2. Separate Accounting.-Where the taxpayer is a resident of a
state which taxes residents on their entire net income irrespective
of its source, the state is not required to make any sort of apportionment since the entire amount can be allocated to the taxing state.
Also, as we have seen, certain types of "nonbusiness" income can be
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:242 (Supp. 1958); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS
c. 63, § 37 & 41 (1953); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.100 (Supp. 1958);
North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 (1943); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-279.3
(Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20(2) (Supp. 1959); Wisconsin
-WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(1) (1957).
143. Arizona, though somewhat unclear, seems to have a provision allocating income following the situs of property or residence of the recipient. AnIz.
CODE ANN. § 43-135 (1956). Wisconsin also has a similar provision. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 71.07(1) (1957). Iowa provides for specific allocation or equitable apportionment when income is derived from other than the manufacture
or sale of tangible personal property, under rules and regulations of the
Commission. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.33(b) (1949). Kentucky has a threepronged provision for allocation of tangible and intangible property even
though no specific items are named. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(3) (1955).
Minnesota states that income from intangible property not in the business of
the taxpayer shall be allocated to Minnesota if the recipient is domiciled in
the state. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.17 (1945). Oklahoma provides for specific
allocation of income from intangible personal property according to the
domiciliary situs of the taxpayer. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878 (1954).
144. N.J. Corp. Bus. Tax Act Reg. § 16:10-1.200 (1959).
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54: 10A-5 (d) (Supp. 1958).
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958).
147. However, cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-32 (c) (1953).
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segregated and specifically allocated in toto to a particular state on
the basis of the source from which the income is derived.
However, the great bulk of "business" income (as distinguished
from "nonbusiness" income) does not lend itself to specific allocation
to one particular state in toto. Thus, the operating income of a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer cannot satisfactorily be allocated by
source where the business is multistate. To deal with this problem
of apportioning such income, the states employ either one or both
of two methods: (a) the separate accounting method; and (b)
apportionment by mathematical formula. First, we will have a look
at the nature and limits of the "separate accounting" method.
When this method is used in a business that operates multistate,
the business operations within the taxing state are treated as though
separate and distinct from the business carried on outside the state.
An attempt is made to determine the net income from the taxing
state in the same manner that it would be if the entire business operation were confined to the taxing state. The income producing activity
within each taxing jurisdiction is accounted for separately. So far
as possible, each item of revenue and expense is associated with its
source, and general overhead expense items are associated with
specific revenues on some acceptable accounting basis. Since the business in the taxing state is considered separate, the income is determined without reference to the success or failure of the taxpayer's
operations in other states. 148 If a taxpayer's accounts can be so kept
as properly to reflect all business attributable to a given state, taking
into account both receipts and expenses, such separate accounting
may serve as an adequate method of apportioning taxable income to
that state.
Certain types of multistate businesses do lend themselves to the
separate accounting method, such as mining, banking, farming and
hotel operations. It is possible, of course, that even some of these
businesses may have sales organizations in other states and thus
really be unitary in nature and not suitable for the separate accounting method.
There are certain serious obstacles to the use of the separate
accounting method which limit its usefulness and applicability in
apportioning income to a given state. When the business within the
taxing state is not a separate business, but an integral part of a
multistate unitary business, the income from the operations within
each state cannot be determined in any satisfactory fashion. The
larger part of business income of unitary businesses extending into
148. See Cohen, State Allocations and Formulas Which Affect Management
OperatingDecisions, 1 J. TAxAiox 2, 3 (1954).
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more than one state cannot be assigned satisfactorily to a given state
by the separate accounting method. The determination by this method
of the economic effect within prescribed geographic limits of any
particular phase of a unitary business is artificial and awkward. The
income may be earned by a series of multistate transactions beginning with buying profit in one state, manufacturing or production
profit in another state and ending with sales profit in other states.
Moreover, attempted separate accounting for such central staff functions as purchasing, advertising, financing, accounting, engineering,
and legal would, at best, be arbitrary, uncertain and difficult. 149
Apportioning taxable income to a particular state by the separate
accounting method should not be employed where the income is from
a unitary multistate business, where the different activities are interrelated and are benefited each by the other. In a unitary business,
some formula which gives weight to the different factors responsible
for earning the income is the only satisfactory solution to the problem
of apportioning the income from the entire unitary business organism
among the various states where it is conducted.
As concerns separate accounting, the statutory provisions generally
take one of three approaches: (1) allow the corporation to use such a
method if the business is not unitary; (2) require the taxpayer corporation to petition the Commissioner of Revenue or similar official
if they wish to use this method, or think any other method to be
improper; (3) give the Commissioner discretionary power to require
or reject such a method if he thinks it is necessary.
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have provisions
adopting one or all of the above approaches. 15 0 Ten states-Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont-make no statutory allowance for
separate accounting. Tennessee allows this method only if the taxpayer is a construction company. 151 Though not provided for by
149. Id. at 1.

150. AZabama-Ala. Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2(A) (1959); Alaska-ALAsKA
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 5(C) (4) (1949); Arizona-ARIz. CODE ANN. § 43-135(g)
(1956); Colorado-CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28(1) (1953); DelawareDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(c) (Supp. 1958); District of Columbia-D.C.
(1956); Idaho-IDAHo CODE
ANN. § 63-3027(d) (Supp. 1959); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3217
(1949); Kentucky-Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(4) (1955); Louisiana-LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:244 (Supp. 1958); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 316(b) (1957); Minnesota-tNN1. STAT. ANN. § 290.20 (Supp. 1958); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.080 (1949); Montana-MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 84-1503 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. A.NN. § 54:10A-8 (Supp.
1958); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-32(d) (1953); New York-N.Y.
TAx LAW § 210 (1944); North Carolina-N.C.GEN. STAT. § 105-134(g) (1958);
North Dakota-N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3814(2) (1943); Oklahoma-OKL..A. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 878(h) (1954); Oregon-OR.E. REV. STAT. § 314.280(2) (1957);
INcOME AND FRANcmsE TAX LAW § 10.2(c) (4)

South Carolina-S.C.CODE § 65-279.14 (Supp. 1958); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN.

§ 58-131.1 (1959); Wisconsin-WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(2)
151. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2710 (Supp. 1958).

(1957).
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statute, however, this method might be available to a taxpayer as a
result of a judicial decision. For example, such seems to be the case
in Arkansas 152 and Georgia. 153 The states allowing separate accounting
are shown in Table II of the Appendix.
Some states have distinct statutory provisions for the use of separate
accounting by railroad companies, interstate bridge companies and
154
telephone and telegraph companies.
3. Apportionment of Income by Mathematical Formula.-What is
the nature and theory of apportioning income by means of a mathematical formula? As we have seen, in a unitary multistate business,
no method of assigning income can precisely determine the exact
amount of income attributable to any geographic area or to any given
part of a series of multistate business transactions culminating in the
realization of profit. Hence any effort in that regard necessarily must
be somewhat arbitrary and unrealistic. For all such income the taxing
states have devised statutory apportionment formulas designed to
arrive at a fraction of income properly and reasonably attributable
to a given state. The mathematical formula method of apportionment
is based upon the assumption that the entire income of a business
enterprise is the final result of certain income producing factors or
elements, such as property, payrolls, sales and costs of manufacturing.
From this premise it is reasoned that the income produced by the
combination of these factors or activities has its source at the locations of the income producing factors. 15 As we will presently see,
the factors used by the various states in their respective apportionment formulas vary widely among the different states, as well as
between classes of businesses in the same state.
How does the formula method operate as to the apportionment of
net income? First of all, the entire net income of a multistate business
is determined. As we have seen earlier, this is done by deducting
from the entire gross income the total expenses and other deductible
items.156 After the entire net income is determined, then income not
connected with the unitary business is usually deducted from the
entire net income. Generally, the "nonbusiness" income, is deducted.
This "nonbusiness" income, as we saw, includes such items as gains
from capital assets, interest, dividends, etc., which may be allocated
according to the location or situs of the property or otherwise. After
this "nonbusiness" income deduction is made, the residue of the net
152. General Box Co. v. Scurlock, 224 Ark. 266, 272 S.W.2d 678 (1954).
153. Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Head, 64 Ga. App. 529, 13 S.E.2d 887
(1941).
154. See, e.g., Mo. ANx. STAT. §§ 143.050, 143.060, 143.070 (1949).
155. See Cohen, State Tax Allocations and Formulas Which Affect Management Operating Decision, 1 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1954).
156. See discussion of this point in text supported by notes 102 through 110
supra.
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income from the unitary business, which is the net income for tax
purposes, is then apportioned according to the relevant formula to
the particular state. This apportionment is made on the basis which
the average of the factors of the formula within the taxing state bears
to the average of the total of such factors within and without the
taxing state.
What are the different formulas and factors used by the various
taxing states? An analysis of the statutes and regulations of the
states employing such corporate taxes reveals eleven different formulas, which are composed of one or a combination of eight different
factors. The substantial lack of uniformity in the provisions has
apparently resulted because of the desire of each' state to devise a
formula and define the factors included therein in a manner most
advantageous, taxwise, to itself.
The eleven different formulas and the state using each are as
follows:
(1) Iowa and Missouri use a one-factor formula of sales. 157
(2) North Dakota uses a two-factor formula composed of property and business.158
(3) New Mexico uses a two-factor formula consisting of sales
and business done. 59
(4) The District of Columbia employs the two-factor formula of
sales and costs.160

(5) Virginia and Colorado use a two-factor formula composed
161
of property and gross receipts.
(6) Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Vermont
provide for a three-factor formula of sales, property and
162
payroll.
157. IowA CoDE: A..

§ 422.33(b) (1949); Mo. AN.

STAT. § 143.040 (1949).

158. N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 & 3813 (1943).

159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-32 (1953).
160. D.C. INcomE AND FRA cH E TAX LAW § 10.2(c) (1956).
161. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-131.1

(1959).
162. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 5(C) (2)

(1949).

As to Alaska sales factor

see, Alaska Laws 1959 (effective Jan. 1, 1960), ch. 175 § 5(c). CALU'. REV. AND
TAX CODE § 25101 (1958). As to California sales factor see, El Dorado Oil
Works v. McColgan, 34 Cal.2d 731, 215 P.2d 4 (1950). CONN. GEN STAT. §
12-218 (Supp. 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (7) (Supp. 1958);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3027(d) (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.120(4) (b)
(1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:245 (Supp. 1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §
316(b) (1957); Ali. STAT. ANN. § 290.19 (Supp. 1958); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84-1503 (Supp. 1958); N.Y. TAx LAw § 210 (1944); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-134 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1) (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 44-11-14 (1956); S.C. CODE § 65-279.5 (Supp. 1958); VT. STAT. ANN. §

32-5903 (a) (1959).
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(7) Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Utah use a
three-factor formula consisting of gross receipts, property
163
and payroll.
(8) Alabama, Kansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin employ a formula consisting of sales, property and manufacturing costs.

164

(9) Arkansas provides for a three-factor formula composed of
65
sales, property and cost of sales.
(10) Georgia has adopted a three-factor formula of gross receipts,
payroll and average inventory.166
(11) Arizona uses a five-factor formula composed of sales, purchases, manufacturing costs, payroll and property.167 The
various factors included in the formula used by each state
is shown in Table II of the Appendix.
How is the formula applied? Generally, the factors of the formula
are averaged. Thus, using a three factor formula of property, payroll
and sales, suppose a corporation has 30% of its property, 40% of its
payroll and 50% of its sales in the taxing state. Averaging the three
factors, its assignable percentage will be 40, and it will allocate 40%
of its income to the taxing state. Giving equal weight to each of the
factors of the typical three-factor formula may produce some unrealistic and inequitable results in certain types of businesses, because
each of the factors represented in the apportionment formula does
not always contribute equally in the production of the net income to
be apportioned. 168
There are, of course, certain distinct advantages to the formula
method of allocation of net income. This method is relatively simple
to apply and it avoids the guesswork, conjecture and uncertainties
that are incident to the "separate accounting" method. Also, taxable
net income will not be attributed to any state unless the entire business, of which the business within the taxing state is an integral part,
is operated at a profit. By the same token, under the formula method
losses need not be attributed to any state unless the entire business
is operated at a loss. 169
163. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 63, § 38(2), 41(d) (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54: 10A-6 (Supp. 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420 (b) & (n) (Supp. 1958);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20(6) (Supp. 1959).
164. Ala. Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2(B) (1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218(c)
(Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878(g) (1954); TENN. CODs ANN.

§ 67-2707 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(2) (1957).
165. See General Box Co. v. Scurlock, 224 Ark. 266, 272 S.W.2d 678 (1954).
166. GA. CODEANN. § 92-3113(3) & (4) (1937).
167. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-135 (g) (1956).
168. See Chwals, The Uniform Apportionment Formula for State Income
Taxes, 33 TAXES 212, 214 (1955); Cox, Uniformity of State Income Taxation,

30 TAxES 184 (1952).

169. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton,
Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
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The due process and commerce clauses have been invoked in resisting the formula method of apportionment, but without much
success. Where the entire multistate business shows a profit, a particular state may be able, insofar as the due process clause is concerned,
to claim taxable income although the operations in the taxing state
show a loss. 170 The operations in the taxing jurisdiction are considered
as being only a portion of the entire unitary multistate operations of
the business. In short, any formula which is reasonably designed to
determine the amount of income attributable to local business activity
7
will be upheld, over commerce and due process clause objections.' '
A taxpayer may, however, be able to carry the burden of proving
that a particular formula does not give proper weight to the out-ofstate activities of its business and that, accordingly, the result reached
by the taxing state is unreasonable. 172
4. An Analysis of the Various Formula Factors.-The actual extent
of the diversity in apportionment procedures can be fully understood
only by an investigation of the definitions of the various apportionment factors. An analysis of these various definitions will also reveal
the vexatious problems, and oftimes inequities, which inhere in the
present tax structures applicable to income from multistate business.
Even though many states use superficially the same formula, they
often define the factors differently.
(a) Property as a Factor.-The basic problems that arise in an
attempt to analyze the statutes of those states employing property as
a factor in their formula concern: (a) the general scope of the term
!'property" as used therein; (b) whether "property" includes rented
as well as owned property; (c) the mode of valuation of property for
inclusion therein.
As to the first, property within the formula of these states is
generally said to consist of all real and tangible personal property
located within the taxing state. 73 This would include buildings, land,
machinery, inventories and other property used by the corporation
in the production of income.
170. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).

171. Ibid.; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920);

cf. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947) (gross receipts
included in tax); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939) (gross
receipts included in tax). See Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for
State Tax Purposes,35 TAXEs 747, 748 (1957).

172. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) (single
factor property formula used).
173. Alaska-ALAsKA Covn. LAWS ANN. § 5(c) (2) (1949); AZabama-Ala.
Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2(B) (1959); Arizona-ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-135(g)
(1956); Arkansas-GeneralBox Co. v. Scurlock, 224 Ark. 266, 272 S.W.2d 678
(1954); California-CA=F. REv. AND TAX CODE § 25101 (1958); ColoradoCOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 12-218 (Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (b) (7) (Supp.
1958); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3027 (d) (Supp. 1959); Kansas-KA. GE.
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As concerns the second question, fifteen states'7 4 include rented as
well as owned property within the factor. Nine of the fifteen states
so including provide for valuation of the rented property at eight
times the annual gross rent, 7 5 gross rent including all consideration
paid by the taxpayer for the use of the rented property.
Lastly, there are in use at least five methods of valuation of real
and tangible personal property owned by the taxpayer in these
states. Sixteen of the states value owned property by adding the
value at the beginning of the year to the value at the end of the
year, and then dividing the total by two to obtain an average yearly
value. 7 6 Two states, Arizona and California, by analogy to the gen77
eral property tax, apparently value property at "full cash value.'
Connecticut uses the "average monthly net book value" method. This
is similar to the average yearly method above and differs only in that
the values at the beginning of each month in a year are added and
STAT. ANN. § 79-3218(c) (Supp. 1957); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. §
141.120(4) (b) (1955); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:245 (Supp. 1958);
Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(b) (1957); Massachusetts-MAss.
ANN.LAws ch. 63, § 38(2) & 41(d) (1953); Minnesota-MNhN. STAT. ANN. §
290.19 (Supp. 1958); Montana-MONT. REV.CODES ANN. § 84-1503 (Supp. 1958);
New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54: 1OA-6 (Supp. 1958); New York-N.Y. TAX
LAw § 210 (1944); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958); North
Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 & 3813 (1943); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 878(g) (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1) (1958);
Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958); Rhode IslandR.I. GEN.LAWS ANN. § 44-11-14 (1956); South Carolina-S.C.CODE § 65-279.5
(Supp. 1958); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2707 (1955); Utah-UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-13-20 (6) (Supp. 1959); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5903 (a)
(1959); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-131.1 (1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 71.07 (2) (1957).
174. Alaska-ALAsKA LAws 1959 (effective Jan. 1, 1960), c. 175, § 5(c) (12);
Arizona-Aniz. CODE ANN. § 42-201 (1956); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 12-218 (Supp. 1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (b) (7) (Supp.
1958); Maryland-MD. INc. TAx LAw & REG. § 312(b) (1957); Montana-Mont.
Corp. License Tax Reg. ch. 9, § 907; New York-N.Y. Bus. Corp. Franchise
Tax Reg. 9-A, art. 412(1) (1956); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134
(1958); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3812 & 3813 (1943); OklahomaOKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878 (g) (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280 (1)
(1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-14(1) (1956); South
Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-279.7(7) (Supp. 1958); Vermont-VT. CoRP. FRANciSE TAx REG. art, 402 (1954); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07 (2) (1957).
175. So in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and Vermont.
176. Alaska-Alaska Laws 1959 (effective Jan. 1, 1960), ch. 175, § 5(C) (14);
Alabama-Ala. Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2 (1959); Colorado-COLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 138-1-28 (1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (7) (Supp.
1958); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3218(c)(1) (Supp. 1957); Kentucky-KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120 (4) (d) (1955); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47:245(G) (Supp. 1958); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 63, §
38(4) (1953); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3813(1) (1943); Oklahoma
-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878 (1954); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1)
(1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-14(1) (1956); South
Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-279.7 (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. §
59-13-20(6) (a) (Supp. 1959); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5903 (a) (1)
(1959); Wisconsin-Wis. Admin. Code, Tax § 2.42(1) (1956).
177. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 42-201 (1956); CALIF. REV. 'AN TAx CODE § 101-2195
(1958).
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divided by twelve. 178 New Jersey and New York use average quarterly value and add the values at every three months interval and
divide by four. 179 North Carolina adopts the concept of original cost
adjusted for depreciation. 180
Here, there is need for a uniform definition of what is property, as
well as the need for a standard method of valuation both as to rented
and owned property.
(b) Payrolls as a Factor.-Those states employing payrolls as a
factor generally express it as ratio of compensation paid within the
state to total compensation paid everywhere. 181 Compensation includes wages, bonuses, salaries or any other form of remuneration
paid by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by employees
182
within the state.
There is some controversy over inclusion of the salaries of executive
officers within the term "compensation." Delaware, New York, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Vermont indicate that it does not include officer's salaries, 8 3 whereas Louisiana and New Jersey, among
84
others, indicate that it does.
The states are in agreement that the services rendered must be
in connection with the business carried on within the state and if the
employee performs services both within and without the state, the
state where he "chiefly" operates seems to be the proper state for
185
attribution.
178. CONN. Gm. STAT. § 12-218 (Supp. 1958).

179. N.J. Corp. Bus. Tax Act Reg. § 16:10-4.150 (1959); N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Franchise Tax Reg. 9-A, art. 412 (1956).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958).
181. Alaska-ALAsKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 5(C) (2) (1949); Arizona-Ainz.
CODE ANN. § 43-135(g) (1956); California-CALiF. REV. AND TAX CODE § 25101
(1958); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218 (Supp. 1958); DelawareDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (b) (7) (Supp. 19 58); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN.
§ 92-3113(3) & (4) (1937); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3027(d) (Supp.
1959); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. § 141.120(4) (b) (1955); Louisiana-LA. REV.
STAT. ANm. § 47:245 (Supp. 1958); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(b)

(1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAws ch.63 § 38 (2) & 41 (d) (1953); Minnesota-Mm. STAT. ANN. § 290.19 (Supp. 1958); Montana-MoNT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84-1503 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54: 10A-6 (Supp.

1958); New York-N.Y. TAx LAw § 210 (1944); North Carolina-N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-134 (1958); Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(1)

(1958); Pennsyl-

vania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420 (b) (Supp. 1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 44-11-14 (1956); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 65-279.5 (Supp.

1958); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-20(6) (Supp. 1959); Vermont-VT.
STAT. ANN. § 32-5903 (a) (1959).
182. See note 71 supra.
183. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(b) (7) (Supp. 1958); N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Franchise Tax Reg. 9-A, art. 414(2) (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134 (1958);
S.C. CODE § 65-279.8 (Supp. 1958); VT. CORP. FRAcBsE TAx REG. art. 404
(1954).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:245 (F) (3) (Supp. 1958); N.J. Corp. Bus. Tax
Act Reg. § 16:10-4.270 (1959).
185. See note 181 supra.
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(c) Cost of Manufacturing as a Factor.--Alabama, Arizona, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Tennessee and Wisconsin use this as a factor in their
formula and express it as a ratio of total cost of manufacturing, collecting, assembling or processing within the state, to total cost of
manufacturing, collecting, assembling or processing everywhere. 1 6
Only Alabama and Wisconsin define what is meant by cost of manufacturing and state that it includes total cost of goods and supplies
used in manufacturing, wages paid in such manufacturing and other
overhead costs assignable to the activities by good accounting prac187
tices.
(d) Gross Receipts as a Factor.-This factor is generally defined as
the ratio of gross receipts from business done within the state to
total gross receipts from business done everywhere, in states so
employing it.
Seven states use this as a factor in their formula and include income
from sales, services performed in the state, rents and royalties from
property situated in the state or patents and other business income,
as elements of gross receipts. 188
(e) Purchase as a Factor.-Arizona is the only state using purchases
as a factor in their formula. The statute provides: "The numerator
of the purchases fraction shall include all purchases resulting from
employee buying activity of the taxpayer within Arizona."' 89 There
is no further explanation of this factor to be found in the code or
regulations of Arizona.
(f) Average Inventory as a Factor.-Georgiauses average inventory
as a factor in their formula and defines it thusly:
The ratio of the average of the monthly inventories of all products held
in this State for sale, lease or other distribution or use in connection with
the trade or business of the taxpayer during the taxable year to the
average of the total monthly inventories of all products held everywhere
for sale, lease or other distribution in connection with the trade or business of the taxpayer. The term 'products' shall include goods, wares, and
merchandise of every character and kind, whether owned by the taxpayer or held on consignment or otherwise, but shall not include unrecovered or unextracted natural resources, raw materials, or goods in
process of manufacture.E0
186. Ala. Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2(B) (2) (1959); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-135(g)
(1956); D.C. INCOME AND FRANcMSE TAx LAW § 10.2(c) (1956); KAN. GEN.
ANN. § 79-3218(c) (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878(g) (1954);
TENN. CODE ANN.§ 67-2707 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(2) (1957).
187. See note 186 supra.
188. Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958); Georgia-GA.
CODE ANN. § 92-3113(4) (c) (1937); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAws c. 63,
§ 38(6) (1953); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-6 (Supp. 1958);
Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958); Utah-UTAUI
CODE ANN. § 59-13-20 (6) (1953); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-131.1 (1959).
189. ARiz.CoDE ANN.§43-135(g) (1956).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113(4) (a) (1937).
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(g) Business Factor.-North Dakota uses this along with property
as a factor and states that the business of a corporation other than
a public utility
shall be measured by the amount that the corporation has paid out
during the year for which the income is returned for wages, salaries, or
other compensation to employees and for the purchase of goods, materials
and supplies consumed or sold in the regular course of business, plus the
amount of all receipts from sales and other sources connected with said
business, excluding, however, receipts from the sale of capital assets and
property not sold in the regular course of business, and also

. . .

[Items

specifically allocated] .191
The percentage is determined by the ratio of business within the
state to total business.
(h) Sales as a Factor.-"Sales" is a factor in most formulas, and an
analysis of the applicable statutes reveals the presence of at least
four broad concepts of a "sale," with possible additional variations
among these. Each state, of course, has defined sales for inclusion
within that factor in a fashion that will best suit its own fiscal needs.
Thirteen states have adopted the "sale by destination" theory.
Under this view delivery to, and receipt of goods, merchandise or
property by the "purchaser" within the state constitutes a sale
therein. 192 In five of these thirteen states, moreover, this result would
still obtain though the goods were delivered to one designated as a
recipient by an out-of-state "purchaser.' 193 Under this theory the
state of the "market" gets the fiscal advantage of the sales factor
rather than the "producing" states.
Seven states use the "state of origin" theory, i.e., that transactions
effected through the maintenance of sales offices, stores, warehouses
or factories within a state are sales attributable to the state in which
191. N.D. REV. CODE § 57-3813(2) (1943).

192. Alabam-Ala. Inc. Tax Reg. § 398.2(B) (3) (1959); Alaska-Alaska
Laws 1959 (effective Jan. 1, 1960), ch. 175, § 5(c) (18); Colorado-CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1958) (note that Colorado follows a "gross receipts"
factor but as a necessary element thereof, defines sales as "sales by destina-

tion"); Delaware-DEL. CODE AwN. tit. 30, § 1903 (b) (7) (Supp. 1958); Georgia
-GA.
CODE ANN. § 92-3113(4) (c) (1937) (note that Georgia, as Colorado

supra, employs a "gross receipts" factor, with similar definition of sales
thereon); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33(b) (1949); Kansas-Kan. Inc. Tax

Reg. (1958) (Kansas could also be classified as state of origin, see footnote
194, infra); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:245(F) (3) (Supp. 1958);
Montana-Mont. Corp. License Tax Reg. ch.9, § 906; New Jersey-N.J. STAT.

Avx. § 54: 1OA-6 (Supp. 1958) (New Jersey, as Colorado and Georgia, employs a "gross receipts" factor with similar definition of sales therein. New
Jersey could also be classified according to state of origin. See footnote 194,

infra); North Carolina-N.C.GEm. STAT. § 105-134 (1958); Oklahoma-OKLA.

STAT. ANN.tit. 68, § 878(g) (1954)

(Oklahoma might also be classified under

"state of origin" theory); South Carolina--S.C. CODE § 65-279.9 (Supp. 1958).
193. E.g., Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, North Carolina and South Caro-

lina.
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such offices, stores, warehouses or factories are located, although
delivery of the goods is to be out-of-state. 194 This method of allocating
a sale, of course, favors the "producing" states.
Another concept of "sale" that is employed is the "activities or
solicitation" theory. Four states and the District of Columbia seem
195
By this definition,
to make their definition of "sale" turn on this.
any sales resulting from promotion and solicitation and various other
types of employee activity within the state are considered attributable
to the state of such activity. The statutes are not at all precise as to
what constitutes "activity" within a state.
Closely related to the "activities or solicitation" theory is a concept
for allocating a sale adopted in four states. These attribute sales
to the locus of the office, agency or place of business at or from which
the transactions giving rise to the sale are chiefly negotiated and
196
executed.
New York and Vermont have lengthy and detailed definitions of a
sale. 19 7 Both seemingly adopt the "state of origin" theory.
It is difficult to classify Missouri under any particular concept of
sale. The Missouri statutes provide:
The amount of sales which are transactions wholly in this state shall
be added to one-half of the amount of sales which are transactions partly
within this state and partly without this state and the amount thus
obtained shall be divided by the total sales . . .and the net income shall
194. Kansas-Kan.Inc. Tax Reg. (1958) (See also footnote 192 supra); New
Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-6 (Supp. 1958) (See also footnote 192
supra); New Mexico-N.M. Inc. Tax Reg. No. 3 § 76-1231(a) (1948); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878(g) (1954) (See also footnote 192
supra); Tennessee-Tenn. Franchise & Excise Tax Reg. rule 15 (1956); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-131.1 (1959) (Virginia employs a gross receipts
factor but defines sales therein according to state of origin); Wisconsin-Wis.
Admin. Code, Tax § 2.42(3) (1956). As to Minnesota, see footnote 196 infra.
195. Arizona-Ariz. Inc. Tax Reg. § 135-8-(D)-5 (1954); California-El
Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, 34 Cal. 2d 731, 215 P.2d 4 (1950); District of
Columbia-D.C. INCOME AND FRANcHIsE TAX LAW § 10.2(c) (1) (1956); Montana-Mont. Corp. License Tax Reg. c. 9, § 906; Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. §
314.280(1) (1958).
196. Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-218 (Supp. 1958); Kentucky-Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(4) (f) (1955); North Dakota-N.D. REV. CODE §
57-3812 (1943) (North Dakota employs a "business" factor but defines sales
therein according to state of negotiation); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 44-11-14(2) (1956). Minnesota seems to include sales upon the basis of both
state of origin theory and place of negotiation and execution. This conclusion
is based upon a letter from the Department of Taxation, State of Minnesota,
dated September 2, 1959.
197. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Franchise Tax Reg. 9-A, art. 413 (1956); Vt. Corp.
Franchise Tax Reg. art. 403 (A-B) (1954). Note also that in footnote 165
supra, Arkansas was listed as employing a sales factor. However, it has not
been possible to ascertain the definition of sale employed therein. Too, in footnote 162 supra, Idaho and Maryland were stated to employ a sales factor.
Definitions of sale in those states are not here included, however, since extensive statutory and regulatory revision is currently in process in those
states in this general area.
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be multiplied by the fraction thus obtained to determine the proportion
of
of income to be used to arrive at the amount of tax, and the amount
8
tax shall be such percent thereon as may hereafter be provided.19
The Missouri Department of Revenue has indicated, however, that
in certain instances it has used a three-factor formula in which sales
were required to be included at 100%, regardless of their contact with
the state of Missouri. 199 This seems contrary to the basic notion that
the amount of sales attributable to a state should depend on a relationship of the effort to produce that sale in the state to the overall
effort to produce sales everywhere.
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of states
using the "state-of-destination" and the "state-of-solicitation" definitions of the taxable situs of a sale. 200 This trend presumably has come
about because of the increased revenue needs of the states, as well
as the result of litigation apparently thought to have cleared the way
for the states to use these definitions of sales when corporate income is
involved.201 Of course, the taxing formulas using these definitions of
sales must now operate within the restricted framework of the recent
congressional statute ousting the power of the states to impose a net
income tax from the sale of tangible personal property when the only
contact of the out-of-state seller is that of mere solicitation of orders
which are then sent to an extra-state source where they are approved
and the orders then filled by shipment from an out-of-state source
2 02
to the customer in the taxing state.
198. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 143.040 (1949).
199. Letter from Department of Revenue, State of Missouri, September 2,
1959.
200. See Studenski & Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, 36
HAav. Bus. Rav. 77, 86-87 (Nov.-Dec. 1958). See Statement of John Dane, Jr.,
representing U.S. Chamber of Commerce, at the Hearings before the Select
Committee on Small Business United States Senate, "State Taxation on Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 21-23 (1959). Earlier, more
states had been using the "location of sales office," and the "source of physical
goods" definition of a "sale," with but few states using the "point of destination" as the definition. See Cohen, State Allocations and Formulas Which
Affect Management Operating Decisions, 1 J. TAxATxON 2, 8-9 (1954). A few
pages later, when the "Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act"
is analyzed, there will be an appraisal of the various definitions of sales. See
discussion beginning with note 207 infra, and going through note 213 infra.
201. The case of West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946)
apparently was believed to give the green light for using solicitation as the
basis for the tax. That case is discussed in connection with note 27 supra.
For an opinion by one tax official that the West Publishing decision resulted
in action by his state to tax net income from interstate commerce, see Statement of James E. Luckett, Commissioner of Revenue of Kentucky, Hearing
before the Select Committee on Small Business United States Senate, "State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 26-27 (1959).
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) had held
that the "transfer of possession" in the taxing state could constitute a taxable
event when a sales tax was in question.
202. See notes 86 through 95 supra, and supporting text, for discussion of
this law.
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The most vexatious problems in connection with the apportionment
factors lie in these varying definitions of the "sales" factor. Here is
to be found the largest source spring for multiple taxation. Every
state employing a factor formula has provided for inclusion of receipts from sales therein either under a "sales," "gross receipts" or
"business" factor. The basic trouble flows from the wide discrepancy
among the different states with regard to the operation of the "sales"
factor in the formula. The discrepancy results, of course, from the
fact that the various states have adopted "situs of sales" rules favorable to themselves in the light of local characteristics, without any
regard to the impact upon taxpayers engaged in unitary operations in
a number of states. More than three different methods or rules for
locating a "sale" have been shown to exist in the present day formulas. Nevertheless, it is easy to demonstrate with the major of these
rules how inequities can result. As we saw in a great bulk of the
states the sale is allocated either (1) to the state or origin; or (2) to
the state of solicitation of the sale; or (3) to the state of destination.
The same sales transaction could thus be taxed by three separate
states with which the sale has a connection, in the event each state
has adopted a different one of these rules for determining the "situs
of the sale" for tax purposes, thus resulting in taxes computed on
300% of the income. Also, it would seem possible to have taxes
computed on 400% of income under the additional theory which
attributes sales to the state wherein the agreement is finally negotiated or executed.
Rigid adherence to the statutorily prescribed factors and formulas
could produce inequitable results, or not fairly calculate net income
attributable to sources within a state. Therefore, twenty-three states
and the District of Columbia have specifically vested wide discretion
with the state tax commissioner to modify or change the allocation
03
formula on petition by the taxpayer, or upon his own motion.
203. Alaska-Alaska Laws 1959 (effective Jan. 1, 1960), c. 175, § 5(c) (21);
CODE ANN. § 43-135(g) (1956); California-El Dorado Oil
Works v. McColgan, 34 Cal.2d 731, 215 P.2d 4 (1950); Colorado-CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 138-1-28 (1953); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12-221 (Supp.
1958); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903(c) (Supp. 1958); District of
Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1580(a) (1951); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. §
Arizona-ARIz.

92-3133(5) (1937); Idaho-IDAHo CODE ANN. § 63-3027(e) (Supp. 1959); Kentucky-KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(9) (1955); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 316(b) (1957); Massachusetts-MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 63, § 42 (Supp.
1958); Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.20 (Supp. 1958); Montana-MoNT.
REv. CODE ANN. § 84-1503 (Supp. 1958); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54:1OA-8 (Supp. 1958); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 878(k) (1954);
Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 314.280(2) (1957); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 3420(b) (Supp. 1958); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-11-15
(1956); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2711 (1955); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 59-13-20(8) (1953); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. § 32-5903(b) (1959); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 58-132 (1959); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(5)
(1957).
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D. The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
The "minimum activities" requirement for taxing net income, as
set forth in the recent congressional statute curbing state power to tax
income, based solely on solicitation, does not, of course, represent a
solution to all the problems in the field of taxation of income from
2 4
a multistate operation. 0
1. The Need for Uniformity in Tax Apportionment and Allocation
Because of the divergencies in the tax structures of the various
states, there continue to exist a number of inequities in the nature
of multiple taxation by the states. To summarize, these inequities
stem primarily from three sources:' (1) the varying rules for allocation of nonbusiness income; (2) the divergent factors included in the
statutory apportionment formulas; and (3) the differing definitions
of superficially identical factors in the apportionment formulas. As
we saw, these apportionment formulas vary not only with respect
to the basic factors used such as property, payroll, sales and manufacturing costs, but also vary with respect to the definition of each of
the factors used in the formula. Even though many states use the
same formulas, they often define the factors differently. The most
troublesome problem in the definition of factors lies in the varying
definitions of the sales factor. Although a multistate business may
be taxed on more than 100% of its net income because of the divergent
apportionment formulas, on the other hand, some interstate business
may be taxed on substantially less than its net income, depending on
the particular state in which the business is subjected to such taxes.
Uniformity is thus an obviously desirable objective in order to
provide equality of tax treatment at the state level. The problem of
uniform allocation and apportionment, though highly desirable, has
proved an elusive goal, even though efforts to improve the tax climate
in this respect for interstate business have been quite considerable.
For more than a quarter of a century the National Tax Association,
the tax Bar, the Council of State Governments accountants and businessmen have recognized the need for uniformity in the allocation
205
and apportionment methods of the various states.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has prepared a "Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act."
It was approved in 1957 by the Committee of State Officials on Sug204. That law has been discussed in detail earlier. See discussion from notes
86 through 95 supra.
205. For a clear, succinct summary of the efforts to achieve some degree of
uniformity, see Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income For
State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIo ST. L.i. 84, 86-95
(1957). See also CoUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIFORM=nT OF STATE INCOME TAxEs ON CORPORATIONS DOING BusINEss IN SEVERAL
STATES

(1954) for the detailed proposals of this agency.
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gested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments and by
the American Bar Association.
2. The Purpose and Scope of the Uniform Act.-If this act is
adopted in every state having a corporate net income tax, it would
assure that 100% of the income, no more or no less, would be taxed.
It should be made clear, however, that there are certain things which
this act does not do. The act does not deal with the question of what
constitutes jurisdiction to tax; it assumes jurisdiction. It thus assumes
that the commerce and due process clause requirements have been
satisfied. Neither does the act deal with the problem of what constitutes income. Nor does the act provide for the tax on income from
a multistate business. It merely provides for what is thought to be
an equitable means of apportioning and allocating the income to
individual states when the existing state legislation has defined the
base of an income tax (what is income), and the only remaining
problem (which is the only problem dealt with by the act) is the
amount of the income that should be assigned to the particular taxing
jurisdiction.
The problem of allocation and apportionment of income of businesses appears only when a particular business is subject to the
taxing jurisdiction of two or more states. Section 2 of the Uniform
Act reaffirms that principle by providing that a taxpayer can employ
its allocation and apportionment provisions only when he is taxable
in more than one state. Section 2 also exempts from its operation
three classes of taxpayers:
1. Individuals, to the extent of their income for personal services.
2. Financial organizations, such as banks, trust companies and
insurance companies.
3. Public utilities.
These exemptions presumably are made either because the allocation
and apportionment in these areas have been satisfactorily dealt with
by existing legislation; or because better methods are available for the
allocation and apportionment of the income of these three classes of
taxpayers. In short, the present laws taxing these persons and institutions would continue in force after the adoption of the Uniform Act.
3. The Allocation and Apportionment Provided by the Uniform
Act.-The basic scheme of apportionment under the Uniform Act
requires a classification of all income as either "business income" or
"nonbusiness income," with a different method of dealing with each
class. Having discussed the meaning of those classes of income elsewhere, nothing further will be said on that point here,206 other than to
206. See discussion in connection with notes 126 through 146 supra.
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set forth the manner in which the Uniform Act allocates such income.
Sections 4 and 8 of the act allocate four types of income to a specific
state to the extent they constitute "nonbusiness" income, rather than
apportion this income by the use of a formula. Very briefly those four
types can be summarized. (1). Royalties and rents from real and
tangible personal property are allocated to the states where the
property is utilized, or at the taxpayer's domicile if not taxed where
utilized. (2). Capital gains and losses from sales of real and personal
property are allocated to the state where the property has a situs, or
commercial domicile if not taxed at the situs. (3). Interest and dividends are allocated to the state of the taxpayer's commercial domicile.
(4). Patent and copyright royalties are allocated to the states where
the rights are utilized, but if not taxable in the state, the income is
allocated to the state of the taxpayer's commercial domicile. The
drafter of the Uniform Act presumably felt that to the extent these
items constitute "nonbusiness" income, they can properly be attributed to a specific state, rather than be apportioned on the basis of a
formula. Thus, "nonbusiness" income is subject to specific allocation
under the Uniform Act.
After disposing of the "nonbusiness" income, the remaining "business" income is then apportioned by the Uniform Act by means of
a formula. That is to say, the act apportions by formula income arising
in the regular course of trade or business and properly attributable
to business activity within the taxing state. Sections 9 through 17
provide for the apportionment of business income by the use of a
three-factor formula, consisting of property, payroll and sales. The
average of the three factors determines the percentage of income
to be apportioned to each state. The Uniform Act also has a "safetyvalve" provision. Section 18 permits the use of some other method
of allocation and apportionment where unreasonable results flow from
the operation of the allocation and apportionment provisions provided for in the Act.
Sections 10 through 12 deal with the method of determining the
"property factor" in the formula. Perhaps the most controversial
matters concerning the property factor under present statutes are
those dealing with valuation of property and the treatment to be
afforded rented property. The Uniform Act adopted the valuation
at original cost test, while rented property is to be valued at eight
times the annual net rental rate.
Sections 13 and 14 provide for the computation of the "payroll"
factor. Basically it is the same as the test for unemployment compensation taxes.
The "sales" factor is dealt with in sections 15 through 17. With
two exceptions, sales of tangible personal property are attributed
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to the state of the purchaser. In other words, the Uniform Act uses
what we have called the "state of destination" definition for attributing a sale to a state for tax purposes, thereby giving the fiscal benefit
of the sales factor to the "market" state, rather than the "producing"
state (state of origin) .207 The two exceptions to allocation by the
state of the purchaser have to do with goods which are not taxed
where shipped, and where the United States Government is the
purchaser. In those two instances, the sales are attributed to the
state from which the goods are shipped. Sales other than the sales of
tangible personal property are attributed by section 17 to the state
where the income producing activity is performed. If such activity
is performed in more than one state, the sale is attributed to the
state where the greater proportion of the activity was performed,
based upon costs of performance.
The "sales" factor has been the most controversial feature of the
Uniform Act. The act has been strongly criticized because it attributes the situs of the sale to the state of the purchaser.20 8 It is urged
by the opponents of the act that the sale should be allocated to the
home or regional office of the seller on the ground that the state
where a corporation's productive activities are located has the prior
claim. This is thought to be so because a corporation is an integral
part of the economy of a state where it employs capital and labor
and operates productive or sales facilities. It receives from that state
protection and other services, and for these benefits, the state is entitled to compensation. Since the corporation's income is the most
207 For states adopting these two concepts for allocating a sale in the apportionment formulas now in existence, see notes 192, 193, 194 supra.
208. See Statement of John Dane, Jr., representing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, at the Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business
United States Senate, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1 at 13, 16-18 (1959). Studenski & Glaser, New Threat In State

Business Taxation, 36 HARy. Bus. REV. 77, 86-91 (Nov.-Dec. 1958).

The fol-

lowing Statement by United States Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York
at the Hearings before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, "State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 31-32 (1959) in
support of congressional curbs on state income taxes based only on solicitation, is illustrative of the criticism. He said, in part:
"A corporation which employs capital and labor and operates facilities
within a State is an integral part of that State's economy and receives a
variety of protective and other services for which the State should be compensated. Since these services directly relate to the income-producing
activities of the company, a tax on income allocated to these activities is
patently reasonable. On the other hand, a company which does not have
a place of business in a State does not receive any benefits from the State
which relate to its income-producing activities. Such a State does not put
out a fire on the company's premises, it does not insure its employees
against injury on the job, it does not protect its warehouses, it does not
maintain the streets and highways or subways and utilities needed for the
company's functioning. The fact that the property of such a foreign corporation is delivered to one of its citizens may justify a sales or use tax, but it
does not justify a tax on the net income of the company."
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practical measure of the benefits it has received, a tax on the income
attributable to the in-state activities has solid justification under the
benefit theory of taxation. On the other hand, so the argument further
runs, the benefits provided by a state to a corporation which has no
place of business within its borders and which merely sells goods to
resident customers are speculative and conjectural at best.
Another objection to the use of the Uniform Act's "state of the purchaser" definition of sale is that it would require a corporation to pay
taxes to a much greater number of states than it would be required
to do if the "point-of-origin" definition of a sale is used. In short, the
argument runs, it would be administratively more efficient for the
corporation, and would cost less for it to pay taxes in the fewest
possible states. 20 9 Likewise, the "state of the purchaser" definition of
a sale is said to have disadvantages to the tax collectors, resulting from
the fact that a large number of corporations would incur many rather
small tax liabilities in some states.210 This, it is pointed out very realistically, places the conscientious tax administrator in a dilemma.
Should he try to cover the waterfront and attempt to collect the tax
from every foreign corporation, even though the costs of collection
might exceed the tax itself? Or should the tax collector enlarge the
mesh of the collection net so that only the larger fish will be caught,
thereby tacitly encouraging tax avoidance by the small taxpayer?
This latter course entails serious consequences from the point of view
of its effect on taxpayer morale. Suppose one taxpayer's sales are
just large enough to be caught in the collection net, but his two major
competitors, whose total sales exceed those of taxpayer, are each so
small that the tax collector does not bother to enforce the tax against
them. We need not long ponder taxpayer's feelings about the equity
of the tax policy of the state.
Of course, much of the sting is taken out of this whole argument
against the use of the "state of the purchaser" definition of sales by
the recent congressional action outlawing state net income taxes based
solely on solicitation of a sale of tangible personal property.21 ' This
minimum activity prescribed by Congress for tax purposes would
prevent their being trifling tax liabilities in many instances. By the
same token, this congressional statute would severely curtail the scope
of the Uniform Act. Thus, the "state of purchaser" sales factor in the
209. See Statement of John H. Murphy, President of the New York State
Tax Commission, at the Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business United States Senate, "State Taxation on Interstate Commerce," 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 at 325 (1959).
210. See testimony by John Dane, Jr., U. S. Chamber of Commerce, at the
Hearingsbefore the Committee on Finance United States Senate, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 196, 200-01 (1959).
211. This legislation has been discussed earlier. See material beginning
with note 86 through note 95 supra.
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apportionment formula of the Uniform Act would be zero if the only
contact of the seller with the state of purchaser of the goods was that
of solicitation of the sale, resulting in no tax for a state so situated.
The proponents of the Uniform Act can, however, make out a strong
case for attributing the sales factor to the state of purchaser. They
urge that the payroll and property factors in the apportionment
formula already weigh the apportionment formula heavily in favor of
the producing states.212 Moreover, the market states deserve a better
break since, without the buyers which they provide, the productive
facilities of the manufacturing state would be of little value. Also,
the state of purchaser test affords less opportunity for manipulation
of sales operations merely to avoid taxes. Thus, central sales offices
can readily be moved to states having no income taxes whereas customers cannot. Taxing a sale other than in the state of the purchaser
can result in a commercial handicap to competing local businesses,
which must pay the tax to the purchaser's state. By permitting a tax
only by the state of the purchaser equality of competition between
local and out-of-state goods is more nearly preserved. This competitive disadvantage to local business by permitting the sale to be taxed
other than in the purchaser's state would seem to exist only if the
commodity sold has not been subject to a similar tax elsewhere. A
very realistic question may somewhat plague those who would deny
to the state of the purchaser the power to include the sales factor
in its apportionment formula. If the state of the purchaser is not
permitted to tax a sale, from what source can it replenish its depleted
coffers? In many such states there may not be necessary manufactur213
ing and production facilities to serve as taxable activities.
Although the Uniform Act has been the subject of very considerable
study since its preparation, only Alaska has adopted provisions similar to the Act 2 1 4 In addition to the foregoing objections to the act,
which would defeat it in the manufacturing and producing states,
there are perhaps two other reasons why it has received less than an
enthusiastic reception. In the first place, any revision of existing
tax laws affects state revenues at a time when the states have been
experiencing unusually great demands for additional governmental
services. States simply do not want to rock the tax boat. In the
212. See statement of Fred L. Cox, Conferee, Georgia Department of Revenue, at Hearings before Select Committee on Small Business United States
Senate, "State Taxation on Interstate Commerce," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at
34 (1959).
213. There has been concern that the curtailment of the taxing power of the
states, which are hard pressed for tax revenues, will make the states powerless
wards of the federal government. See Report of Committee on Finance United
States Senate, Byrd, State Taxation of Income Derived From Commerce
(minority views), S. REP. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959).
214. See CCII State Tax Guide, Summary of Current Tax Legislation, 1491.
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second place, while tax paying groups or their representatives desire
uniformity, they remain unwilling to accept any revision which increases their taxes, although overall administrative savings might
well offset any tax increases.2 15 Unless Congress takes a hand in the
matter by enacting a uniform apportionment statute, there appears
to be but little hope of achieving any solution to the tax tangle by
2 16
means of uniformity in apportionment methods.

PART Two:

STATE TAXATION OF CORPORATE GROSS INcOmE

In order to round out a discussion of state taxation of corporate
income, it is felt that some attention should be given to the taxation of
the gross income of corporations. Already we have had occasion to see
how the gross receipts of corporations sometime constitute one of the
factors in the fiscal formula by which the states apportion, for tax
purposes, the net income of a corporation engaged in a multistate
217
business.
Most of the states have some sort of tax reaching either total gross
income of the taxpayer or the gross receipts derived from certain
activities. Some of the taxing states allow exemptions, others do
not. Incident to their operations in more than one state, corporations
may become subject to a tax levied directly upon their gross income
from all sources, including gross receipts from sales of property and
services, as well as interest, rentals and dividends.21 8 Or in such operations corporations may become subject to a franchise or privilege tax,
with the measure of the liability being gross income,21 9 or with the
tax liability restricted to the gross receipts from sales of certain kinds
215. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of this Uniform Act, see
Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXEs 747
(1957). For a critical analysis of the Uniform Act, along with a number of
proposed changes and modifications, see Wilkie, Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes,37 TAxEs 65 (1959).
216. Later, there will be a discussion of various proposals for congressional
action in field of state taxation of interstate commerce. See discussion starting

with note 364 supra,and going through note 373 supra.
217. See the various formulas set forth in connection with note 157, supra,
through note 167 supra.
218. E.g., Indiana levies a tax on gross income of all residents and gross
income of persons and corporations doing business in Indiana, derived from
sources in Indiana. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2602 (1951).
219. E.g., Alaska has a business license tax for engaging in any business
levied on gross receipts, see CCH STATE TAX Gum ff 60-216 (1959). Arizona
levies an occupational gross income tax, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1309
(1956). Michigan imposes an adjusted business receipts tax for the privilege
of engaging in activity for gain in Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANNi. § 7.557(3)
(Supp. 1957). Mississippi levies a privilege tax measured by gross income or
gross proceeds, Miss. CODE ANN'. § 10105 (Supp. 1958). New Mexico levies a
privilege tax measured by gross receipts, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16-4.1 (Supp.
1959). Washington imposes an occupation or business tax for the privilege
of engaging in business, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.080 (1952). West Virginia
levies an occupational tax on gross income for the privilege of engaging in
business, W.VA. CODE ANN.§ 959-960 (10) (1955).
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of property, 22 0 or gross receipts from sales of services, particularly
receipts from services of utilities. 221 A good bit of commerce clause
litigation has involved the taxation of the gross receipts of public
utilities. That will become evident as this discussion moves along.
Various kinds of taxing statutes will be noticed as we proceed with
the discussion, which will consider, by and large, the commerce clause
limitations on the power of the states to reach, taxwise, corporate
gross income or receipts from particular activities. The due process
clause has been involved to a much lesser degree than the commerce
clause in this area.
220. E.g., Arkansas has an excise tax on gross receipts from sales of tangible
property, ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-1903 (Supp. 1957). Delaware has a manufacturer's license tax based on gross receipts, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30 § 2701 (1953).
Hawaii levies a tax for the privilege of selling certain property, HAWAII REV.
LAWS §§ 117-13, 117-14 (1955). Louisiana levies an occupational license tax
covering gross receipts from many occupations, some of which are selling
various items, LA. REV. STAT. 88 47:359-397 (1952). Mississippi levies a tax on
gross income from sales of certain property, MIss. CODE ANN. § 10108 (Supp.
1958). North Carolina levies an excise tax on gross proceeds of sales of tangible personal property by wholesalers, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.5 (Supp.
1959). Illinois has an occupational retail sales tax for selling property, ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 441 (Supp. 1958). Texas has an excise tax for the sale
of certain property, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 122 § 7058 (1951). Virginia
levies a merchant's license tax on gross receipts from sales, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-321 (1959).
221. E.g., Alaska taxes gross receipts of certain utilities. CCH STATE TAX
GUIDE
80-215 (1959). Alabama levies a tax on gross receipts of utilities,
ALA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-177 through 186 (1940 and Supp. 1955). Arizona taxes
gross receipts of certain utilities, ARiz. CODE ANN. § 40-401 (1956). Arkansas
levies an excise on gross receipts of certain utility services, admissions, and
services by hotels, etc. APx. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-201, 84-1903 (1956). Colorado
uses gross revenues of certain public utilities as basis for regulatory fees,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-2-10 through 16 (Supp. 1957). Connecticut has
tax on gross earnings of certain utilities, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-249 through
12-268 (1958). Delaware taxes gross earnings of certain utilities, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 30 §§ 3301, 3501, 3502 (1953). Florida taxes gross receipts of certain
utilities, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 195.13 through 195.16 (1958). Hawaii has a privilege tax measured by gross receipts from sales of certain services, including
receipts of utilities. HAWAuI REV. LAWS §§ 117-14, 125-1 through 126-7 (1955).
Idaho taxes gross receipts of express companies, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-2602
(1948). Illinois has an occupational tax for repairing property, ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 120 § 441 (Supp. 1958). Illinois also has a tax on gross receipts of certain
railroads, and the sale of electricity, gas, transmission of messages, ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 120 §§ 373, 467 through 481a (1954). Kansas taxes gross earnings of
express companies, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-806, 79-907 (1949 and Supp.
1957). Kentucky taxes gross receipts of certain utilities, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 136.240 (Supp. 1959). Louisiana taxes gross receipts of certain utilities, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:355 through 47:358 (1952 and Supp. 1958). Maine taxes
gross operating revenues of certain utilities, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 16, §§
116, 122, 123, 128, 133 (1954 and Supp. 1959). Maryland imposes a franchise
tax on gross receipts of businesses, including utilities and insurance companies,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 129-143 (1957). Minnesota has a tax on gross earnings of utilities and trust companies, as well as a tax on gross premiums of
insurance companies, MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.63, 294.01, 294.43 (1947 and Supp.
1958). Mississippi levies an occupational tax on gross income of sales of certain services, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 10106, 10109 (Supp. 1958). Missouri taxes
gross receipts of express and freight lines, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 153.010, 153.020
(1952). Montana levies a tax on gross receipts of certain utilities, MONT. REV.
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I. Commerce And Due ProcessClause Limitations On
Taxation Of Gross Income Of Corporations.m
In many respects, taxes on the gross income from all sources resemble net income taxes. There are, however, some significant differences.
A tax imposed on gross income affects each transaction, whether
profitable or otherwise, while a tax on net income does not arise at
all unless a gain remains after expenses and losses. Taxation of the
gross income or gross receipts from a multistate business, of course,
would furnish a lucrative and easily accessible source of revenue for
state and local governments. Such taxes have sailed a rather stormy
course during our constitutional history, however. When challenged
on commerce clause grounds, the first such tax was upheld in 1872 in
the case of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts,2 which involved
CODES

1959).

ANN. §§ 84-1601, 84-1707, 84-2501, 84-2601, 84-4819 (1947 and Supp.

New Jersey imposes a tax on gross receipts of certain utilities

and insurance companies, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:13-11, 54:13-15 (Supp.
1958). New Mexico taxes gross earnings of certain utilities, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-12-1 through 72-12-6 (1953 and Supp. 1959). New York levies a tax
on gross income of utilities and insurance companies, N.Y. TAX LAw §§ 186,
186 a & b and 187. North Carolina taxes gross receipts of certain utilities, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-115 through 105-120 (1958 and Supp. 1959). North Dakota
taxes gross earnings of certain utilities, N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3304 (Supp. 1957).
Ohio taxes gross receipts of certain utilities, OHo REv. CODE §§ 5727.33 through
5727.42 (1959). Oklahoma levies a tax on gross receipts of airports and
airways, freight cars and electric cooperatives, OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-773
through 782, 68-805 through 805g, 68-861 through 867 (1954 and Supp. 1958).
Oregon imposes a tax on gross operating revenue of certain public utilities,
OaR. REV. STAT. §§ 308.705 through 730 and 308.805 (1957). Pennsylvania levies
a tax on gross receipts of certain public utilities, banks and insurance companies, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 2181 through 2284 (1949 and Supp. 1958).
Rhode Island levies a tax on gross income of public utilities companies, R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 44-13-1 through 44-13-10 (1956) and insurance companies,
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 44-17-1 through 44-117-10 (1956). South Carolina
levies a tax on gross premiums of insurance companies and certain utilities,
S.C. CODE § 58-12 (1952). South Dakota taxes gross earnings of certain utilities, S.D. CODE §§ 57-1401 through 1405 (1939). Tennessee levies a tax on
gross income of public utilities, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4202 items 87-89, 674102 items G. H. M. N. P. Q. (1955). Texas imposes a tax on gross receipts
from public utility services and insurance companies, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. 7058 (1951 and Supp. 1958). Utah taxes gross operating revenue of
utilities, UTAH CODE ANN. 54-5-1 and 2 (1953). Vermont levies a tax on the
gross premiums received from insurance, and in a limited manner taxes gross
earnings of telephone, and telegraph companies, VT. STAT. §§ 32-8492, 32-8521,
32-8551 (1959). Virginia has a tax on gross proceeds of various service companies, including railroads, power companies, telephone and telegraph companies, pipe line and express companies, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-503 to 58-685
(1950). Washington taxes gross income of certain utilities, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 82.16.010 (1957). West Virginia taxes gross receipts of certain utilities,
W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 958 (13) through (17) (Supp. 1959). Wisconsin imposes
a tax on gross receipts of public utilities and insurance companies, Wis. STAT.
§§ 76.34 through 42 (1957). Wyoming taxes gross receipts of express companies, Wyo. Com. STAT. ANN. § 39-181 (1957).
222. Elsewhere the writer has discussed somewhat more in detail several
of the gross income tax cases that will be considered herein. See HARTMAN,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 180-214 (1953); Hartman, Sales
Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REv. 138, 176-203 (1956).
223. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872).
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a Pennsylvania tax imposed on the gross receipts of transportation
companies. The receipts there taxed were made up from freight
charges received from transporting merchandise in interstate commerce. The Court purported to adhere to the proposition that a state
could not regulate interstate commerce, but the assailed tax was
gotten across that hurdle by deciding that the fruits of interstate
transporation lost the commerce clause protection against taxation
after they became intermingled with the other property of the carrier.
As an alternative ground of decision, the Court treated the levy as an
excise tax upon the franchise of a corporation created by the state,
with gross receipts being a fair and convenient measure of the value.
Fifteen years later, however, the Court pretty much reversed its
field and placed serious limitations on the taxation of gross income
from interstate operations, deciding two cases that have influenced
judicial thinking ever since. In Fargov. Michigan224 and Philadelphia
& Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania,= the Court held that the
states were impotent, because of the commerce clause, to impose
taxes directly on the gross receipts derived from interstate transportation. The rationale of the two decisions is that gross income received
from interstate commerce is as necessary to the commerce as the
transportation itself; and when the state taxed the gross receipts from
the transportation it was attempting to regulate the commerce itself,
in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce.
We have seen that the Court employs a completely different rationale when taxation of "net income" from interstate commerce is involved. In repelling a commerce clause attack where the tax is levied
directly on net income, rather than gross income, from interstate commerce, the Court takes the position that the tax is levied after the
commerce has taken place, expenses have been paid, losses adjusted
and the taxpayer is free to use the money as he pleases; and if there
is no profit, then there will be no net income tax.226 The net income
tax is much less likely, therefore, to discourage interstate trade than
is the gross receipts tax.
While the commerce clause ban against taxation of gross income
from multistate operations originated in the field of transportation,
nevertheless we will soon see that the scope of the ban has been so
widened that it prohibits taxes not only on gross income from inter224. 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
225. 122 U.S. 326 (1887).

226. See U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1918),
discussed in connection with notes 20 and 21 supra. In essence, too, that is the
rationale of Northwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
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state transportation activities, but also taxes on gross income from

227
interstate communications and interstate sales

Next, we will try to locate some of the varying and wavering lines

between permissible and non-permissible state taxing action as the
states have tried by one method or another to reach gross income for

tax purposes.
II. Methods Of Reaching Gross Income For Taxation
Although the Court pretty effectively closed the door to state and
local taxes levied directly on the gross income from interstate commerce during much of our constitutional history, that did not mean
that this convenient and lucrative source of revenue would go untouched. Taxing officials have ingenious minds at times. Two methods
of making fiscal inroads developed.
A. In Lieu of Property Tax
One method of breaking through the commerce clause barrier was
the so-called "in lieu of" tax, which meant that the tax was imposed
upon the gross income as a fair substitute for all other taxes which
a state could constitutionally impose on taxpayer's property. The
commerce clause has never been thought to prohibit a state from
levying a tax on property owned by a concern engaging in an interstate business. The Court sustained an "in lieu of" tax in United
States Express Co. v. Minnesota.-'-m There Minnesota had imposed a
tax on the gross receipts of express companies derived from interstate business within the state. Repeating the doctrine that a state
could not burden or regulate interstate commerce, the Court nevertheless felt that since the tax was levied "in lieu of" all taxes upon
the property of the taxpayer, it was a constitutionally competent
exercise of state taxing power. In essence, the Court treated the tax
as a fair substitute for a property tax on the business of a "going
concern."
Two cases, one in 1954 and one in 1959, mark out fairly definite
current judicial guide lines for the validity of the "in lieu of" gross
receipts taxes. That this tax may run into commerce clause difficulties
was shown by the 1954 case of Railway Express Agency v. Virginia.2 9
The taxpayer, a foreign corporation, did only an interstate busi227. E.g., J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Bd. of Assessment, 132 U.S. 472 (1889);
Western Union Tel Co. v. Pennsylvania, 128 U.S. 39 (1888):
228. 223 U.S. 335 (1912). One of the earliest cases approving the "in lieu of"
doctrine as applied to gross receipts seems to be Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895), where the statute was cast in terms of a privilege
tax.
229. 347 U.S. 359 (1954). The decision was 5-4. Mr. Justice Clark, with
whom Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, wrote the dissenting opinion.
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ness within the taxing state (Virginia). It was prohibited by the
Virginia Constitution from doing any public service business in Virginia except that done in interstate commerce.23 0 Nevertheless this
Delaware corporation had numerous offices in Virginia; it owned real
property and motor vehicles there; and carried on a large express
business in Virginia. Virginia had developed a rather comprehensive
tax structure applicable to express companies. She empowered the
local governments to impose ad valorem taxes on the "dead value"
of all real property and tangible personal property located within
the respective jurisdictions of the local governments. Her statute
allocated to state taxation, free of all local taxes, two kinds of property
-intangible personal property and money. Also applicable to express
companies was "an annual license tax . . . for the privilege of doing

business" in the state. This tax was imposed upon gross receipts
earned in Virginia "on business passing through, into or out of" the
state.2 3 ' This tax was in addition to the state property tax. When
Virginia sought to apply this annual privilege tax to the Railway
Express, it was resisted as an unconstitutional levy on the privilege
of carrying on interstate commerce.
The Virginia Supreme Court sustained the tax as a property tax
measured by gross income and laid on the excess of the "goingconcern" value of the taxpayer's physical assets over their "barebones"
value.23 2 This was regarded by the Virginia Court as a separate

intangible property of the taxpayer. In upholding the tax, the Virginia Supreme Court thus disregarded the statutory language that
expressly characterized the exaction as a "privilege tax." Taxpayer
was thus subject to three property taxes: the local tax on the barebones value of physical assets; the state ad valorem tax on intangible
personal property, as well as this contested state tax on the excess
value of taxpayer's assets.
The Supreme Court of the United States held the law, as applied,
invalid as a privilege tax on an exclusively interstate business. Such
privilege taxes, as we have seen, have uniformly been declared a violation of the commerce clause.23 3 However, in striking down the
Railway Express tax, the Supreme Court disregarded the state court's
characterization of the exaction as a property tax on intangible property, measured by gross receipts. As we have seen, such apportioned
gross receipts taxes on an interstate transportation company are
230. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 163. This provision of the Virginia Constitution
was upheld in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
231. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-546, 58-547 (1950).
232. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 194 Va. 757, 75 S.E.2d 61
(1953).

233. See discussion in connection with notes 56 through 59 supra.
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valid, if "in lieu of" property taxes. 23 4 Moreover, in determining the
value of such property, a state may take into account the property's
augmentation of value as a part of a "going concern," and tax this
intangible value of the taxpayer's property 5
What, then, caused the Supreme Court of the United States to upset
Virginia's tax on Railway Express as a tax on the privilege of engaging in exclusively interstate commerce? There are several things that
the court seems to think pointed the way to that conclusion. In the
first place, a tax on gross receipts to be sustained "in lieu of" a
property tax has been upheld only where it is roughly equivalent to
a normal property tax.23 6 It has been procribed where levied in addition to a property tax.23 7 The Virginia statute expressly provided that
this questioned tax on the intangible or "going-concern" property
value of taxpayer should be imposed in addition to Virginia's intangible property tax on this taxpayer. The Court did not stress this
feature, however. The Court was of the opinion that the equivalency
between the challenged tax and a normal property tax was lacking,
pointing out that if this "going-concern" value were treated as separate "intangible property," then, every dollar invested in taxpayer's
tangible property is deemed worth over $100 for tax purposes.M The
Court arrived at this result by taking the amount of the gross receipts
tax imposed by Virginia and projecting the "going-concern" value
from it by the use of the rate imposed by Virginia on intangible personal property. The Court thought it overtaxed the credulity of the
Court to ascribe to the intangible going-concern worth of property a
value over one hundred times that of the tangible property that produced this intangible worth. That, concluded the Court, was such
"extreme attribution" that it required a rejection of the state court's
characterization of the levy as a property tax. The "going-concern"
value of a prosperous business, of course, might well be that great. In
what the Court may have regarded as clinching its position that this
gross receipts tax could not be considered a fair equivalent of a
property tax on the Railway Express, the Court concluded that it had
234. E.g., Illinois Central R. R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Great
Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Pullman Co. v. Richardson,

261 U.S. 330 (1923); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918);

United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912).
235. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor,
165 U.S. 194 (1897), rehearing den., 166 U.S. 185 (1897); Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895).
236. Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Pullman Co.
v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S.
450 (1918); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914).

237. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930);
U. S. 298 (1912).

Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223

238. See Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359, 366 (1954).
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declined to regard mere gross receipts as a sound measure of goingconcern value in the practical world of commerce, where values
depend on the profit potential of a business, not merely its volume.
Another feature which the Court ostensibly thought militated
against the validity of the tax was the fact that the Virginia
statute expressly declared that this tax was imposed for the privilege
of doing business, and it will be remembered that Railway Express
was confined to business that is exclusively interstate by Virginia's
Constitution. However, under prior authority the fact that the
statute was cast in terms of a privilege tax should not be fatal to the
validity of this gross receipts tax, provided the levy amounts to no
more than the ordinary tax upon property or its just equivalent,
including the intangible or "going-concern" value added by the
physical property's assemblage into a going business, even if that
business is interstate commerce.= The Court felt that the tax in
dispute did not depend on taxpayer's owning any physical property
in Virginia, nor upon the value of such property, but would attach
to the gross revenues even if the taxpayer found some way to dispense
with all local, physical property. Also, the tax base used by Virginia
for this tax was exactly the amount of gross revenue reported by
taxpayer. When all those factors were thrown on the scales, a
majority of the Court concluded that Virginia's gross receipts tax
was in fact and in effect a privilege tax for the purpose of doing an
exclusively interstate business, rather than a tax on gross receipts
"in lieu of" property taxes. As such, it violated the commerce clause.
Four members of the Court dissented. They agreed with the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion that the levy was an ad valorem
tax on taxpayer's intangible property, with the operative incidence
of the tax being the "going-concern" value of taxpayer's physical
assets in Virginia. The writer has difficulty in finding anything in
the Court's opinion that refutes the contention that the "going-concern" value of taxpayer's business in Virginia was less than Virginia
claimed.
Five years after Virginia lost this first round of her legal battle to
tax Railway Express, she reappeared in the legal arena for a second
round with the same foreign corporation. That occurred in the 1959
case of Railway Express v. Virginia.240 This time Virginia fared much
better with a new tax statute applicable to express companies. Since
her first defeat, Virginia had overhauled her tax structure. Her new
239. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918) (license
tax on gross receipts in lieu of all personal property taxes was upheld); Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895) (Mississippi tax on gross receipts of foreign corporation in lieu of property tax was phrased as a privilege tax. It was sustained.).
240. 358 U. S. 434 (1959).
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statute empowers local governments to levy ad valorem taxes on the
"dead" value of all real property and tangible personal property
except rolling stock, with the state keeping for itself the power to tax
rolling stock, money and other intangibles, as well as the "live" or
"going-concern" value of business in Virginia. The new statute expressly characterized the tax on express companies as "a franchise
tax which shall be in lieu of taxes upon all of its (express company)
other intangible property and in lieu of property taxes on rolling
stock." 241 This franchise tax is measured by the gross receipts from
operations within Virginia.
It will be noticed that this revamped statute is not denominated a
license tax laid on the "privilege of doing business in Virginia," as
was the earlier tax statute that was invalidated. Nor was this new
tax "in addition to the property tax" levied by Virginia under the
old statute that ran afoul of the commerce clause. The new statute is
clearly designated a franchise tax "in lieu of" taxes upon all of taxpayer's other intangible property and "in lieu of" property taxes on
rolling stock, with gross receipts as the measure.
Again, taxpayer objected to the tax as an invalid privilege tax on an
exclusively interstate business, rather than being a tax on intangible
personal property. Also, it was claimed that the tax deprived taxpayer of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
In its opinion upholding the tax, a majority of the Supreme Court
of the United States thought the sole question was "whether the tax
in practical operation is on property or on privilege.' 24 It agreed with
the Virginia Supreme Court that this tax, although termed a franchise
tax, was a property tax on the "going concern" and intangible property
values of the taxpayer's business. Although labeled a franchise tax
by the statutory nomenclature, nevertheless this tax was expressly
declared by the statute to be in lieu of all taxes on other intangible
property and rolling stock. The tax was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States as an exaction in lieu of all other taxes
which Virginia could lawfully levy on the property of the taxpayer
within the state The Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that a tax measured by gross receipts might not be the best
measure of a "going concern" value, but thought that it was too late
to question the constitutionality of such a measure. As we have seen,
this conclusion by the Court is supported by authority. Nevertheless,
there may be an uplifted eyebrow when it is recalled that in the
241. VA. CODE ANN.§ 58-546 (1950).

242. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 439 (1959).
r.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result reached without an opinion.
Justices Harlan and Brennan wrote separate concurring opinions. Mr. Justice
Whittaker wrote a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Stewart joined.
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prior Railway Express case in 1954, in giving the commerce clause
quietus to a Virginia tax on the gross receipts of the same taxpayer,
the Court had felt that the levy was such "extreme attribution" that
it would "overtax" the "credulity" of the Court to characterize it as
a property tax on the going-concern value of taxpayer's property. The
Court had further made it known in the 1954 case that it declined to
regard gross receipts as a sound measure of going-concern value in a
practical world of commerce, where values depend on profitableness
of business, not merely volume. 243 In the 1959 Railway Express case,
the dissenters took the position that the tax was imposed directly on
interstate commerce and thus violative of the commerce clause.
Virginia's tax was likewise upheld over the due process clause objection. This issue was based primarily on the fact that the taxing
authorities had computed the tax by a formula ascribing to Virginia
the proportion of gross receipts as the mileage of carriers within Virginia bore to the total national mileage. The resulting amount of the
tax was said by taxpayer to be confiscatory. The Court rejected this
contention by pointing out that taxpayer's failure to reveal its gross
receipts on its tax return forced the state to obtain the amount by
some method of approximation. Taxpayer had failed to make an
affirmative showing that the mileage method used by Virginia was
"so palpably unreasonable that it violates due process." 244
From Virginia's two recent taxing experiences with Railway Express, as well as from earlier cases, we can see that the Court is
concerned with two main considerations in dealing with taxes on gross
receipts from interstate commerce. On the one hand, the Court makes
it clear that the states lack power to tax the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. On the other hand, the Court recognizes the
essential fairness that the states should be allowed to tax property
within their boundaries, and to tax it at its actual value as a going concern, taking into account the augmentation of value attributable to the
interstate business in which it is employed. Thus, where the gross
receipts taxes have a fair relation to the property employed within
the state, including the tangible, as well as the intangible or "going
concern" value of the property, the tax can withstand the impact of
the commerce clause. As the second Railway Express case holds, even
though the statute designates the exaction as a privilege tax measured
243. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1954), discussed beginning at note 229, supra.
244. Id. at 443. A tax may be upset, however, where the apportionment formula can be shown to produce an inequitable result to the particular taxpayer.
E.g., Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (1927) (excise tax); Wallace v.
Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920) (excise tax apportioned by mileage method); Johnson
Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Maxwell, 290 U. S.158 (1933) (property
tax); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919) (property tax
apportioned by mileage method).
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by gross receipts, if it amounts to no more than the ordinary tax on
property or a just equivalent therefor, the tax is not open to a successful attack on commerce clause grounds, even though the receipts
were derived from a business that is exclusively interstate. This
principle is brought into sharp focus when taxes on gross receipts
have been imposed in addition to ad valorem property taxes, rather
than "in lieu of" such taxes. Where the tax has been in addition to
property taxes, it has fallen before the commerce clause, but the tax
has been upheld where levied "in lieu of" such other taxes. This
difference is regarded as vital. In the latter instance the tax is treated
as a valid tax on property with its value determined by gross receipts
from an interstate operation; in the former it is considered as a prohibited tax on interstate commerce itself. 245 To repel a commerce
clause attack, the tax on gross receipts as a substitute for a tax on
property must, therefore, be conditioned on a finding that it is reasona24 6
bly equivalent to a normal property tax.
B. Gross Income as the Measure of the
Value of a Local Activity or Event
A second legislative device for reaching gross income by a tax has
been to impose the exaction on some local "activity" or "privilege"
which would not be regarded as a tax-immune segment of interstate
commerce, and to measure the amount of the tax by the gross income
attributable to the local activity or event even though the income was
received, in part, from interstate operations. This method of reaching
gross income received judicial sanction, apparently for the first time,
in Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry.,2 47 decided in 1891, just four years after
the states had received their set-back in gross receipts taxes in
Fargo,248 and Philadelphia & Southern.249 The Grand Trunk case
involved a statute of Maine, which levied upon a foreign corporation
engaged in interstate railroad business a tax "for the privilege of
exercising its franchise within the State of Maine." The amount of the
tax was determined by the gross receipts from both interstate and
local business which were derived from operations within the taxing
state. The Court treated this tax as a levy imposed upon the local
privilege of exercising the corporate franchise within the state, with
gross receipts constituting only the measure of the tax. Thus, the
245. E.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U. S. 338

(1930); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908).
246. E.g., Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 (1912), where the
equivalency could not be shown and the tax fell.
247. 142 U. S. 217 (1891). This case was relied on as precedent in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
248. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887), discussed in connection with
note 224 supra.
249. Philadelphia & Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326
(1887), discussed in connection with note 225, supra.
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tax escaped commerce clause condemnation as a tax on interstate
commerce. Since only those receipts attributable to operations within
the state were included in the measure, it was thought to be a fair
means of ascertaining the value of the local privilege. The Court
took the trouble to point out, however, that the Maine tax was not
imposed upon the gross receipts themselves either in form or in fact.
Also, it has been held competent for a state to use gross receipts as a
tax measure where the taxable event is the privilege of existing as a
domestic corporation.250 The right to be a domestic corporation and
carry on business in a corporate capacity depends solely upon the
grace of the state. Consequently, the incorporating state may measure
a charge for that privilege by the gross receipts from business operations within the state.
The use of gross receipts to determine the value of a local privilege
or activity has been used widely and extensively as a lucrative
revenue raising device although interstate operations are involved.
Where property or commodities have not yet begun to move in interstate commerce, they are not immune from various state privilege
taxes, although the property ultimately will be transported beyond
the borders of the taxing state. The fact that goods are being produced, processed or prepared for an interstate journey has not
exempted from various sorts of nondiscriminatory privilege taxes
either the production, processing or preparing of the articles themselves, or those who manufactured or otherwise processed or prepared the article for the interstate passage. Thus, the state of origin
2 51
has been able to impose a tax on the privilege of manufacturing,
production of commodities,2 52 or the extraction of resources, 25 3 sold in
interstate commerce, and measure the tax by the gross receipts from
such sales. The tax is regarded as levied on a local activity distinct
from interstate commerce. The use of the gross receipts, including
gross receipts from interstate sales, as a measure, is regarded as a
convenient, sanctioned method of arriving at the value of the local
privileges of manufacturing, production and extraction. The tax is
said by the Court to be only an "indirect burden" on interstate commerce. Here the gross receipts tax has been sustained even though
levied "in addition to an ad valorem property tax."254 However, a tax
laid directly on gross income from interstate operations has often been
255
regarded as a proscribed "direct burden" on interstate commerce.
250. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549 (1915); Ashley v. Ryan,
153 U.S. 436 (1894) (tax on privilege of consolidation).
251. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
252. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (generation of
electricity); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
253. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (extraction of gas).
254. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
255. See e.g., Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 297 (1917).
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Also, there may be a taxable event or privilege at the conclusion of
an interstate journey, and the Court has gone rather far, at times, in
finding localism on the consuming end.256 Gross receipts from sales
of gas brought in from another state can be taxed if the sale is the
25 7
last, because consummated by consumption of the commodity.
However, the sale of gas to a connecting carrier in an interstate journey of oil and gas has not created a taxable event.2 58
Although interstate and local business are inseparably intermingled,
a local privilege tax measured by gross receipts will be sustained if
it is not levied inseparably on both.259 The local aspects of the business can serve as a proper fulcrum of the tax with gross receipts as
the measure.
Prior to 1938, a state could reach the gross income from interstate
commerce only if the tax (a) was levied in lieu of a property tax;
or (b) was used as a fair measure of the value of a local privilege or
activity. Such taxes were said to be only "indirect burdens" upon
the commerce. Unless the Court was satisfied that the tax satisfied one
or the other of these requirements, the tax was condemned by some
such appellation as a "regulation of the commerce,1 260 and as a "direct
261
burden" upon the commerce.
From the standpoint of the economic consequences of the tax, the
Court drew a distinction that was artificial and formal. Thus, while
the states were forbidden to impose a privilege tax "on" gross receipts from interstate commerce, nevertheless the states ordinarily
could levy a tax on certain local privileges or activities, and measure
262
the tax by gross receipts. American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis
illustrates this distinction. In that case the tax was imposed on the
privilege of manufacturing and measured by the gross receipts from
the manufacturing plant, including out-of-state sales. The proper
statutory formula was used-it was a tax "on" the privilege of manu256. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1944); Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills, Inc. 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E.2d 34
(1942), af'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 740 (1943); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (sales tax).
257. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 283 U.S. 465 (1931).
258. State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931);
cf. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954). On another occasion the writer has discussed in detail the cases dealing with the
commerce clause and state and local taxes on the oil and gas industry. See
Hartman, The Commerce Clause and the States' Power to Tax The Oil and
Gas Industry. Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas
Law and Taxation as Affects the Oil and Gas Industry (1956), pp. 387-445.
(Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas).
259. Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Pacific Tel. Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936) (occupation tax measured by gross receipts invalidated since tax inseparably imposed on both). See Southern Ry. v. Watts
& Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 530 (1923).
260. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 227 (1908).
261. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 297 (1917).
262. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
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facturing, measured by gross receipts. The tax was upheld. In the
later case of Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 263 the Court
placed its blessing on this artificial distinction in striking down a tax
levied directly "on" gross receipts from sales of manufactured goods
by the state where they were manufactured. Speaking through Justice
Roberts, the Court very pointedly observes that the American Manufacturing tax "was upon the privilege of manufacturing within the
state and it was permissible to measure the tax by the sales price of
the goods produced rather than by their value at the date of manufacture. If the tax there under consideration had been a sales tax
the city could not have measured it by sales consummated in another
26 4
state.,
This formal distinction between taxes levied "on" gross receipts
and taxes "measured by" gross receipts seems purely formalistic and
without any commerce clause justification. A tax imposed on a local
privilege or activity measured by the volume of gross income from
both local and interstate operations would appear to have, in practical and economic results, the same consequences for curtailing or
burdening the commerce as a tax laid "directly on" the income. Nevertheless, this distinction has continued to exist for the purpose of
determining the commerce clause question, and the fact that a tax
levied directly on the gross income was fairly apportioned to business
done within the taxing state did not save the tax from commerce
265
clause condemnation.
Consistent with the admonition of a great authority in the field of
constitutional law that "the states can tax interstate commerce if they
go about it in the right way,"266 it should follow that the imponderables of gross receipts taxes would disappear with a revamping of a
condemned tax statute, changing it from a tax "on" gross income to
a tax on some other subject and "measured by" the gross income.
Unfortunately, such has not always been the case. Constitutionality
of a tax has not always been achieved by the simply expedient of
casting the statute in terms of bearing upon some local activity or
privilege. The Court often is of the opinion that the event designated
as the subject of the tax is an integral part of interstate commerce,
thus resulting in the invalidity of the tax. The Court has failed, moreover, to develop a trustworthy or workable standard to guide the lawactivity has sufficient
makers and tax collectors in deciding when the
267
localism to serve as the subject of a valid tax.

263. 304 U.S. 307.
264. Adams Mg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 313 (1938).
265. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887) (tax was limited to earnings
from use of cars within the state).
266. Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State
Taxation, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 774 (1928).
267. An occupation tax on broadcasting, measured by gross receipts from
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There have been some instances where the Court seemed to feel
that the tax ran afoul of the commerce clause because gross receipts
were used as the measure or method of fixing the value of the privilege or activity designated as the subject of the tax.268 That is somewhat unusual, however. As a good bit of the preceding discussion
of gross income taxes would indicate, the Court has at times made it
plain that the subject taxed, rather than the measure of the tax, is
the dominant test of taxability with respect to both the commerce
clause and the due process clause.269 However, there have been
instances where the Court found that the measure violated the
requisites of the due process clause,27 0 and we have just seen where
the Court apparently thought the measure was offensive to the commerce clause. In short, the decisions are rather inconclusive on the
issue of whether the measure, as well as the subject of the tax must
satisfy due process and commerce clause requirements.
III. The PragmaticApproach To Gross Income Taxes
Beginning in 1938, there was a brief interlude when the Court took a
different approach to the constitutionality of gross income taxes. This
approach made its appearance on the judicial horizon under the
guidance of Justice Stone. In his Di Santo dissent,2 71 Justice Stone had
showed his dissatisfaction with the "direct-indirect" burdens test of
constitutionality of a state tax, which was employed by the Court
during a long era of doctrinal declarations that interstate commerce
sales of time to customers, was struck down as a tax on interstate commerce.
Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 650 (1936). However, is broadcasting any more interstate commerce than the generation of
electricity where the generation and transmission across state lines are simultaneous, which was held a taxable local event in Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932). Loading and unloading interstate commerce on
ships has been held an integral, nontaxable segment of interstate commerce,
so that the gross receipts therefrom could not be taxed. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U. S. 90 (1937); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947). However, the delivery of goods transported interstate by land as part of an interstate sale has been thought to be
a taxable, local event, so that a state could tax the gross receipts from the
sale. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340
(1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 650 (1940)
(sales tax).
268. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939); New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U. S. 338 (1930). In some of the capital stock franchise tax cases the Court seems to take the view that the legislatively designated measure of the tax is an infringement of the commerce
and due process clauses. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
269. The "validity of the tax can in no way be dependent upon the mode
which the state may deem fit to adopt in fixing the amount," and, continued
the Court, no "constitutional objection lies in the way of a legislative body
prescribing any mode or measurement to determine the amount it will charge
for the privilege it bestows." Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 600
(1890). See Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913).
270. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
271. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927).
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could not be taxed at all. In that land-mark dissent he had declared
that this test is "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and
too remote from actualities to be of value," and to employ it, said
Justice Stone, was "little more than using labels to describe a result
rather than any trustworthy formula by which it was reached." In
1938 this great jurist began to lay a foundation for an approach to the
question of the validity of state taxes which would give more consideration to the possible economic effect of the particular tax on interstate commerce and less consideration to the formal aspects of the tax.
Also explicit in his approach is the essential fairness that interstate
commerce should bear its fair share of the cost of local governments
under whose protection it operates.
The first real opportunity to apply his approach as a ground for
the decision of a case came to Justice Stone in the Western Livestock
case, 272 where the Court sustained a New Mexico occupation tax on

the business of publishing a magazine having an interstate circulation,
measured by its gross receipts from the sale of advertising. One
ground for the holding was the application of the traditional, mechanical formula of calling it a tax imposed on the "local activity" of preparing, printing and publishing magazine advertising, with gross receipts from the advertising fairly measuring the value of the local
occupation. The burden on the interstate business was thought to be
too remote and too attenuated to call for a rigidly logical application
of the doctrine that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not
be made the measure of a tax.
As an "added reason" for sustaining the tax, Justice Stone introduced the "cumulative burdens" test for determining the validity of
gross receipts taxes when challenged on commerce clause grounds.
In essence, his "added reason" concerned two main propositions: (1)
Interstate commerce should bear its just share of state tax burdens;
(2) State taxes on interstate commerce should be sustained when not
involving risk of "cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." Not being able to perceive any risk that other states could, in
form or substance, levy the same or a similar tax upon the same segment of the interstate transaction as that taxed by New Mexico (the
taxing state), the Court upheld the tax.
The "cumulative burdens" test of constitutionality, which commenced in Western Livestock, 73 has wound its way through a maze of
subsequent cases with varying degrees of acceptance, rejection and
274
distortion. We saw its reappearance in Northwestern-Stockham,
272. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
273. For a much fuller discussion of the development of the "cumulative
burdens" doctrine by the writer, see Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate
Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138, 185-90 (1956).

274. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450

(1959).
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this time applied to net income taxes, rather than taxes on gross income. The "cumulative burdens" doctrine early assumed the more
familiar name of the "multiple burdens" test.275 Although this approach appeared as the "added reason" in Western Livestock, it was
relied on as perhaps the controlling reason in Adams Manufacturing
Co. v. Storen 76 to strike down an unapportioned Indiana gross income
tax imposed directly on the gross receipts of a local manufacturer derived from interstate sales requiring out-of-state delivery. Although
not articulated so clearly in the Adams case, the "cumulative burdens" test was used as an alternative ground for overturning the tax,
but the Court also referred to the tax as a forbidden burden on the
commerce. In the Adams case there was no attempt to apportion the
receipts so as to let Indiana reach only that part of the gross income
attributable to those activities which took place within her borders.
Since Indiana laid her tax on gross receipts "without apportionment,"
it was thought to threaten a double tax burden not borne by local
commerce. The Court reasoned that if the tax by the manufacturing
state (Indiana) were upheld, a similar tax could be imposed by the
state of the buyer upon the total gross income, and interstate commerce would thus be subject to the risk of a double tax burden not
borne by local business. This result was reached even though the taxpayer was incorporated in the taxing state.
It should be added in passing that it is not absolutely clear from
the Adams opinion exactly what is meant by the Court's phrase "without apportionment." It is not possible to say with certainty whether
the Court meant only "without apportionment between local and
interstate receipts," or whether it meant "without splitting the interstate receipts between the participating states," so that each state
could tax that part of the receipts fairly attributable to it, even though
derived from interstate commerce.27 7 Also, in his opinion in the Adams
case, Justice Roberts reaches backwards to clutch the dead hand of
the past in distinguishing the Adams case from the American Manufacturing 78 case which sustained a privilege tax on manufacturing
where gross proceeds from interstate sales were used as the measure.
Seemingly he thinks that the statutory ritual is the all important distinction. He points out that the American Manufacturing case in275. For helpful discussions of this doctrine, see Hellerstein, State Franchise
Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 TAX. L. REV. 95 (1948); Menard, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce: From Form to Substance and Back Again,
18 Omo ST.L. J. 9, 14 (1957).
276. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).

277. Compare Mr. Justice Roberts' statement in Adams Mffg. Co. v. Storen,
304 U.S. 307, at 311 (1938) with his statement at 314 of the same case. See
Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 501, 521-22
(1947).
278. American Mffg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.

13

volved an excise tax levied on the privilege of manufacturing, with
the proceeds of the sales of manufactured goods used as the measure.
Justice Roberts then goes on to express the belief that had the American Manufacturing tax been levied on the sale, the tax would have
fallen before the commerce clause.279 It seems rather obvious, however, that both types of tax would have had the same dollars and
cents effect on interstate commerce.
Not long after the Adams case, the Gwin, White 80° case again invoked the "multiple burdens" test to upset a Washington occupation
tax. The measure was gross receipts from sales made by taxpayers
who were commission merchants of a Washington sales agency engaged in obtaining orders for, and supervising shipment and sale of,
Washington fruit throughout the United States. This time Washington
had used what had been regarded as the correct statutory ritual. The
subject of the tax was the privilege of engaging in business activities
in Washington with the unapportioned gross receipts from sales of
fruit grown in and shipped from Washington being used as the
measure. Nevertheless the tax met its Waterloo, the Court feeling
that the taxed proceeds included not only that part of the proceeds of
sales attributable to the taxpayer's activities in Washington, but also
included receipts attributable to extra-state activities by sales agencies. These out-of-state sales agencies would sell fruit shipped to
points beyond the state before there were orders for it. The measure
of the tax, however, included income only from the sale of those
apples that grew in Washington. The Court reasoned that if the
Gwin, White tax were upheld as to the total receipts a similar tax
could also be levied on the same sales proceeds by those states in
which the sales agents operated. The Court felt that the net effect
would be to impose upon interstate commerce "the risk of a multiple
burden to which local commerce is not exposed. '281 The tax would
thus place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with
local commerce.
Although Washington had used the proper statutory formula by
making the subject of the tax a local occupation, with the gross proceeds used as a measure, it did not save the tax. The Court felt "that
the tax, though nominally imposed upon appellant's activities in
Washington, by the very method of its measurement reaches the
entire interstate commerce service rendered both within and without the state and burdens the commerce in direct proportion to its
volume. 2 82 It seems pretty plain that the Gwin, White Court, speak.279. Adams Mg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1938).

280. Gwin, White &Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
281. Id. at 439.
282. Id. at 438.
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ing through Justice Stone, was much more concerned with the economic consequences of the tax in suppressing or curtailing the commerce than with the statutory formula in which the tax was cast. We
should not lose sight of the fact, of course, that if the legislatures are
given a completely free rein in selecting the measure of a tax, they
could exert their taxing power to the detriment of national commercial freedom just about as effectively as if they were permitted to
fasten their tax talons on an out-of-state value as the subject of the
tax, which they cannot constitutionally do. Either the commerce or
due process clause should bar a state from using the measure of a tax
to reach extrastate values not fairly attributable to the taxing state.
It is extremely difficult to get away from the thought that the stuff
'that will create a trade barrier, such as the commerce clause was
designed to prevent, is the disproportionate economic weight of a
tax on interstate business as compared with the tax consequences on
local business, and not some legislative departure from a judicially
created mechanical formula, barren in its economic results. Although
the Adams, as well as the Gwin, White Court, indicated that an
apportioned tax levied on gross income would withstand the impact of
the commerce clause, it gave no indication of what kind of an appor,tionment would suffice.
, One year after the 1939 Gwin, White decision, the Court upheld
sales taxes levied by the state of the consumer, declaring that the
'"taxable event" was the "transfer of possession" of the goods by the
:seller to the purchaser at the conclusion of an interstate journey.
That was McGoldrick v. Berwind-White,2 83 and its three companion
.cases.28 4 During the next few years after Berwind-White, the Court
,not only had an opportunity to examine cases involving taxes levied
,by the state of the purchaser "directly on" gross income which consisted of receipts from interstate sales transactions, but it also ex,amined cases of taxes levied "directly on" gross income from such
interstate sales by the state of the seller. While a number of cases of
this nature were before the Court within a three year period, nevertheless an examination of only two of them will serve to illustrate
,the judicial attitude toward taxation of gross income, during the
,period.
In Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp.,285 in 1951,
:the Court was faced with the question whether it would permit a
state to include in a tax levied directly on gross income the receipts
283. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
284. McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430
'(1940); McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940); Jagels,
"A Fuel Corporation" v. Taylor, 255 App. Div. 965, 8 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1938),
af'd, 280 N.Y. 766, 21 N.E.2d 526-(1939), aff'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 619 (1940).
285. 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
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from sales where the sale was followed by interstate transportation.
Indiana's gross income tax was again before the Court. The taxpayer
(seller), a Delaware corporation, made contracts outside Indiana for
the sale of railroad ties, which were obtained from producers in
Indiana and delivered to the buyer (Baltimore & Ohio Railroad) in
Indiana, where they were immediately loaded on cars and shipped
to the seller's plant in Ohio for creosoting. Payments for the ties
were made to the taxpayer (seller) in Pennsylvania, where it had
its principal place of business. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes,
a unanimous Court held that it was constitutionally competent for
Indiana to impose a tax directly on the gross receipts from those sales.
The sale and delivery of the ties to the railroad company in the taxing
state were thought to be local transactions, even though they were
shipped out of the state immediately after the sale.
The Wood Preserving tax on gross income was unapportioned, but
no apportionment was thought necessary, since the only proceeds that
were taxed was the income derived from the sale, which was attributable to the taxing state. The receipts which the taxpayer received
from its creosoting operations in Ohio were not included in the income
that was taxed. The taxing state had thus eliminated from the taxed
income those receipts not attributable to activities within her borders,
thereby avoiding the danger of the risk of multiple taxation, which
was said to be the vice that called for the nullification of the taxes in
the Adams and Gwin, White cases. The entire taxed Wood Preserving
receipts were thus attributable to the taxing state. The Court makes
no mention of the "multiple burdens" doctrine, however.
It should be noted that the tax in question was levied "directly on"
the gross income which included gross receipts from an interstate
transaction. Nevertheless it got safely across the commerce clause
hurdle.
In International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury,8 6 the
complaining taxpayer was objecting to a tax levied directly on his
gross income from sales at both ends of the interstate journey. The
taxed income included gross receipts from sales followed by interstate transportation, as well as gross receipts from sales where the
sale was made at the conclusion of the interstate trip. The taxpayer
(seller) was a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Indiana
(the taxing state) and it maintained manufacturing and sales
branches in the taxing state, as well as in other states.
In this case the taxpayer challenged the applicability of Indiana's
gross income tax to the gross proceeds from the sales of three different
types of transactions. In Class C type sales Indiana buyers bought from
286. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
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branches of taxpayer-seller outside Indiana. The contracts of sale
were made beyond the borders of Indiana, but the buyers took delivery to themselves at factories of taxpayer in Indiana. In the class
D type sales, buyers outside Indiana bought from branches of taxpayer in Indiana, and the contracts were made in Indiana. In Class E
type sales, Indiana buyers made purchases from Indiana branches
under contracts made in Indiana, but the goods were shipped by taxpayer from its factories outside Indiana to buyers in Indiana.
Over due process and commerce clause objections, the Court held
that it was competent for Indiana to apply her gross income tax to
all three classes of sales. In class C sales, the delivery of the goods
in Indiana at the conclusion of the interstate journey was thought to
be an adequate taxable event. Reasoning that Indiana could have
imposed a sales or use tax on these class C transactions, the Court
concluded that "there is no constitutional objection to the imposition
of a gross receipts tax by the State of the buyer. 287 The Court thought
that Indiana was asserting authority over the fruits of a transaction
consummated within her borders.
In Class D sales, the deliver of the goods by the Indiana taxpayer
(seller) to the buyer in Indiana at the beginning of the interstate
transportation and the making of the contracts within the taxing state
were events adequate to sustain Indiana's tax on the gross proceeds
of the sale. Although the goods sold and delivered were to be transported beyond the taxing state immediately on delivery, that was held
not to affect the taxability of the transaction. That was like the tax
in Wood Preserving288 that was upheld. The Berwind-White2 9 sales
tax case was thought to be authority for imposing the class D tax,
although the class D sales were on the opposite end of the interstate
journey from the Berwind-White sales. In both cases the Court considered the taxable event to be a "local transaction" separate and
distinct from the interstate commerce. The risk of exposure to sales
taxation of the same transaction by another state was not enough to
require the Court to condemn Indiana's tax on Commerce clause
grounds.
In the class E sales, where the Indiana buyer bought goods from an
Indiana seller which shipped the goods to the buyer in Indiana from
points outside the state, the consummation of the transaction in Indiana was considered a taxable transaction. It was regarded as an event
distinct from the interstate movement of the goods, and the event
287. Id. at 345.
288. Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941),
discussed with note 285 supra.
289. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), used
in connection *ith note 283 supra.
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occurred after the interstate commerce had ended. The Court relied
primarily on the use tax and sales tax cases as authority. In its reliance on these cases, the Court took occasion to observe that while the
Indiana tax was called a gross income tax levied on the proceeds of
the class E sales, the name of the tax did not matter; it was dealing
with matters of substance, said the Court, and not with dialectics. The
Court was of the opinion that there is the same practical equivalence
whether the tax is on the selling or the buying phase of the transaction. Each was said to be in substance an imposition of a tax on the
transfer of property. The Court thus made it plain that there is no
constitutional difference when a "gross receipts" tax, a "sales tax" or
a "use tax" is utilized 0
In conclusion, the InternationalHarvester opinion says that "where
a State seeks to tax gross receipts from interstate transactions consummated within its borders its power to do so cannot be withheld on
constitutional grounds where it treats wholly local transactions the
same way... To deny Indiana this power would be to make local
industry suffer a competitive disadvantage." 291
Beginning in 1938 with Justice Stone's opinion in the Western Livestock decision,292 the Court employed a test of substance, rather than
form, in answering the commerce clause question when taxes involving gross income were called into question. The Court increasingly
stressed the consequences and effects, either actual or threatened, of
the challenged tax to hamper or hinder interstate operations. In a
forthright manner, the Court had emphasized that it was not the
purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burdens even though it
increased the cost of doing business. The paramount concern of the
Court was whether the challenged tax would place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with local business. At times,
too, the Court recognized that the denial of state power to tax an interstate transaction would be to make local business suffer a competitive
disadvantage. Consistent with the Court's approach of substance,
rather than form, in determining the commerce clause issue, the Court
had declared without equivocation that there is no constitutional difference when a "gross receipts" tax, a "sales tax" or a "use" tax is
employed by the state. Likewise, the Court had erased the formal,
and economically empty, distinction between a tax levied "on" gross
income and taxes levied on some local activity or privilege, using gross
receipts from interstate operations to measure the value of the activity
or privilege. The tax would be sustained if the income taxed was
290. See id. at 347-48.

291. 322 U.S. 340, 349 (1944).

292. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), discussed beginning at note 272 supra.
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fairly attributable to activities and events having a substantial connection with only the taxing state. That was the criterion for determining the commerce clause question whether the subject of the tax
was some local privilege or event, with gross income used to fix the
value (the measure), or whether the tax was imposed directly on
gross income from interstate activity as the subject of the tax. If the
tax, though nominally imposed upon a local privilege or event, by
the method of its measurement, subjected interstate commerce to a
heavier tax burden than local business, it would be struck down. The
emphasis and stress upon formulas and labels were greatly reduced.
A pragmatic approach to the commerce clause question had been
adopted and interstate commerce paid its way, but it could not be
293 ,
discriminated against.
IV. Retreat From Substance to Formalism In Gross Receipts Taxes
A. Expansion of the Zone of Tax Immunity
The practical considerations that were making headway after the
Western Livestock gross receipts tax decision in 1938, in determining
the commerce clause question, were all jettisoned in 1946 by Freeman
v. Hewitt.294 Although this case did not concern a corporate taxpayer,
nevertheless it did set a pattern which is applicable to the gross income received by a corporation. Moreover, the approach used by the
court in that case has influenced much of the judicial thinking in state
taxation of interstate commerce since that time.
In Freeman v. Hewitt formalism and labels again became the touchstone for determining taxability, and interstate commerce was again
given unnecessary freedom from taxation. Once more Indiana's tax
on gross income was called into judgment. 'A divided Court held that
Indiana's tax could not be applied to the proceeds of the sale of certain
securities of an Indiana trust estate, which had been sold for the
estate by a local Indiana stock broker acting through a New York
broker. The actual sale was consummated upon the New York Stock
Exchange. The proceeds of the sale were then delivered to the objecting taxpayer (trustee of the estate) in Indiana. A majority of the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, struck down the
tax, as applied to the gross proceeds, as violative of the commerce
clause, using a variety of appellations to describe the infirmities of
293. For a useful discussion of an approach to determine whether or not a
tax discriminates against interstate commerce, see Overton, State Taxation
of InterstateCommerce, 19 TENN. L. REV. 870 (1947).
294. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). For a recent clear and succinct case analysis
showing the cycle from form to substance and a return to form in the tests
used to determine the commerce clause question, see Menard, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce: From Form To Substance and Back Again, 18 Osno
ST.L.J.9 (1957).
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the tax. It was thought to be a "direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow,"12 5 a forbidden imposition on the "very processes of interstate commerce"29 6 and a "direct tax"297 on interstate
commerce.
The "multiple burdens" doctrine, which had been developed mainly
by Justice Stone in an effort to require interstate commerce to pay its

-way, was rejected as mere "fashions" in judicial writing.298 In its
place, there was the judicially resurrected doctrine that interstate

commerce cannot be taxed at all, no matter how slight the burden,
and it "is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar
encumbrance," 299 said the Court. The economic effect of the tax was
thought by the Court to be irrelevant in determining whether it runs
afoul of the commerce clause. To Mr. Justice Frankfurter's way of
thinking, "the aim of the Commerce Clause was precisely to prevent
' 300
States from exacting toll from those engaged in national commerce.
The Freeman v. Hewitt criterion of constitutionality pretty much
dredges up the discarded pre-Stone Age "direct-indirect" burdens test,
which had been used while declaring that interstate commerce could
not be taxed at all. As Justice Stone had earlier protested on another
occasion by way of trenchant dissent, the test used by the Freeman
Court to determine whether the tax is invalid is "too mechanical, too
uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities to be of
value," and to use this test is "little more than using labels to describe
a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it was
reached." 301
Had the Court not permitted itself to be so hobbled by formalism it
might have sustained the tax. Because of the substantial local incidence of the transaction in the taxing state, the gross receipts could
have been used as a fair value of that local activity. The local aspects
of the transaction consisted not only of the domicile of the trustee and
beneficiary of the trust estate, but also the situs of the trust. We have
already seen that the use of gross receipts as a fair measure of a taxable "local incident" has long been sanctioned, even where the tax
295. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
296. Id. at 253.
297. Ibid.
298. A well-known authority in the field thinks that the trend towards the
point that interstate commerce must pay its way came to a halt when Justice
Stone passed from the scene. Dowling, Introduction-State Taxation of Multistate Business, 18 OHmO ST. L.J. 3, 5 (1957).
299. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
300. Id. at 254.
301. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927).
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was levied directly "on" those receipts. 302 The Freeman decision thus
illustrates Professor Powell's criticism of commerce clause tests that
"names were made to matter more than mathematics or economics. 3 03
3 04
deThe 1947 case of Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.
cided a year after Freeman v. Hewitt, perpetuated the doctrine that
interstate commerce is immune from taxation. Carter& Weekes upset
New York's gross receipts tax as applied to receipts from stevedoring,
where both interstate and foreign commerce were loaded. Not being
able to find sufficient localism in loading the cargo to permit the tax
on the "local event" theory, the majority of the Court thought that
the tax was an infringement of the commerce clause insofar as the
interstate commerce aspects of the stevedoring were concerned. The
Court then proceeded to decide that the risk of a "multiple tax burden" also was enough to make the tax fatally defective on commerce
clause grounds because of the possibility of an additional tax on the
proceeds from unloading of the cargo at another port of call in another
state.
Clearly, the same incident, i.e., loading cargo in New York, cannot
be reached, taxwise, by any other state. The activity of loading was
confined exclusively to the state that imposed the tax, and a tax upon
gross receipts from unloading in another state would be taxation of
receipts from an entirely separate and distinct activity.3 05 Consequently, the risk of multiple taxation of the same proceeds simply was
not present in Carter & Weekes, and the Court's basis for unconstitutionality assumed the existence of a premise which factually did not
exist. Local business in New York, including stevedoring, presumably
must pay the gross receipts tax litigated in Carter & Weekes on both
loading and unloading operations. Therefore, local business suffers a
commercial handicap with interstate business by reason of the tax,
because local business is forced to compete against interstate business,
which is sheltered against the assessment of the taxes which are being
paid by the local business. Because of the pyramiding costs of state
government, it generally will be impossible for a state to give any
equalizing tax relief by trying to temper its severe tax wind to the
shorn local lamb.
302. On a number of occasions that had been the holding of the Court when
the tax was questioned under the same statute as that involved in the Freeman case. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 220 Ind.
340, 42 N.E. 2d 34, aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 740 (1943); Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252 (1941); Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
303. Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 LARv. L. REv. 501,
503 (1947).
304. 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
305. The Court has held that there is no forbidden multiple taxation where
the tax by another state would be on a different subject matter. Coverdale v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
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In Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Meaey,306 decided one year
after Carter & Weekes, there was a much more sensible approach to
the problem of taxation of gross income. Mealey involved New York's
tax on gross receipts of all utilities doing business within the state.
The tax was applied to the total receipts of the Greyhound Bus Company derived from interstate transportation of passengers. The Court
held that New York had no taxable grip on the unapportioned gross
receipts on the ground that the tax made interstate commerce bear
more than its fair share of the cost of local government. However, the
tax would be upheld, the Court said, if apportioned according to the
percentage of the total mileage which was traversed within the taxing
state.
Two aspects of the rationale of the Mealey decision should be noted.
In the first place, this tax levied directly "on" gross receipts was held
to be a "direct" tax on interstate commerce, which generally has been
regarded as a forbidden imposition on interstate commerce. In the
second place, the tax could not escape commerce clause condemnation,
but only because it was not fairly apportioned. The Court says, however, that if properly apportioned, such a tax, although levied "on"
the gross receipts from interstate transportation, rather than "measured by" gross receipts, would be sustained, at least insofar as gross
receipts from interstate transportation are concerned. The Court thus
seemed willing to permit interstate commerce to be taxed, so long as
no other state can repeat the tax, and thereby expose interstate commerce to multiple tax burdens not borne by local business. In Canton
R.R. Co. v. Rogan,30 7 the Mealey rationale was followed in upholding a
Maryland franchise tax on railroads engaged in interstate commerce,
measured by gross receipts, where it was apportioned according to
mileage within the state.
In 1949, in the case of Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone,308 four
of the nine members of the Court voted to sustain a tax on the privilege of doing business measured by the gross receipts from the operation of an interstate pipe line, engaged in transporting oil exclusively
in interstate commerce. A fifth justice voted to uphold the tax on
the ground that the event taxed was a local activity. Thus the tax
was sustained, but the remaining four members of the Court dissented
306. 334 U.S. 653 (1948). For a recent discussion of all the various kinds of
state and local taxes to which multistate transportation is subjected, see

Brabson, Multistate Taxation of the TransportationIndustry, 18 OHIO ST. L.J.

22 (1957).
307. 340 U.S. 511 (1951). In the recent case of Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 446 (1959) Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision upholding a gross receipts tax, on the ground that it was properly
apportioned, relying on both Rogan and Mealey. This case is discussed beginning at note 240, supra.
308. 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
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on the ground that this was a prohibited tax on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce. As the case stands, it means but little,
since later pronouncements by the Court, including the NorthwesternStockham30 9 decision, make it clear that the Court will not sustain a
tax which it thinks is an encroachment on the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce.
Two more cases are of importance in trying to decide what activity
can be used as the subject of a privilege tax with gross income used
as the measure or base of computation of the tax. The first of those
cases is Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue. 310 There Illinois sought to
impose her occupation tax, measured by gross receipts, upon a foreign
manufacturing corporation, which maintained a sales office and warehouse in Chicago. Some orders for goods were sent by Illinois customers directly by mail to the home office in Massachusetts. Other
orders were forwarded by the Illinois branch office. All orders were
accepted or rejected by the home office in Massachusetts. The orders
were filled by shipment from the home office either directly to the
customers in Illinois or through the Illinois branch. Illinois tried to
include within the taxable gross receipts all proceeds from all sales
made to Illinois customers. The Court held that Illinois could properly
include receipts from all sales that utilized the branch office, (a)
either in receiving the orders; or (b) in distributing the goods. Iinois was not permitted to include the proceeds from the sales of orders
sent directly by the customer to the taxpayer's out-of-state home office
where the order was filled and the goods shipped directly to the customer from the home office.
The Norton opinion is clear as to what transactions Illinois can regard as taxable local activities, but the opinion is not clear as to the
exact reason why some of the transactions are taxable. The Illinois
branch office maintained a stock of goods; it received orders; it held
merchandise shipped in carload lots in order to save freight; and it
supplied services to customers by way of repairs to machines and
technical advice. The Illinois branch also made some over-the-counter
purely local sales to customers. The Court says that the activities of
the Illinois branch office were decisive factors in holding the Illinois
market, and that this foreign corporation cannot channel business
through a local outlet to gain the advantage of a local business and
also hold the immunities of an interstate business. However, it is not
clear whether the Court is saying that local activity of the branch
office may bring within the taxing power of a state some other transactions which otherwise would escape taxation on commerce clause
309. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959), approving this doctrine as announced in earlier cases.
310. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
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grounds. Specifically, would those controversial transactions have
been held to be taxable if the Illinois branch office had done nothing
but solicit the orders from customers? Mr. Justice Reed dissented on
the ground that he thought Illinois could not tax those orders solicited
by the branch office. 311 In his opinion the solicitation of orders by the
Illinois branch was not any different, from the commerce clause standpoint, from the non-taxable sale resulting from solicitation in McLeod
v. Dilworth,3 12 where there was no branch office in the taxing state.
At the other pole, Justices Clark, Black and Douglas, in their dissent,313 thought that, because of the activities of the Illinois branch
office, all of the proceeds of taxpayer's sales in Illinois were reasonably
attributable to Illinois, including those orders sent directly from the
customer to the out-of-state office, where they were filled and the
goods sent directly from it to the customer. This view, in essence, does
say the local activity of the branch office may bring within the taxable grip of the state some transactions which otherwise would
escape taxation on commerce clause grounds. To some extent, that
may be what the majority also says.
Field Enterprises,Inc. v. State of Washington 314 may have extended
the Norton doctrine, or it may simply have clarified that opinion. In
Field Enterprises a foreign corporation, which published encyclopedias, maintained in the taxing state (Washington) a division branch
office. This Washington branch office included a manager, stenographers and salesmen, some of whom solicited orders and collected any
initial payments, but other payments were sent by the purchaser directly to the home office in Illinois. Displays and sample sets of
encyclopedias were also maintained in the branch office in the taxing
state. Orders obtained, either by the Washington solicitors or by
customers coming to the branch office in that state, were forwarded
to the out-of-state home office where they were accepted and filled.
The home office was the source of all supply of books and all orders
were shipped directly from the home office directly to the customers.
Upon this set of facts the State of Washington was permitted, over
commerce clause objections, to collect her business and occupation tax
for the privilege of engaging in business, measured by the gross proceeds of sales. Since no opinion was written by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the Field Enterprises tax, it is difficult to
say what are the controlling factors for finding sufficient localism to
311. Id. at 539.
312. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 332 U.S. 327 (1944).
313. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
314. 47 Wash. 2d 852, 239 P.2d 1010 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 806
(1956). For a detailed analysis of this case by a writer who thinks the Court
may have done some violence to some of their earlier decisions, see Strecker,
Local Incidents of Interstate Business, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 69, 71-78 (1957).
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support this privilege tax. Norton315 was cited by the Court as authority for the tax, although it is pretty clear that there was much more
that could be termed local activity in Norton than those activities of
Field Enterprises.
Norton does make it plain that a tax involving gross receipts will
not be upheld unless it is attributable to what the Court thinks is a
"local incident." 316 Interstate commerce continues to enjoy its tax
immunity bath in the area of gross receipts taxes. The latest word
on the subject, Northwestern-Stockham,3 17 by preserving Spector,318
leaves no doubt that the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce
is not a taxable local privilege. Moreover, Northwestern-Stockham
makes it equally clear that mere solicitation from offices within a
state, where the orders are sent out of state to be filled, is purely interstate commerce. 319 Hence, such solicitation, without more, pretty
clearly would not be a taxable privilege.3 20 We know from Northwestern-Stockham, however, that Illinois, and states similarly situated, could take a leaf out of the book of Minnesota and Georgia and
impose a tax on the net income from the activity of soliciting business
that is exclusively interstate, and not run afoul of the commerce
clause.
B. Gross Receipts As A Factor In The Apportionment Formula
Already we have seen that several states use "gross receipts" as a
factor in the mathematical formula used to apportion net income for
the purpose of taxing that income. 32 1 Also, gross receipts may be used
as a factor in an apportionment formula for the purpose of computing
other kinds of state taxes. A review of a couple of cases will show
most of the problems that come up when gross receipts are used,
either singly or along with other factors, in the fiscal formula for the
purpose of computing, for tax purposes, the value of an activity in a
far-flung multistate operation.
The use of gross receipts as a single factor in the formula for valuing
local activity for a franchise tax was involved in Ford Motor Co. v.
Beauchamp.322 There, Texas imposed an annual franchise tax on all
315. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951),
discussed in connection with note 310 supra.
316. Id. at 537.
317. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959), discussed beginning at note 8 supra.
318. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), discussed
beginning with note 47 supra.
319. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
320. See notes 73 and 74 supra.
321. See discussion beginning with note 157 supra, and going through note
167 supra.
322. 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
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corporations chartered or authorized to do business in Texas. The tax
was assessed upon such proportion of (a) the outstanding capital
stock; (b) surplus and undivided profits of the corporation; (c) plus
its long-term indebtedness, as the gross receipts from the corporation's
Texas business bore to total gross receipts.
The complaining taxpayer, Ford Motor Company, sent parts into
Texas for assembly and sale in intrastate commerce to Texas dealers.
Ford's capital, as defined in the statute, was over $600,000,000. Total
gross receipts for the year were over $800,000,000; and Texas gross
receipts were over $34,000,000. The statutory apportionment formula,
as applied to Ford, yielded a $23,000,000 tax base allocable to Texas.
Ford had only an assembly plant in Texas, whose book value was
$3,000,000. The tax was paid under protest and suit instituted to recover the amount of tax paid on the $20,000,000 in excess of the book
value of the assets in Texas. Ford launched a two-pronged attack on
the tax, as applied to it. It contended that the tax was inimical to the
commerce clause in that it was imposed on assets used in its interstate
business; and that it took Ford's property without due process of law
because it taxed activities and property outside the taxing state and
over which the state had no jurisdiction.
Over these objections, the tax was sustained. The exploitation by
a foreign corporation of interstate opportunities under the protection
and encouragement of a state government afforded a sufficient basis
for imposing a privilege tax. There was an abundance of localism. The
Court was also of the opinion that the statutory formula used to
arrive at the value of the franchise tax was fair, although the value
of the taxed local privilege took into account the augmentation in
value from its connection as a part of an interstate organism. This
method of computation merely recognized the increased value of the
privilege of doing local business resulting from the use of property
beyond the state. The state was simply placing a charge upon that
privilege commensurate with the protection it afforded.
Of course, common sense should teach us that an asset may fluctuate
in value according to the income it produces. In this connection, we
have it on the twice-given assurance of the highest tribunal in the
lauid that a "live horse is worth more than a dead one, though the
physical object may be the same, and a smooth-going automobile is
worth more than the unassembled parts."323 Likewise, these tangible
assets by way of the assembly plant located in Texas, as part of an
interstate organism, may have produced much more income than like
assets located elsewhere. Again, we have the judicial assurance that
323. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959);
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359, 364 (1954).
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"Death Valley Scotty generated much less gross from his sightseeing
3 24
wagon than did his counterpart in Central Park."
Consequently, the property of Ford's assembly plant in Texas with
a book value of only $3,000,000 had an income producing potential that
made the privilege of operating that plant in Texas worth much more
than the book value of the physical assets. The "going-concern" value
of property is an integral factor which influences the real value of the
activity. As such intangible factor, it should be reflected in the compu32 5
tation of the privilege tax.
The value of the taxable activity thus received an increment from
interstate operations. In this respect interstate commerce is reflected
in the amount of the tax, and it can realistically be said that interstate
commerce was required to pay its way.
InternationalHarvester Co. v. Evatt326 has some features that distinguish it from the FordMotor case and, by the same token, this case
widens the compass of validity of gross receipts taxes. In the Ford
Motor case, gross receipts constituted the single factor formula used
to compute a privilege tax. In InternationalHarvester gross receipts
appeared as one of the factors in a multifactor formula. In Ford Motor
all the sales were local; in International Harvester there were interstate sales.
In International Harvester, the taxing state (Ohio) had imposed a
tax for the privilege of doing business and computed the tax, in part,
on the basis of gross receipts from both interstate and intrastate sales,
and partly on a proportion of the capital stock of the corporation. Taxpayer was a far-flung enterprise engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing machinery. Factories, warehouses and sales
agencies were owned by taxpayer both within and without the taxing
state. Some goods manufactured in other states were sold in the
taxing state.
Under Ohio's apportionment formula, the total value of the taxpayer's issued capital stock was divided in half. One half of the value
of the stock was multiplied by a fraction whose numerator was the
value of all of taxpayer's property in Ohio and whose denominator
was the total value of all of the taxpayer's property wherever located.
The other half of the value of the capital stock was multiplied by a
fraction whose numerator was the total value of "business done" in
324. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 443 (1959).
325. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959), appears
to be the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court in which it permitted a
state to impose a privilege tax, measured by gross receipts, in lieu of a property tax on the intangible or "going-concern" value of property. For a discussion of that case, see note 240 supra.
326. 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
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Ohio and whose denominator was the total value of business done
everywhere. The sum of these two products was used by Ohio as the

tax base.
Taxpayer contended that the formula, as applied to it, transformed
the tax on its business to a tax on an activity outside the taxing state,
in violation of both the due process and commerce clauses.
The main objection to this formula of calculation lay in the fact
that the total value of business used as numerator in the second fraction included the gross proceeds of sales of goods manufactured
within, but sold outside, the taxing state, as well as the gross proceeds
of goods manufactured in plants outside the taxing state but sold in
Ohio.
The Court sustained the tax, as applied. The commerce clause argument was rejected on the ground that the apportionment formula
used to determine the value of the local privilege was thought to be
fair. In holding that the commerce clause offered no barrier to the
imposition of this tax, the Court said, in part:
Of course, the Commerce Clause does not bar a state from imposing a
tax based on the value of the privilege to do an intrastate business merely
because it also does an interstate business. . . . Nor does the fact that the
computation ... includes receipts from interstate sales affect the validity
of a fair apportionment... And here, it clearly appears... that the whole
purpose of the state formula was to arrive, without undue complication, at
a fair conclusion as to what was27the value of the intrastate business for
which its franchise was granted.3
The use of gross receipts from interstate sales to determine the fair
value of a local activity such as manufacturing, of course, has long
328
been sanctioned.
In order to buttress its commerce clause objections to the International Harvester tax, the taxpayer had urged that, although the tax
was apportioned, nevertheless it could be repeated by other states.
In answering this multiple burdens argument, the Court replied that
"since it (the tax) is assessed only against the privilege of doing local
Ohio business of manufacturing and selling, we do not come to the
question, argued by appellant, of possible multiplication by other
states. None of them can tax the privilege of operating factories and
327. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 421 (1947). Western
Cartridge Co. v. Emerson, 281 U.S. 511 (1930) involved an Illinois franchise
tax imposed on a manufacturing corporation at the rate of five cents per
hundred shares of that portion of its issued capital stock which bore the same
ratio to all its issued capital stock as the amount of its property and business
within the state of Illinois bore to its total property and business. Although
all interstate sales of goods manufactured by the challenging corporation
within the state were attributed by the taxing officials to that state as business done there, the tax did not fall before the commerce clause.
328. American Mg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).

1959]

STATE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME

113

sales agencies in Ohio.1329 It is, of course, true that no other state can
tax the local activity of operating factories and sales agencies in Ohio,
which is the subject of the tax; but what about multiple taxation of
these gross receipts from interstate sales which are used in the measure of the tax. Other states may well have a valid tax claim on the receipts from these sales.33 0 However, in view of the fact that these
receipts were part of the legislatively designated measure of the taxwere thus used only as a factor in the formula for computing the
value of the taxed local activity-the Court was expounding ordinary
garden-variety of commerce clause gospel. Generally the subject of
the tax, rather than the measure, has been the dominant test of taxability under the commerce clause.3 31 Nevertheless, looking at the matter realistically, whether or not taxpayer is required to pay multiple
taxes on these receipts from the interstate sales in question would
seem to depend upon the fairness of the apportionment formulas used
by the various states having a taxable grip on the income. Unless each
state in which International Harvester has taxable sales activity has
assigned to itself only a proportion of the receipts that are commensurate with the activities there carried on and the property there
located, then there will be tax duplication. The Court quite properly
stated the nub of the matter in the Northwestern-Stockham opinion,
in responding to the argument that the taxpayer was subject to the
risk of tax duplication:
Logically it is impossible, when the tax is fairly apportioned, to have the
same income taxed twice. In practical operation, however, apportionment
formulas being what they are, the possibility of the contrary is not foreclosed, especially by levies in domiciliary states.3 32
Moreover, we have seen earlier that because of the divergent state
apportionment formulas in the net income tax field, along with the
differing definitions of the factors in even a superficially identical formula, tax multiplication is quite possible even though each state pur-

329. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 423 (1947).
330. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1944); Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313
U.S. 62 (1941); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940). All these cases are discussed beginning with note 283 supra, and
going through note 291 supra.
331. See discussion beginning at note 262 supra, and going through 270
supra. The Court has, on rare occasions, upset a tax imposed on a local activity where the measure, consisting of gross receipts, threatened a multiple
tax burden not borne by local business. E.g., Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). This case is discussed beginning at note 280 supra,
and going through note 282 supra.
332. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
462-63 (1959).
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ports to assign to itself only that income it thinks fairly attributable
333
to it.
In rejecting the due process argument, the InternationalHarvester
Court made it clear that a tax law will not be thrust down merely
because the result is achieved through a formula which takes into
consideration interstate and out-of-state transactions having a relation to the local privilege. Here, as in the Ford Motor case, the Court
stressed that the privilege of doing business within the state is made
more valuable owing to its being part of a multistate enterprise. The
recognition of that fact for tax purposes does not run counter to the
requisites of due process, because the opportunities afforded by the
taxing state have a direct and substantial relationship to the interstate operations.
The national character of the modern corporation whose property
and operations may be scattered through many states, but whose use,
management and balance sheet are unitary, is given realistic recognition in the Ford Motor and InternationalHarvester decisions. Earlier
in this article, we saw that same realistic recognition for the purpose
of imposing net income taxes. 33 4 When we discussed the taxation of
net income, it was there pointed out that an apportionment by way
of a mathematical formula, including such income-producing factors
as property, payroll, sales and manufacturing costs was the only feasible way to assign net income for tax purposes in a unitary multistate
enterprise. 335 In the cases involving net income, we saw that apportionments have been upset upon a showing that they were materially
contrary to fact, in that a taxing state was attempting, through its
apportionment formula, to assign to itself a greater portion of income
than was fairly attributable to it.336 Likewise in other kinds of taxes,
when the Court felt that the formula produced an inequitable result,
the tax has been set aside. 337 The Court could not find that such an
333. See discussion beginning at note 121 supra, and going through note 203
supra.
334. See discussion beginning at note 8 supra, and going through note 53
supra.
335. See discussion beginning at note 154 supra, and going through note
155 supra.
336. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, ex rel. Maxwell, 282 U.S.
123 (1939); see note 170 supra, through note 172 supra.
337. Some excise taxes have been invalidated where the Court thought the
apportionment formula used by the taxing state was trying to compel the
taxpayer to pay more than its fair share of tax by including values not properly attributable to the taxing state. Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76
(1927); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920). In the Wallace case an excise
tax based on the proportion of the value of the total property of the railroad
which its mileage in the taxing state bore to its entire mileage, was invalidated
on both due process and commerce clause grounds. The cost of construction
per mile in the taxing state was much less than without, and the taxpayer
had valuable property outside the state which could not be shown to add
to the value of the road and of rights exercised in the taxing state. In the
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inequitable apportionment had been made in Ford Motor and International Harvester, which likewise involved unitary multistate operations. The apportionment formulas in both cases were found to be
fair, even though the formulas reflected the value of the local privilege
as an integral part of a much larger interstate organization. The
advantages of such large capital resources should be distributed fairly
and equitably among all those states in which the corporation engages
in business activity.
The "unit rule," which is the basis of the apportionment method of
assigning income for tax purposes, and which was followed in Ford
Motor and InternationalHarvester,was originally developed to apportion property or earnings of such unitary enterprises as communication or transportation companies. 338 Those, of course, are companies
whose property does have real intangible or "going-concern" value
above its "barebones" or physical worth, owing to its use as part of
one entire enterprise, and whose earnings are incapable of separation
into the respective portions derived from the in-state segment of the
business. This "unit rule" has thus been extended, wisely it seems, to
corporations engaged in production and selling activities. Although it
may be more difficult to determine what rightfully belongs to a state
when a sale is concerned in multistate sales operations than when the
receipts are from multistate transportation or communication, that
does not mean that there can be no constitutional apportionment of
income from enterprises whose income is derived from interstate sales.
The Ford Motor and InternationalHarvester decisions are in line with
those decisions using the apportionment formulas in the taxation of
net income 339 in showing that such a practice is possible and feasible,
as well as constitutional. Gross receipts may not constitute a very
satisfactory nor accurate measure of the value of an activity, since
field of property taxes the assessment has also been struck down where the
Court thought the apportionment formula was trying to include values not
properly attributable to the taxing state. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright,
249 U.S. 275 (1919).

338. E.g., Pullman Palace Coy. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891);
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897), on rehearing
166 U. S. 185 (1897); St. Louis & S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Gottleib, 190 U.S. 412 (1903); see
Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499 (1904). For a discussion of the origin and
development of the "unit rule," as well as a treatment of the formulas used
to apportion net income, see Silverstein, Problems of Apportionment in Taxation of Multistate Business, 4 TAx L. REv. 207 (1949).
339. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271
(1924); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); United States Glue
Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918). These cases are discussed earlier, beginning with note 8 supra, and going through note 53 supra. See also, Butler
Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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such receipts may not reflect any profit whatsoever. Nevertheless
there is little doubt that such is a constitutionally proper measure. In
its latest word on the subject, the Supreme Court declared that while
"it may be true that gross receipts are not the best measure, it is too
'340
late now to question its constitutionality.
V. Summary Comment On Gross Income Taxes
When a state taxes the gross income or receipts of a multistate business enterprise, the judicial function should be to determine what
portion of the income or receipts may fairly be attributed to the taxing
state. That is to say, the task of the Court should be to determine
whether the taxing state has assigned to itself only a proportion of
the gross income of the business that is commensurate with the activities there carried on and the property there located. That portion of
the business fairly attributable to the state should be a proper subject
for raising revenue for the state, under whose protection the business
is carried on, irrespective of whether the Court can segregate some
part of the business and label it a "local" activity. That should be the
crux of the constitutional issue, whether the state is trying to reach
gross receipts derived from interstate sales activity, or whether the
state has levied a property tax on such unitary multistate enterprises
as transportation and communications systems. In short, the "in-state"
event or activity should be the proper subject for state taxation, even
though it is an integral part of interstate commerce, so long as the tax
does not place that commerce at a competitive disadvantage with
local business. In this fashion the tax burden is equalized between
local and interstate business. Using this approach, it is not necessary
for the Court to engage in mental gymnastics trying to find a taxable
so-called "local" event which is not a part of interstate commerce.
Looking at the matter realistically, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to find such an event or activity in modern unitary multistate
business.
To be sure, the job of determining whether a particular tax does
give local business a competitive advantage over interstate business
may be difficult, but it should not be any more so than the task of
weighing all the varied and complicated factors in arriving at a
judgment whether a particular tax discriminates against interstate
commerce. Both jobs appear to be essentially the same. The Court has
always been willing to wrestle with the problem of tax discrimination.
In truth, in Gwin, White & Prince 341 the Court concluded that a gross
receipts tax which places interstate business at a competitive disad340. American Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959).
341. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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vantage with local business by subjecting it to multiple tax burdens
not borne by local business is a form of forbidden discrimination
against interstate commerce.
However, when gross income is involved, the Court often clings to
the view that the commerce clause renders the states impotent to tax
that income unless "some local incident occurs sufficient to bring
the transaction within its taxing power. '342 When a tax on gross
income is involved, the Court remains impervious to the admonition
of a great jurist, in speaking of such taxes, that it "was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing business. ' 34
PART THREE:

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF STATE TAXATION OF

INTERSTATE COiVIERCE

I. The Shortcomings Of The JudicialProcess
Congress has at last taken a step toward devising a congressional
policy in an effort to solve the tremendously complex and important
problem of multiple state taxation of interstate commerce. It did two
things. First, as we have already seen, Congress passed a law providing a standard for testing the authority of the states to tax the net
income from outside businesses, albeit limiting the scope of its standard to taxes derived from net income from the sale of tangible personal property where the only connection of the out-of-state seller
with the taxing state is solicitation of the sale. Specifically, Congress
has prohibited taxes on net income from the sale of tangible personal
property where the only contact of the taxing state with the extrastate seller is the solicitation of the sale. The second congressional
step was the designation of the House Judiciary Committee and
Senate Finance Committee to make full and complete studies of
state taxation of income derived from interstate commerce for the
purpose of proposing "legislation providing uniform standards to be
342. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 537
(1951), discussed, beginning with note 310 supra; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes

Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), discussed beginning with note 304 supra.
The latest case upsetting a gross receipts tax is Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), where a franchise tax measured by gross receipts was held fatally defective because the Court thought it was a tax on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, even though the tax was apportioned to the gross receipts derived from business within 'the taxing state.
This case is discussed beginning with note 229 supra. The Court has permitted
an apportioned gross receipts tax on receipts from interstate transportation.
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Canton R.R.
Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951). These two cases are discussed in connection
with notes 306 and 307 respectively supra.
343. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938),
discussed, beginning with note 272 supra.
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observed by the states in imposing income taxes on income" from
interstate commerce. These committees are required by the act to
344
report the results of such studies not later than July 1, 1962.
Congress has thus made a beginning at clearing away some of the
smog in an area where such action has been advocated for many
years, both by the judiciary and by writers. Many sources have
questioned whether recourse to the Court alone for guidance in the
area of state taxation of interstate business can keep abreast of the
present day, dynamic situation, as the national economy becomes
increasingly complex and tax demands skyrocket. Much more than
a hundred years ago, Marshall recognized that the economy of our
nation was national in scope and declared that "no inconsiderable
portion of the industry of the nation" is "entrusted" to Congress under
the commerce clause power. 345 If that was true in Marshall's day
when commerce crept slowly by pack horses and wagons by land,
and in barges and sailing ships by water, how much more so is our
present day economy national in scope with our high speed methods
of transportation and communication which crisscross the land.
The problems of multiple taxation in our federal system do not
lend themselves to a satisfactory judicial solution. Much has been
said concerning the practical impossibility of a satisfactory judicial
solution of this problem of maintaining the national interest in commercial freedom and at the same time bringing it into an effective
harmony with the local interests for revenue-a problem calling for
vigilance and regulation on a national scale. It is to be doubted
whether over-all policies, fair alike to the state and the nation, can
be devised within the framework of the judicial process. 346 The policy
of judicial control of state taxation of interstate commerce has certain
inherent weaknesses which members of the Supreme Court itself
have been the first to recognize and point out.
In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Northwestern-Stockham dissent he
made the forthright declaration that this "problem calls for solution
by devising a congressional policy. ' 347 By way of emphasis, he
reasoned that "Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough
canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors which compose
344. This congressional action has been discussed in some detail beginning
at note 86 supra, and going through note 95 supra.
345. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 407 (1819).
346. For a recent incisive analysis of this problem, taking the position that
the judiciary cannot adequately handle the matter, see Braden, Cutting the
Gordian Knot of Interstate Taxation, 18 Omo ST. L.J. 57 (1957). For the
views of a writer who thinks that the courts can make economic sense out of
the decisions in this field, if they will take an approach which he proposes, see
Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause
to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740, 749-89 (1953).
347. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476 (1959).
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the problem of the taxing freedom of the States and the needed limits
on such state taxing power." There has been much judicial thinking
along the same lines. Earlier it was said by members of the Supreme
Court that "judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative
regulations-must from inherent limitations of the judicial process
treat the subject by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local
controversies upon evidence and information limited by the narrow
rules of litigation. 348 This, of course, is true since the Court deals
only with specific cases and issues as they come before it. While this
has advantages for many purposes, the majority in NorthwesternStockham recognized that it is not calculated to produce a comprehensive policy and seldom establishes satisfactory standards. 349 It follows that the Court does not and cannot lead the states into common
action which will, in the long run, best serve the national economy.
Expressing the belief that "Congress alone can formulate policies
founded upon economic realities," Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Northwestern-Stockham dissent also points out that "Congressional committees can make studies and give the claims of the individual States
adequate hearing before the ultimate legislative formulation of policy
is made by the representatives of all the States." 350 Thus, only by "a
comprehensive survey and investigation of the entire national economy-which Congress alone has power and facilities to make"3'5 can
it be determined whether a particular tax on interstate commerce is
consistent with the best interests of our national economy.
Out of long years of brilliant experience in the field, that great
scholar and leading authority in his field, Professor Dowling, summed
the matter up succinctly in this fashion:
I believe it is in order to say that the general problem of the maintenance
of the federal system, including special problems of state taxation of
multiple business ... has all but become political in character and that the
ultimate answers will have to come from Congress rather than the Su348. Dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940). To
the same effect is Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944).
349. The Northwestern-Stockham Court did some thinking along these lines
jn its opinion. "The resulting judicial application of constitutional principles
to specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy and confusion and
little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
bimesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959). To the same effect, see Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, State Taxation on Interstate Commerce, S. REP.
No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 9 (1959).
350. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476-77 (1959).
* 351. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc.
v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 449 (1939).
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preme Court. This seems to me to be the composite, and salutary, result
of more than a century of litigation over the adjustment of state and
national power in the operation of the federal system.35 2
II. The Power Of Congress To Control State Taxation
Because of the inherent limitations on the judicial process, coupled
with the judicially recognized "need for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases with reference to the taxing power of the
States,"3 53 where interstate commerce is involved, it is appropriate
for Congress to take a hand in the matter. The limitation which Congress has already placed on the taxing power of the states in the
restricted field with which it deals apparently is intended only as
stop-gap legislation. It has been criticized as "nothing more than
a protective measure for a few manufacturing States and a few companies which do a multistate business of a specified type."354 The
same source criticizes the act for failure to "attack the problem positively," and takes the position that "what is needed is proper allocation of taxes among the various states and not a prohibition against
certain state taxes." As this criticism reveals, there is a need for
congressional action more comprehensive than that taken, establishing guide lines generally for state taxation of interstate commerce,
and not restricting the congressional endeavors to state taxes on net
income.
Such affirmative congressional control over state taxing activities
would entail no sharp break with precedent, and its exercise would
be in line with some of the best efforts of the Court during the past
hundred years.
In formulating national policy over interstate commerce, Congress
has many times displaced otherwise valid state action that interfered
with congressional policy. In like fashion, Congress has many times
expanded the power of the states to control or tax interstate commerce, where the state action otherwise would have been forbidden.
In the Southern Pacific case, Chief Justice Stone gave a clear and
succinct declaration that Congress "may either permit the States to
regulate the [interstate] commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible," or "exclude state regulation even of matters
352. Dowling, Introduction-State Taxation of Multistate Business, 18 Omo
ST. L.J. 3 (1957).
353. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
457 (1959).
354. Report of Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Byrd, State
Taxation of Income Derived From Interstate Commerce (minority views),
S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959).
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of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate com355
merce."
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is so complete and
paramount in character that Congress has displaced state action even
in fields which are admittedly local, where Congress has used that
power as the basis for the affirmative establishment of national policy
over interstate commerce, and conflicting state regulatory action has
been held inoperative. 35 6 The doctrine of congressional displacement
of state action where Congress has acted in connection with the
same subject matter has also found lodgment where the questioned
state action is taxation, as well as regulation. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil
Corporation3 7 furnishes a ready example. There the Court curbed,
as in conflict with a congressional regulation of commerce, the taxing
activities of New York City. The tax in question was struck down,
not because it ran afoul of the commerce clause, but because it was
antagonistic to the congressional policy expressed through legislation.
Congress likewise has given permission to the states to regulate
and tax interstate commerce in a manner which would otherwise not
be permissible. The case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 58
apparently for the first time, called for a square holding on the power
of Congress to permit the states to levy a tax on interstate commerce.
This case involved a state unemployment tax and Congress had provided that the employer should not be "relieved from compliance
therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce." 359 So confident was the Court that Congress possessed the
power to consent to the state tax that it disposed of the argument
against the power in one sentence. In this one sentence, sustaining
the power of Congress to consent to the state tax, the Court gave one
of the most sweeping and unequivocal declarations found in its opinions on the subject: "It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the
exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in specific
''
ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it. 360
355. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945). The writer has discussed the subject of congressional consent to
state action over interstate commerce, and congressional displacement of
state action in matters of local concern, in considerable detail, elsewhere. See
HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 247-57 (1953).
356. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); New York v.
United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922); Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Houston, E. '&W. T. Ry. v. United States,
234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport Rate Cases); cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9Wheat.) 1 (1824).
357. 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
358. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
359. 49 Stat. 642 (1935), 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1946).
360. International Shoe Co. v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). Chief
Justice Stone's confidence that Congress can remove the commerce clause
barrier to state action was justified by decisions of the Supreme Court. In re
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Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin 61 represents perhaps
the most conspicuous example of judicial approval of congressional
consent to an otherwise forbidden tax on interstate commerce. There
the Court sustained an act of Congress giving permission to the states
to tax interstate insurance business which the Court assumed, without deciding, would otherwise have been in conflict with the commerce clause.

362

There seems little doubt, therefore, that under its power over
interstate commerce, Congress can fix the bounds of state taxation
of that commerce. It can either authorize such taxation by the states
as Congress deems appropriate, or it can prohibit facets of state
taxation, otherwise valid, when Congress uses its power as the basis
for the establishment of national policy over interstate commerce. 363
III. Suggested Areas For CongressionalAction
The House Judiciary Committee and Senate Finance Committee are
instructed to make a study for the purpose of proposing legislation
providing uniform standards to be observed by the states in imposing
taxes on income from interstate commerce. That appears to be a
worthy objective. However, as has been suggested, there is need for
these committees, or some other committees, to give attention to a
much more comprehensive examination of the tremendously important, but equally vexatious, problems of all the major facets of state
taxation of interstate commerce.
By legislation, Congress should promulgate policy rules, giving a
declaration as to permissive limits of state taxation by means of
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891), and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), sustained congressional consent to state control over

the interstate liquor traffic. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936), and Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R. 299 U.S. 334 (1937), sustained
congressional consent for state control over convict-made goods shipped in
interstate commerce. As early as 1789, Congress enacted a statute which put
pilots for interstate commerce under state law. This statute was sustained in
the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
361. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
362. This case sustained the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945),
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958), which was passed to remove doubts as to the continued operation of state laws after the Supreme Court decided in 1944 that
the business of insurance is interstate commerce, in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
363. "Commerce between the States having grown up like Topsy, the
Congress meanwhile not having undertaken to regulate taxation of it, and
the States having understandably persisted in their efforts to get some return
for the substantial benefits they have afforded to it, there is little wonder
that there has been no end of cases testing out state tax levies." Mr. Justice
Clark speaking for the Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959). (Emphasis added.) "Congress, through
the commerce clause, possesses the . . . power of control of state taxation of
all merchandise moving in interstate or foreign commerce." Chief Justice
Stone speaking for the Court in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652,
679 (1945).
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authorization and prohibition in various areas of state taxation, not
limiting its action to taxation of income. That is to say, Congress
should sweep away the commerce clause barrier in certain areas and
consent to state taxation of certain facets of interstate commerce
where such taxation would not now be permitted; and Congress
should limit other state taxing activities, although they have met
constitutional approval. The latter, of course, is what Congress has
undertaken in its recent efforts, upsetting the Northwestern-Stockham
doctrine.
Among other things, Congress should take steps to try to insure
fairer tax treatment between interstate and local business. The recent
congressional enactment does not do that. In enacting this statute,
Congress has permitted the feared costs of compliance with the tax
laws of the various states where sales were made, which Northwestern-Stockham was thought to have spawned, to outweigh the revenue
needs of the states even as to net income taxes. It may be that this
was a proper balancing between the national needs for commercial
freedom and the local needs for revenue. However, it may have
created as many problems as it solved.364 It is felt that Congress
might well give considerably more attention in this and other areas
to try to insure more nearly equal tax treatment between local and
interstate business. There are-areas where it is believed that interstate business has received too much freedom from state taxation,
although the forbidden tax was nondiscriminatory and fairly apportioned to business done within the state, so that the taxed interstate
business would not have been subject to multiple tax burdens not
borne by local business. 365 Of course, it would be practically impossible for Congress or the states, taxwise, to insure competitive equality
of similar goods in the same market. Tax burdens will vary from
state to state and from product to product. Thus, tax costs incurred
in the production of goods will vary greatly, depending upon the
tax structures of the particular states. Hence, if a heavier tax burden
happens in some instances to fall on interstate commerce than on
local business, that is attributable to the fact that interstate commerce is subject to more than one taxing jurisdiction. Such inequality
cannot be avoided under our federal system, but it is just as likely
to work to the advantage of interstate commerce as it is to its disadvantage. In any event, interstate business should not be given
364. For a discussion of this congressional legislation, see material beginning
at note 86 supra, and going through note 96 supra.
365. E.g., Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), discussed
earlier, beginning at note 56 supra, and going through note 60 supra. Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), discussed earlier,
beginning at note 304 supra, and continuing through note 305 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 13

a competitive advantage over local business by preferred tax treatment under the aegis of the commerce clause.
Any study which Congress makes should take into account the
formulation of sound fiscal policy. Such a study should envisage the
problems of whether to permit only those state taxes thought desirable from the viewpoint of national economy as a unified process, and
the prohibition, perhaps, of some taxes now sustained by the Court,
but thought undesirable from the standpoint of trade and economics.
That is to say, Congress should try to arrive at some sort of value
judgment whether or not the national interest is outweighed by the
local needs for revenue of particular kinds of state taxes. Thus, any
tax which would bear more heavily upon interstate business than
upon local business-which in effect discriminates-should be prohibited. In this connection, Congress should consider whether to
prohibit certain flat fee license taxes which are invariant with the
volume of business done, and many of which are thought to be aimed
at suppressing out-of-state business.3 66
In the step which Congress has already taken to limit the taxing
power of the states, Congress has given much consideration to the
cost of compliance with the tax laws by the taxpayer. 367 Along this
same line, Congress might consider the wisdom of insulating interstate transactions from tax levies by political subdivisions of a state.
Especially the smaller, distant interstate competitor undoubtedly is
at a disadvantage in keeping informed as to the tax laws of political
subdivisions of a state, particularly so since there is but little uniformity in regard to municipal taxes.
One important area in which Congress should soon undertake to
improve the tax climate for interstate business lies in the area of
allocation and apportionment of income for tax purposes. Already
we have seen that because of the divergent apportionment formulas
found in the various state tax statutes, along with the varying definitions of factors in superficially identical formulas, an interstate business may be forced to pay a tax on more than 100% of its net income,
or it may escape much taxation. 368 Congress should undertake to
bring some degree of uniformity to state taxation of income from
multistate business, so that a corporation will pay its fair share of tax
but on no more than 100% of its income. There is but little hope of
366. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, (1940);
see Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce
Clause to Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740, 780-84 (1953).
367. See Senate Select Committee on Small Business, State Taxation on
Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For a

discussion of this concern of Congress, see materials beginning at note 84

supra, and going through note 86 supra.
368. See discussion beginning with note 121 supra, and going through note
203 supra.
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achieving any sort of uniformity through state action alone. The
present lack of uniformity in state tax structures is, by and large,
attributable to variations inherent in conditions of the states. Each
state has a different combination of natural resources and industry
and has constructed its taxing structure in the light of such circumstances. With the states hard pressed for revenue, each state naturally
may be expected to employ the apportionment and allocation formulas
and techniques that will produce the greatest possible returns.
As we have seen, the outstanding effort, to date, to achieve uniformity in net income taxes was the proposal put forward by the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the form of the
"Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act."369 While it has
been approved by the American Bar Association and the Council of
State Governments, nevertheless it has encountered stiff opposition.
The manufacturing and producing states oppose the "sales" factor
definition of the Uniform Act, which attributes the sale to the "consumer" state, where the goods would come into competition with
locally produced and marketed goods. The manufacturing and producing states want the sales factor allocated to the states of "origin,"
where the goods are produced. Already we have seen the pros and
70
It is
cons of this question and nothing further will be said here.
the
unlikelipurpose
of
demonstrating
mentioned here for the sole
hood of anything constructive being accomplished by way of working
out a uniform apportionment solution by means of state action alone.
Efforts toward state cooperation should be encouraged, but it should
never be forgotten that any sort of useful uniform apportionment
formula inevitably will provide for factors which will be politically
unacceptable somewhere. Even though attempts to bring about uniformity by state cooperation were begun forty years ago, little con371
crete evidence of achievement exists.
Congressional efforts to bring about uniformity in taxation should
not be limited to taxation of net income, but might well extend to
such fields as taxation of gross income and gross receipts, as well as
other taxes.&3 72 Congress should be able to contribute a great deal
by denying to the states power to impose these taxes unless specified
uniform apportionment and allocation formulas for each type of tax
are used.
369. This act is discussed, beginning at note 205 supra, and going through
note 216 supra.
370. Ibid.
371. See Senate Select Committee on Small Business, State Taxation on
Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959).
372. Professor Dowing has lately stated that he would welcome the enactment by Congress of a law exhibiting and built around three major features:
(1) establishment of a substantive rule against state taxation which unreasonably interferes with the national interests in commerce; (2) creation of
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I No detailed recommendations will be made here as to what taxes on
interstate commerce should be permitted and which forbidden by
Congress. This is so for two reasons. First of all, this article is
limited in scope to taxes involving corporate income. In the second
place, a judgment as to the types of taxes that should be permitted
or proscribed can properly be made only after Congress has all the
facts at hand, resulting from competent research and investigation.
The foregoing rather cursory treatment of possible facets of congressional action is simply suggestive of the areas where Congress might
37 3
well take some action.
This approach to the knotty problem of state taxation of interstate
commerce should provide flexibility in the accommodation of the
national interests in commercial freedom and local revenue interests.
At the same time it would preserve the judicial and amplify the
legislative function. From the judicial point of view it would preserve
to the Supreme Court, the function of determining whether the local
tax measures were in harmony with congressional policy. From the
legislative viewpoint, the fullest power of Congress, the representative of all the states, would be guaranteed. In no event could the
Court forestall or obstruct congressional action. If the judicial decision with respect to a particular state tax law was not in harmony
with the congressional policy, Congress could step in and take corrective action.
an administrative agency for effectuating the substantive rule; and (3) postponement of the operative date of the substantive rule for at least six months,
possibly a year. This postponement of the effective date, would cushion the
impact of the rule on the states and other interested parties, and it would
afford the members of the administrative agency a period of grace to inquire
into and reflect upon their assigned task in preparation for the days of hard
decisions ahead.

See Dowling, Introduction-State Taxation of Multistate

Business, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 7-8 (1957).

373. On other occasions the writer has discussed in considerable detail certain legislative history that should be helpful in promulgating congressional
policy. See HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 279-284

(1953); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Appraisal and
Suggested Approach, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233, 265-68.
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Appendix
TYPE OF TAX, RATES, AND REVENUE YIELD, BY STATES
Statutory Provisions

Tax Rate

Total Tax
Revenue
(1957) (a)

Per Cent of
Revenue from Total Tax Revenue
Corporation
Attributable to
Tax
Corporation
(1957) (a)
Tax
(a)

Ala. Code Ann., tit. 51,
Alabama
Direct
Sec. 373424 (1940)
3%
$229,647,000 $3 0.182,000"
13.140
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.,
Alaska
Direct
Sec 5(A)(B)(C) (1949)
_9%
20,974.000
1.065.000
5.1
Ariz. Code Ann.
0
Arizona
Direct
Sec. 43101-199 (1906)
Progressive~
107,029.000
15,061,0000
14.07"
Ark. Stat. Sec. 84-2001Arkansas
Direct
2048(1947)
progressive"
125,260,000
9,777,00D
7.81
Franchise Calif. Rev. & Tax Code
California
& Direct
Sec. 23001-26481(a)(1958)
4%
1.637.187.000
167.339.000
10.2
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Colorado
Direct
Sec. 138-1-1-60
(19S3)
5%
153,255,000
4.399,000
3.5
Conn. Gen. Stat.
Connecticut
Franchise
Sec. 12-213-242
(Supp. 1958)
3%
227.614.000
29.765.000
13.1
Del. Code Ann.. tit. 30.
Delaware
Direct
Sec. 1901-20(Supp. 1958)
5%
D. C. Code Ann.
Dist. of Columbia Franchise
Sec. 47-1551-159S
(1951)
5%
Ga. Code. Ann.
Georgia
Direct
Sec. 92-3001-3317
(1937)
4%
314.513,000
21.850.000
6.9
Idaho Code Ann., Sec.
Idaho
Direct
63-3001-3087
(Supp. 1959)
9.5/o
50,714,000
4,135.000
8.2
Iowa Code Ann.
Kansas
Direct
Sec. 422.32.422.41
(1949)
2%
247.906,000
3,681.000
1.6
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
2.9
4.605,000
158,035.000
3%
(1949)
Sec. 79-3201-3247
Dirqct
Iowa
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Kentucky
Direct
Sec. 141.010-141.990
(1955) Progressive**
201.160.000
17,470,000
8.7
La. Rev. Slat. Ann.
,
8
,
e
7.8*
4/
1
372.927.000
Louisiana
Direct
Sec. 47:21-285(1952)
2 9 2 4 0 00
Md. Ann. Code, art. 81,
19,457,000
7.8
5%
250,637.000
Maryland
Direct
Sec. 279-323(1957)
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 63.
0
Massachusetts
Franchise
Sec. 1-81(1953)
Complex ~
413,95,000
30,449.000
7.4
Franchise
Minn. Stat. Ann.
Minnesota
& Direct
Sec. 290(1945)
6%
292,567,000
21.706,000
7.4
Mo. Ann. Stat.
Missouri
Direct
Sec. 143(1949)
2%
266,152,000
29,284.000*
11.0*
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
Montana
License
Sec. 84-1501-1519 (1947)
0%
52,632,000
2.360,000
4.5
N. J. Stat. Ann.
New Jersey
Franchise
Sec. 54:10(a) (Supp. 1958) Complex***
280,729,000
N. M. Stat. Ann.
Now Mexico
Direct
Sec. 72-15 (1953)
2%
97,114,000
5.187.000"
5 .3*
N. Y. Tax Law
251,284.000
17.4
1,440,454,000
Complex~*
Franchise
Sec. 208-219(1944)
New York
N. C. Gee. Stat.
North Carolina
Direct
Sec. 105-161(1958)
6%
369.779,000
45,582,000
12.3
N. D. Rev. Code Sec.
North Dakota
Direct
57-3801-3857 (1943)
Progressive"e
51,750,000
1,174,000
2.2
Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 68,
Oklahoma
Direct
Sec. 871-918 (1954)
4%
235,720,000
10,457,000
4.4
Franchise Ore. Rev. Stat.
Oregon
& Direct
Sec. 317-318(1957)
6%
.193,98S,000 20,713,000
10.6
Franchise Pa. Slat. 2Ann., tit. 72.
Pennsylvania
& Direct
Sec. 34 0(a-n) (Supp. 1950)
0%
985.222,000 164,059.000
16.6
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann.
Rhode Island
Direct
Sec. 44-11-1--44-11-39 (1956) Complex-*
62.563,000
7,880,000
12.6
S. C. Code Sec. 65-201South Carolina
Direct
65-367 (1952)
5%
184,344,000
17,412,000
9.4
Ilenn.
Code Ann. Sec. 67Tennessee
Franchise
2701-67-2724
(1955)
3.75%
268,896.000
19.647,000
7.3
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-13-1Utah
Franchise
59-13-64(1953)
Complex*
76,746.000
8,224.000
10.7
Vt. Stat. Ann. Sec. 32-5901Vermont
Franchise
5910(1959)
55'o
34,916,000
2.283,000
6.5
Va. Code Ann. Sec. 00-77Virginia
Direct
58-11 (1959)
5%
315,908,000
27,453,000
8.7
Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 71.01Wisconsin
Direct
71.373(1957)
Progressive-e
35,977,000
00,646.000
15.6
TOTAL
$10,070.887,000 $1,078,870.000
Key: (a) These figures derived from-U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE
GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1957(1958).
'-Corporation and individual tax is tabulated together, therefore revenue and percentage columns
do NOT present an accurate picture of the corporation tax.
00-Sea footnote 112.
***-See footnote 113.
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Alabama
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No Provision
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
Sec. S(B) (1949)
Ariz. Code Ann. Sec. 43135(g) (1956)
Ark. Stat.
Sec. 84-2020(1947)

INCOME. BY STATES

x

No Provision

X x

No Provision
No Provision
Colo. Roy. Stat. Ann.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 138-1-28() (1953)
(1958)
Sec. 138-1-28
Colorado
Conn. Gen. Stat.
No Provision
Sec. 12-218(Supp. 1958)
Connecticut
Del. Code Ann., tit. 30,
Del. Code Ann., tit. 30.
Sec. 1903(c) (Supp. 1958)
Sec. 1903(b)(Supp. 195)
Dela'
06. C. income & Franchise Tan D. C. Incorne & Franckise Tax
Law Sec. 10.2(c)(4) (1956)
(1986)
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Sec.
Law
Columbia
of
Dist.
Ga. Code Ann.
Provision
No
19 )
Sec. 2-314 (
Georia
8.63
IdahoCodaAnn.
Se. 63
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IdahoCod
(Supp. 195)
3027(d)
3027(a) (Supp. 1959)
Idaho
IowaCode Ann.
No Provision
Sec. 422.33 (1949)
Iowa
Stat. Ann.
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Stat. Ann.
Kan. n.
Sec. 79-3217 (1949)
Sec. 79-3218 (Supp. 1957)
Kansas
Ky. RA. Stat. Ann.
Ky. RA. Stat. Ann.
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Sec. 141.120(4)
Sec. 14103 (L21 13958)
Kentucky
La.Roy. Sta.Ann.
La.Ray. Stt AnM.
Sec. 47:244 (Supp. 1958)
Sec. 47:24 (Supp. 195)
Louisiana
Md. Ann. Code, art. 81,
Nd. A. Code, art. 81,
)
Sec. 316(b) (1957)
Sec. 316(a) (1957)
Maryland
Mlass.Ann. Laws c. 63,
No Provision
Sec. 38 (1953)
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey t
Now Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
isyovania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

No Provision (Sc.
N. J. Star Ann. Sec.
e:.7A-(d) (Supp. 1958)
N. M. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 72-15-32 (193)
N. .Tax Law
Sec. 210 (1944)
Stat.
. S. Ann.
Sec. 105-134 (1958)
N. C. C aCode
Sec. 57-3812 (1943)
Okla. Sta . Ann., tit. 68,
Sec. 878 (195)
Ore. Ray. Star.
No
Provision
31.31.
72S
Pa. Stat. Ann.,
Sec. 3420 (Supp. 1958)
No Provision
S. C. Code Sec. 65-279.3
(Supp. 1958)

Minn. Stat. Ann.
)
S2.12290.20 (Supp.19
Sec.
M. Ann. Staw.
Sec. 143.080 (1949)
S An.
Mont. R.
(SUpp 19
08-13
N. J. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 54:10A-8 (Supp. 1n)
N M. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 72-15-32 (1953)
N. Y. Tax Law
Sec. 210 (1944)
N.C. Gen. Sta.
Se . 105-134 (1958)
N.D.
6
S Roy.
57-314 (1943)
kla. Slat. Ann., fit. 68,
Sc. 878(h) (i954)
Or. Rev tat.
Sec.
(1959)
Wit.
No Provision
-No Provision
S. C. Coda Soc. 65279.14 (Supp. 1958)

Tennessee

No Provision

No Provision

Utah

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 5913-200I) (Supp. 1959)

No Provision

Vermont

No Provision

-'No Provision

Virgjinia
Wisconsin

No Provision
WsStrAn.Wis.
Sec. 71.7I

Va.Code Ann. I;•
1.1199
Sc. _813
nn
Sta.

='
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SEPARATEACCOUNTING
ALLOWED
Ala. Inc. Tax Reg.
Sec. 398.2(a) (1959)
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
Sec. S(c) (1949)
Ariz. Code Ann.
Sec. 43-135(g) (1956)
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Minn. Sta. Ann.
(193)
Sec.
Stat
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